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Foreword 
The global economic crisis has put an end to a period of six consecutive years of growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, growth on a scale that had not been seen for decades. This crisis is 
different from those which had been seen in the past, not only because its origin is different but also 
because, as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has reported 
on several occasions, the region is much better prepared to deal with it. The favourable international 
environment which had been enjoyed by most of the countries of the region in recent years went hand 
in hand with clear progress in the design and management of macroeconomic policy, so that the 
countries were able to go through the boom period with twin surpluses on the public and external 
accounts. This made possible a generalized reduction in levels of debt and, at the same time, a build-
up in international reserves. 
Nonetheless, in no way can the region be considered immune to this crisis; among other 
things, it is affected by falling external demand and export prices, difficult access to the financial 
system, capital outflows and high levels of uncertainty. In such situations, public policies have a dual 
responsibility: to stabilize the countries' economic growth by means of countercyclical measures, and 
to design instruments to protect the most vulnerable sectors of the population from negative 
distributive impacts. 
It should be borne in mind that one of the major lessons of the previous crises is that recovering 
from the resulting levels of poverty takes much longer, practically twice as long, as the recovery of 
economic indicators. Analysis of the region's per capita GDP trend in the major recessionary cycle of the 
1980s shows that it took some 14 years to return to the pre-crisis level. However, the region took 25 
years to fall to the pre-crisis poverty level, of about 40% of the population. 
The challenge for fiscal policy is dual, considering that the greatest demand for spending 
occurs at a time when fiscal resources are expected to decrease as a result of falling commodity prices 
and levels of activity, at a time when access to credit is reduced. This demonstrates the vital 
importance of the discussion of public policy contained in this document. 
Chapter I, Crisis and public policies in Latin America, examines the impact of the 
international crisis on the economies of Latin America, focusing mainly on how the crisis spread 
throughout the region. As highlighted in the chapter, the period characterized by the region's fastest 
economic growth in four decades was interrupted by a global crisis which reached practically all 
economies in the developed and developing world alike, and suddenly put the brakes on an 
extraordinarily intense and widespread economic expansion. 
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This crisis, which found the region much better prepared than it had been in the past, clearly 
originated in the developed countries and from there spread to the periphery, in particular to Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Around two years after the onset of the financial turmoil, the nature of the 
impact on the countries of the region and their capacity to respond have clearly been very different 
from what was observed during the recurring episodes from the 1980s debt crisis to the early 2000s.  
The first chapter highlights a changing macroeconomic trend in the region from 2002 to 2008. 
Unlike previous booms, it encouraged savings, which in turn translated into reduced dependence on 
external financial resources and, in many cases, decreases in the absolute value of debt obligations 
with the rest of the world.  
Despite the clear differences between this crisis and others, the region will not escape 
unscathed. GDP is expected to decrease and unemployment will rise, probably accompanied by 
increasing informality. Unlike the situation in 2003-2008, this combination of events will likely lead 
to increased poverty and the emergence of new impediments to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
In the area of public finances, increased solvency was expressed as a decrease in total non-
financial public sector debt as a percentage of GDP. In many cases this was thanks to increases in 
fiscal revenue and economic growth as well as public debt reduction. In addition, improvements were 
seen in public debt management in terms of currency, rates and terms. One cause for concern, 
however, is the significant narrowing of macroeconomic and fiscal space caused by weakening 
average fiscal balances in the region. 
The chapter entitled Crisis, volatility and fiscal policy in Latin America looks at the 
relationship between macroeconomic fluctuations and fiscal policy in order to identify structural and 
behavioural trends relevant to the design of fiscal stabilization policies.  
As the authors state, there was initial speculation that the region might be able to remain 
detached from the downturn in the United States and Europe. Today, however, no one doubts that the 
governments of the region will face serious macroeconomic challenges. This applies both to fiscal 
policy in general and to its stabilizing role in particular. It is only natural, therefore, that many in Latin 
America are anxious to identify effective initiatives to lessen the macroeconomic effects of the crisis, 
which are referred to in the document as exogenous trade shocks and sudden stops in capital flows. 
Although for the moment the situation seems better than in other episodes of contagion, there is no 
room for optimism because the contraction which has occurred has been sufficient to induce strong 
recessionary forces. 
The final chapter, The role of tax policy in the context of the global crisis: limits and 
possibilities, discusses how the effects of the international crisis on tax revenues in the region will 
differ from one country to another, explaining that the extent of the fiscal impact on each one will 
depend not only on its economic characteristics, but also on its tax system, in particular its tax 
structure, level of collection and sources of financing. 
To that end, the authors analyze taxation issues and their interaction with the current 
economic situation. First, they present an analysis of the main stylized facts which arise out of the 
evolution of fiscal and tax policy in recent years. Second, they consider the possible repercussions of 
the crisis in this situation and the level of exposure of each country in the region. They then examine 
the main fiscal and taxation measures adopted by governments, and the political-economy issues 
which may influence the implementation of reforms in response to the crisis. Lastly, they put forward 
some ideas on the paths the countries should follow in the coming years.  
In sum, this publication draws attention to the fact that the fiscal space achieved in recent 
years may continue to contract if the worldwide situation fails to improve. This would make it harder 
for public-policy decision-makers to choose between preserving the sustainability of public debt and 
alleviating the financial and social effects of the crisis; between protecting liquidity in the payment 
system and maintaining international reserves and controlling inflation; between shoring up 
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macroeconomic stability and supporting specific sectors to prevent politically sensitive sectoral and 
social conflicts; and between subsidizing at-risk sectors and resorting to protectionism. 
Beyond the current situation, as this document points out, the crisis offers an opportunity to 
analyze the characteristics of macroeconomic policies which could bring about a sustained growth 
trend and limit the vulnerability of the region's economies to disturbances, whether of internal or 
external origin. The region has made progress in this respect, but much remains to be done, and the 
need to take advantage of favourable situations to accumulate resources with a view to financing 
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Chapter I. Crisis and public policies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
Osvaldo Kacef1 
1. Introduction2 
The global economic crisis marked the end of the longest, most intense phase of economic growth in 
the region in more than 40 years. The growth took place against a backdrop of global economic 
expansion, which was particularly strong from 2003 to mid-2007, when problems in the subprime 
mortgage market in the United States spread to other markets and regions. The crisis impacted the 
financial systems worldwide and had important effects on markets for goods and labor, especially 
since September 2008. The ensuing global upheaval has been so severe that it has been compared to 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
In Latin America, this crisis is unquestionably different from previous downturns: in part, 
because its origin was different, in that it first broke out in developed countries and from there spread 
to emerging economies; but especially because this crisis finds the region much better prepared than it 
once was. Today, about two years after the financial turmoil began, it is clear that the impact on the 
region’s countries and their capacity to react as not the same as they were in the recurring episodes 
between the debt crisis of the 1980s and the beginning of this decade. Thus far, the region has not 
been shaken by runs on its currencies or debt crises; indeed, the countries of the region enjoy a degree 
of manoeuvring room that has made it possible —albeit to substantially different extents— to 
implement policies to counter the impact of the crisis.  
Nevertheless, despite the clear differences from previous ones, this crisis will not leave the 
region unscathed. GDP and employment are expected to decline, probably accompanied by growing 
informality. The combination of these factors makes it likely that, unlike from 2003 to 2008, poverty 
will increase and new obstacles will hamper the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals.  
                                                        
1
 Director of the Economic Development Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
2
 The author is grateful to José María Fanelli, Daniel Heymann and José Luis Machinea for their comments on previous versions of 
this article. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Economic Development Division of ECLAC for their assistance with 
and comments on the Economic Survey 2008-2009, on which this article is based.  
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The next section of this chapter briefly reviews some recent trends in the global economy. 
The third section analyzes how the crisis has manifested itself in the region. The fourth section 
considers the macroeconomic context in which anti-crisis policies have been adopted and assesses the 
measures announced by the countries of the region. The final section examines the short-term 
prospects and broaches issues whose importance transcends the current situation. 
2. The global economy 
The region is facing a crisis whose depth and scope are comparable solely to that of the 1930s. 
Moreover, both episodes have several points in common: both crises began in the United States 
financial system and from there spread outward to other countries and sectors; both started when a 
bubble of asset prices burst; and both led to insolvency problems in the financial system. However, 
this time the financial system is much larger, the financial entities are far more closely interconnected 
at the international level, and the opacity of the financial system had reached unprecedented levels. 
Also, however, the economic policy response came more quickly and was more accurately 
targeted. The crisis of the 1930s had shown the need to contain financial crises as soon as possible and 
to implement expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in order to prevent a possible depression. This 
is what the countries have been doing in general since 2008, notwithstanding the great differences 
resulting from their varying capacities and the particularities in each case. 
Another major difference from the events of the 1930s is that there are now a number of 
international coordinating institutions on the regional and multilateral levels, many of them set up 
following the Great Depression and the Second World War, and others more recently, like the Group of 
Twenty (G20).3 Despite their limitations, these institutions have some capacity to strengthen the policies 
that countries implement individually to prevent, or at least restrict, the predatory trade or exchange-rate 
policies that can harm international trade —which has already been quite badly hit by the crisis.  
Although it is hard to forecast the depth and duration of the current global recession, it might 
turn out to be merely an economic contraction that, however abrupt and severe, will not be as 
damaging for the world economy overall as was the Great Depression in terms of unemployment, 
breaches of contract and the destruction or prolonged underutilization of productive resources4. 
The financial crisis rapidly impacted real variables and its effects spread around the world, 
owing mainly to four factors5: 
• The credit squeeze caused by the fragility of the financial system, which led banks to 
demand more liquidity, given their uncertainty over the renewal of their liabilities and their 
need to rebuild their capital as well as doubts on the solvency of potential borrowers; 
• The destruction of wealth, both financial and non-financial, caused by losses of value in 
real-estate property and in equity and other assets; 
• Worsening expectations regarding economic activity, affecting households’ consumption 
decisions and businesses’ investment decisions; and  
                                                        
3
 The author thanks José María Fanelli for drawing his attention to this point.  
4
 Krugman (2009) compares the seasonally adjusted monthly evolution of industrial GDP in the United States in the 1930s with that 
in the current crisis, which he shows to be lower. By contrast, Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) argue that the similarity between 
the current situation and the early stages of the Great Depression is greater for economies that have contracted even more sharply 
than has that of the United States. Indeed, the trend seen in industrial GDP is very similar in the early months of both crises. 
However, if the contraction is coming to an end —as appears may be case— the cumulative decline this time around would be 
much smaller than in the 1930s.  
5
 For an analysis of the global crisis from a Latin American perspective, see Machinea (2009) and Lopes (2008).  
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• The decline in global trade, which stood at a cumulative 21% in volume and 38% in value 
between July 2008 and January 2009, although it seems to have eased up in recent 
months (see figure I.1). 
 
FIGURE I.1 
INDEX OF WORLD EXPORT VOLUME  













Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
 
Projections agree that as a result of this combination of factors global GDP will shrink, basically 
owing to declining GDP in the developed economies (see figure I.2). In the United States, GDP is 
expected to fall by close to 3% in 2009, while in Europe and, especially, Japan, it is expected to fall even 
more sharply. In emerging and developing countries overall, GDP variation is expected to be positive, 
although much less so than in recent years. Expectations for continued growth in this group are largely 
based on the outlook for the Chinese economy. Other economies in Asia and Africa are also expected to 
expand, but they are all expected to do so at much lower rates than in recent years. In every case, 
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FIGURE I.2 





















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the 
 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
3. Channels of transmission of the crisis 
One feature that sets this crisis apart from previous episodes concerns the channels through which it 
has been transmitted to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean. Unlike in similar, previous 
episodes, the strongest impacts have come through the real economy. As discussed below, export 
volume and prices, remittances and other elements directly related to economic activity, combined 
with the deterioration in consumer and producer expectations, have been the factors behind the abrupt 
cessation of growth in the region in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
An analysis of the recent turbulence in the region shows that in only three of the 14 countries 
in question (Brazil, Chile and Peru) is there evidence of a sudden stop in capital flows associated with 
the crisis6. As shown in figure I.3, these are the three countries of the region with the largest relative 
net debtor positions7. In seven cases (Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru), the data appear to point to a trade shock caused by a much greater fall in 
exports than would have occurred in the usual movement. However, these shocks are to a certain 
                                                        
6
 Two methodologies were employed to estimate these effects. The first focused on the reversals that the Latin American countries’ 
exports have experienced as a consequence of changes in global demand. This exercise looked at the deviation of the detrended 
export series from its long-term trend, calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A reversal of trade was defined as any 
reduction in exports of more than one and a half standard deviations.  
 The second method was employed for episodes in which capital flows dropped sharply. This series comprises the detrended 
investment flows obtained from the difference between accumulated reserves and the basic balance. A drop in capital flows is 
defined as an episode in which these flows fall more than one and a half standard deviations below the average for the period.  
7
  The statement that these countries have a net debtor position with the rest of the world does not imply a negative value judgement 
on their financial systems. Indeed, this debtor position may be due to their having more developed markets and requiring larger 
scale operations, which makes it necessary for entities within them to resort to the global financial markets. In addition, it should 
be noted that Chile shows a reversal of capital flows when public sector flows are discounted from the analysis. In the case of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a reversal in the balance-of-payments capital account is apparent in the first quarter of 2009, 
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extent linked to changes in the prices of commodities and hence cannot be completely dissociated —in 
terms of either their origin or their impact— from a financial-type shock. 
3.a. The financial channel 
The fact that Latin American countries in recent years have reduced their levels of indebtedness, in 
some cases renegotiating loans with improved maturities or interest rates, while simultaneously 
building up their international reserves, helps to explain why the region has not, unlike on other 
occasions, faced a financial crisis. 
Because the region’s financial systems have relatively low external exposure, the domestic 
credit supply is not as sensitive as it might be to external conditions, especially in comparison with the 
credit supply in the emerging economies of Asia and Eastern Europe (see figure I.3)8. 
 
FIGURE I.3 
NET EXTERNAL POSITION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, DECEMBER 2008  




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
a
  Does not include the Russian Federation 
b
  Does not include China  
 
It was in the last quarter of 2008 that countries encountered the greatest difficulties in 
obtaining external bank credit. In response, as discussed in the next section, the central banks of 
several countries of the region took steps to guarantee the availability of liquidity in both local 
currency and foreign exchange in order to support their banks. To the same end, the United States 
Federal Reserve entered into agreements with the central banks of Brazil and Mexico9. Placements of 
sovereign and corporate bonds in global markets completely dried up in the countries of the region 
during the phase in which risk premiums rose (as shown in figure I.4). 
 
                                                        
8
 This figure shows the net external positions (assets minus liabilities) of banks located in the country and that report to the Bank 
for International Settlements. 
9
 See ECLAC (2009b). 
0.9
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Uruguay
Bolivia (Plur. State of)
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Honduras
















Developing Asia-Pacif ic /b
Chile
Developing Europe /a
ECLAC – Project Documents collection Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives 
14 
FIGURE I.4  
SOVEREIGN AND CORPORATE BOND ISSUES IN GLOBAL MARKETS  



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
 
This set of factors has had a strong impact on international reserves, which fell back after 
reaching a historic record of some US$ 500 billion in September 2008. Subsequently and in the first four 
months of 2009, reserves in the region declined by approximately 9%, or US$ 48 billion (see figure I.5).  
 
FIGURE I.5  
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES VARIATION, SEPTEMBER 2008 TO APRIL 2009  














Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
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In the first few months of 2009, the conditions under which the financial markets operate began 
to gradually change. The programmes implemented in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Europe 
bolstered the expectation that, apart from isolated bankruptcies, all possible steps would be taken to 
prevent the failure of institutions which were of systemic importance. At the same time, monetary policy 
in several developed countries sought to restore liquidity by cutting interest rates to close to zero, as well 
as to restore the flow of credit by offering certain guarantees on interbank lending. 
In the first quarter of the year, the perception of risk surrounding emerging countries began to 
wane, although it remained higher than in the preceding three years10. The region once again gained 
access to international capital markets, and issuance of sovereign and corporate bonds resumed (see 
figure I.4). Pressure on the foreign-currency markets eased, resulting in a certain appreciation. In turn, 
share prices began to recover, and in several countries of Latin America, the stock-market gains 
largely reversed the losses seen at the height of the crisis.  
3.b. The real economy  
The impact has been felt more strongly through the channel of trade. Volumes of goods and services 
exports fell sharply in real terms: by nearly 15% year-on-year in the first semester of 2009 (see figure 
I.7). The global recession and the drop in global trade hurt commodity prices, which plummeted from 
the highs reached in the first half of 2008. The partial reversal of this pattern in recent months has not 
made up for the falls experienced in late 2008 and early 200911. 
According to estimates, the terms of trade could worsen by as much as 11% for Latin 
America in 2009, after having improved by 37% between the mid-1990s and 2008. For South America 
and the countries of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the terms of trade are expected 
to decline by 15.7% and 5.9%, respectively, compared with an improvement of 58% and 19% during 
the boom period. The countries most affected will be exporters of metals and of petroleum and energy, 
whose terms of trade will fall by 20.6% and 28.3%, respectively, having posted cumulative gains 
between the mid-1990s and 2008 of 67% and 160%. The terms of trade of Mexico are expected to 
worsen by 5% in 2009, compared with a 23% improvement in the previous period. By contrast, the 
terms of trade for Central America are expected to improve by 4%, only partially offsetting the 
cumulative 18% decline in the previous period.  
                                                        
10
  Even at the worst point of the crisis (September-October 2008), the jump in risk premiums implicit in sovereign debt yields was 
smaller than during other crises.  
11
 Nor is there any certainty on the duration of these price hikes. 
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FIGURE I.6  















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
 
Some countries, especially Mexico and the countries of Central America, will feel the 
additional impact of lower services exports due to falling tourism revenues, which in many cases have 
been further eroded by the outbreak of the A(H1N1) virus.  
In addition to the international repercussions that the crisis in the United States has had across 
financial markets and on external trade, other factors, albeit harder to quantify, have also come into 
play, such as the destruction of wealth resulting from falling asset values (in finance and real estate) 
and the impact of worsening household and business expectations on the demand for goods and 
services. These factors are particularly significant in countries with larger domestic markets that 
influence economic activity more heavily and they have translated into lower investment and sharp 
drop in private consumption. Growth in public consumption, on the other hand, has picked up, which 
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FIGURE I.7 




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Chile, July 2009.  
 
In some countries, private consumption has also been eroded by a dip in migrants’ 
remittances, which began in the third quarter of 2008 and became more severe in the first quarter of 
2009. Partial data available for the second quarter of 2009 show an even sharper contraction, of 
between 13% and 19%, in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Mexico. 
 
FIGURE I.8  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (8 COUNTRIES) YEAR-ON-YEAR VARIATIONS IN 




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
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The fall in investment, meanwhile, is partially explained by smaller inflows of FDI, estimated 
at between 35% and 45% for 200912. This effect has been particularly apparent in Central American 
countries in which FDI flows represent a high proportion of GDP, even though they are not among the 
largest recipient countries.  
4. Macroeconomic space and policies to deal with the crisis  
Macroeconomic behaviour has changed in the region in recent years, although in different ways from 
one country to the next. Unlike in previous booms, countries encouraged higher savings rates in the 
most recent growth period. This has reduced their dependence on external financial resources and, in 
many cases, translated into a reduction in governments’ external liabilities that has more than offset 
the private sector’s greater reliance on international credit.  
The decline seen in recent years in total non-financial public sector debt —expressed as a 
percentage of GDP— was produced by higher public revenue and economic growth, as well as changes 
in some relative prices13. In several countries the composition of public debt changed considerably, with 
a higher prevalence of longer-term and fixed-interest debt and a larger share of debt held by residents 
and denominated in local currency. These changes reduced the vulnerability to exchange rate 
fluctuations of governments that depend mainly on domestic economic activity for their revenue.  
 
FIGURE I.9  
LATIN AMERICA: NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT  











Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
 
The region’s external position was also bolstered by the accumulation of significant 
international reserves. In the wake of episodes such as the Asian crisis, various developing countries 
                                                        
12
  See ECLAC (2009c).  
13
  Public sector finances in Honduras, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia were also strengthened by the Heavily 
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had decided to build up their external assets, which reduced their need to borrow in the event of 
liquidity constraints. This type of self-insurance reflected the decision to pay a price —equivalent to 
the opportunity cost of the external resources accumulated— in recognition of the procyclical nature 
of the international credit supply and out of a desire to avoid the conditionalities associated with 
multilateral agency financing. The countries of Latin America were no exception to this global trend 
and they raised their international reserves significantly, especially when export prices began to climb. 
From 2002 onwards, the accumulation of net reserves accelerated, and in late 2008, when the crisis 
became more acute, those reserves were at historic highs and far above the levels seen during previous 
crises, both in absolute terms and in proportion to import volumes (see figure I.10)14. 
 
FIGURE I.10  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES  



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
 
Despite projections of smaller inflows of hard currency in both the current account and the 
capital account of the balance-of-payments, the countries of Latin America are not expected to face 
difficulties in meeting their external obligations in 2009. The sum of the foreign currency required to 
cover the projected basic balance (balance of the current account plus the balance of direct 
investments) and estimated external obligations that fall due in 2009 is fully in line with the available 
external assets of the countries of the region, even if only a very small portion of the external 
obligations can be refinanced (see figure I.11).  
 
                                                        
14
 The efforts of the countries of the region would appear even larger if calculations of international reserves included the sums 
saved by a number of countries in sovereign funds, fed by fiscal surpluses. This has, naturally, implied a substantial sacrifice in 
terms of the opportunity cost of resources that the countries of the region and emerging economies in general have had to incur to 
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FIGURE I.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (13 COUNTRIES): ESTIMATES OF BASIC BALANCE, 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND EXTERNAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS FOR 2009 




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
a
  Preliminary estimate; includes short- and long-term debt payments  
b
  Positive values indicate a basic-balance deficit  
 
The stronger footing of the countries of the region not only distinguishes the current financial 
difficulties from those they have faced in previous, similar episodes of crisis, but it also has created 
additional space to implement public policies. Nevertheless, the recent repercussions of the crisis have 
narrowed the macroeconomic space for implementing policies to spur domestic demand, and have 
underscored that choices must be made regarding instruments and resources available to governments 
for fulfilling competing objectives15. 
Figure I.12 shows the parallel trends of two elements that, from the perspective of capital 
flows, are fundamental for delineating the boundaries of economic policy: the current account balance 
and the public sector’s financial balance. The bonanza period, from mid-2003 to at least 2007, 
witnessed a parallel improvement in both balances. This allowed Latin America, on average, to post 
twin surpluses for the first time, in 2006 and 2007. 
Nevertheless, given that much of the improvement in the fiscal situation in recent years was 
due to steadily rising commodity prices from 2002 until the first half of 2008, a deterioration in those 
prices, although somewhat mitigated recently, places significant constraints on the fiscal space gained. 
According to projections made by ECLAC, fiscal resources in 2009 will fall by the equivalent of 5.6 
percentage points of GDP in countries with a high degree of specialization in producing and exporting 
commodities, and in which revenue stemming from such activities account for more than 30% of all 
tax receipts. By contrast, revenue is expected to fall by some 1.7 percentage points of GDP in 
countries with an average degree of specialization in commodities. For other countries, revenue is 
expected to fall by 0.5% of GDP, owing to slumping economic activity.  
The total effect for Latin America and the Caribbean is a dip in receipts equivalent to 1.8% of 
GDP (simple average), which means the region would shift from an average overall surplus of 0.3% of 
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GDP to a overall deficit of around 2.7% of GDP in 200916. This outcome will depend heavily on the 
extent to which the countries implement the spending increases announced to mitigate the effects of 
the crisis.  
Something similar occurred with the balance-of-payments current account, which posted 
increasingly large surpluses between 2003 and 2006, as a result both of improved terms of trade and 
higher export volumes and remittance income. In 2007, the positive balance contracted, primarily 
because of slower export growth, and in 2008 the region finished the year with a current account 
deficit equivalent to 0.6% of GDP, marking the end of five consecutive years of surpluses.  
The balance-of-payments current account in Latin America is expected to deteriorate further 
in 2009. A deficit of 2.3% of GDP is projected, mostly because the likely deterioration of the region’s 
terms of trade is expected to sharply worsen the trade balance and cause it to go into deficit. The 
projected decrease in remittances is also expected to contribute to the worsening situation, although to 
a lesser extent. Still, this will be partially offset by a narrowing of the deficit in real services trade and, 
in particular, the smaller deficit in the income balance in keeping with expectations of reduced profit 
remittances by foreign companies operating in the region.  
 
FIGURE I.12  
LATIN AMERICA: CURRENT ACCOUNT AND FISCAL BALANCE, 2000-2009  

















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
 
In addition to the constraints that changes in public accounts and external accounts may impose 
on the amount of resources available for countercyclical interventions, the characteristics of the 
economies of the region may place other limits on the efficacy of macroeconomic policy. Specifically, 
irrespective of the importance of maintaining liquidity levels that allow financial systems to operate 
smoothly, the effectiveness of monetary policies in countries with low levels of monetization and 
financial depth may prove to be limited. Highly uncertain situations may hamper the mechanisms by 
which expansionary monetary measures increase the credit supply and those by which an increase in the 
credit supply leads to an effective use of available financing to boost the demand for goods. 
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In crisis situations, when credit markets tend to become segmented, fiscal policy may play a 
key role in maintaining aggregate spending levels17. Nevertheless, the countries of the region often 
face institutional constraints and limitations on the public sector’s capacity to implement policy. This 
restricts the manoeuvring room for using fiscal policy flexibly for macroeconomic stabilization. In 
particular, although tax cuts can easily be implemented, their impact may be limited in countries in 
which taxation is low to begin with. Furthermore, in conditions of uncertainty, increases in disposable 
income do not necessarily spur demand, especially if the beneficiaries of tax cuts belong to the upper 
income groups18. In addition, increases in public spending place greater burdens on institutions and 
public administrations. Increasing public investment requires time, especially because countries do not 
normally have projects that have been evaluated and are ready to be implemented. Targeted subsidies 
can be highly effective, but not all countries have developed mechanisms to identify and reach the 
potential beneficiaries of social programmes. 
4.a. Monetary and financial policy  
Faced with the changing international outlook in the last four months of 2008, in which credit in the 
developed countries tightened and the inflationary pressures that had prevailed for much of the year 
eased, the region’s central banks took steps to ensure that there was sufficient liquidity for domestic 
financial markets to function19. To this end, the legal reserve was reduced, terms were shortened or 
liquidity absorption operations were reversed and special mechanisms for rediscount or repurchase 
operations were established or broadened. At the same time, central banks held monetary-policy 
interest rates almost unchanged, with the expectation that lower raw-materials prices would lessen 
inflationary pressure. Since the final months of 2008, inflation has tended to decline in most of the 
economies of the region and has remained within the target ranges set by the monetary authorities, at 
least those that set explicit inflation targets. Inflation is expected to continue downward in 2009.  
In early 2009, the central banks of most countries in the region lowered their monetary-policy 
rates, in coordination with their fiscal measures, to spur economic recovery. Still, in some countries, 
rates can be expected to continue to fall, given that they remain high in real terms. The easing of 
inflationary pressure and expectations of a lower rate of increase in prices have made it possible to 
change the orientation of monetary policy20. 
Nevertheless, expansionary monetary policy proved unable to prevent the credit market from 
slackening, especially once the international crisis worsened. Growth in total lending, in real terms, 
continued to slow down in the first quarter of 2009 in Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Starting in the third quarter of 2008, financial and trade shocks led to significant depreciations 
in the currencies of several countries of the region, despite the drawdown of reserves by those 
                                                        
17
 On the effectiveness of fiscal policy for dealing with a financial crisis, see Baldacci, Gupta, and Mulas-Granados (2009). 
18
 Chapter 3 lists the tax measures that could be applied in the countries of the region and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages 
of each one.  
19
 The spike in inflation in 2007 and the first half of 2008 complicated the management of monetary policy and hindered the 
achievement of inflation targets set by the central banks. Inflation remained over-target during this period in Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. Only in Brazil did the inflation rate remain within the target range (which is broader than that of the 
other countries), but there too inflation rose and hovered above the middle of the band. Although the main reason for higher 
inflation was supply shocks associated with food and energy prices, most central banks raised their monetary policy rates in order 
to anchor inflationary expectations. As inflationary pressure eased in the second half of 2008, real interest rates in many cases 
remained very high at the end of the year.  
20
 Examples include the steps taken by the central bank of Brazil, which lowered the basic interest rate of the Special System of 
Clearance and Custody on four occasions between December 2008 and April 2009, with a total reduction from 13.66% to 11.66%, 
and similar measures taken in the same period by the central banks of Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. The central bank of 
Chile slashed its interest rate by seven percentage points, from 8.25% in December 2008 to 1.25% in May 2009, and the central bank 
of Honduras also sharply cut its rate, from 9% to 4.5%, between November 2008 and March 2009. Argentina constitutes an exception 
to this trend, as developments in the currency markets there have limited the central bank’s scope for lowering interest rates.  
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countries’ central banks. The types of interventions varied and included spot-market operations as well 
as currency futures transactions21. 
Although central banks across the region cut interest rates between December 2008 and May 
2009, currencies tended to rise in value in nominal terms, reflecting improving conditions in 
international financial markets. This appreciation was not sufficient to compensate for the 
depreciations of the previous months, however. During this period, auctions of foreign exchange 
gradually declined before ceasing altogether22. 
4.b. Fiscal policy  
The challenge of fiscal policy in the current economic climate lies in applying countercyclical 
measures in a context of lower tax revenues while simultaneously protecting certain expenditures —
on education, social protection and infrastructure— that are vital for avoiding increased poverty and 
for laying the foundations for future growth. Although the governments of the region still have some 
capacity to shore up their economies through fiscal interventions, in practice, the manoeuvring room 
for fiscal policy varies greatly from one country to the next and depends on the savings built up in 
good times, spending rigidities, the duration of the crisis and the scope for prudent borrowing.  
The crisis has placed the public finances of the Latin American economies in a complicated 
situation. On the one hand, fiscal revenues have been substantially curtailed, owing to lower levels of 
activity and falling commodity prices. On the other, the fiscal stimuli countries have implemented and the 
measures they have taken to offset the distributive costs of the crisis will further erode their fiscal balances. 
In addition, the fiscal downturn is taking place, in many cases, amid severely constrained external 
borrowing conditions, and this affects the countries’ ability to apply countercyclical fiscal policies.  
In terms of public finances and fiscal policy, although the region is unquestionably better 
positioned than it was in past crises, some matters related to the public sector’s capacity to weather 
this crisis warrant concern. The dramatic increase in fiscal revenues witnessed in 2002-2008 is closely 
linked to income from natural-resource extraction, which is more volatile than revenue from other 
sources. Indeed, income from exports of natural-resource-intensive products is expected to fall, while 
economic activity is expected to generally decline, within a context of increasing demands to raise 
public spending. The primary balance is thus expected to be virtually negative for the first time in six 
years and to be virtually the largest negative balance in the last two decades (see figure I.13).  
 
                                                        
21
 See Jara, Moreno and Tovar (2009). 
22
 The exception is Argentina, whose currency has gradually depreciated since mid-2008.  
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FIGURE I.13  
LATIN AMERICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME, EXPENDITURES AND PRIMARY BALANCE  




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
 
The effects of the international crisis on fiscal income vary from country to country depending 
upon their tax structure, level of tax collection and other sources of current financing23. The countries 
most exposed to the effects of the crisis will be those with low tax burdens, high percentages of non-tax 
revenue or revenue derived from natural resources and very open markets (particularly if they export 
mainly to developed countries). By contrast, countries with higher tax burdens, larger percentages of 
revenues from income tax and higher value-added-tax productivity should be less exposed. 
The fiscal policy measures taken by the governments in the region are summarized in table 
I.1. On the spending side, 15 countries have announced measures to support their production sectors, 
generally targeting small and medium-sized enterprises or the agriculture sector. The same number of 
countries has plans for infrastructure investment and spending on housing and 14 have included 
housing spending programmes. As regards taxes, eight countries have announced cuts in personal 
income tax, through changes in deductions, lower tax rates or increased exemptions (in two cases the 
cuts are temporary). In addition, nine have cut corporate taxes, through new exemptions, deductions or 
accelerated depreciation schemes (announced as temporary in four cases). An analysis of this type of 
measures, whether from the perspective of spending or income, must take into account the temporary 
or permanent nature of the measures as well as their impact on the sustainability of public finance.  
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 The degree of exposure of each country’s fiscal revenue to different variables is calculated in chapter III, and the countries are 
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TABLE I.1  


























































































































                  
  Corporate income tax, 
reductions/depreciation    T X T X  X  T    X  T  
  Personal income tax cuts X  X T X    X X T  X      
  Taxes on external trade X  T    X    X T       
  Taxes on goods and services   T                
  Social contributions X          T        
  Other   X X X  T        T  X  
Public spending 
                  
  Infrastructure investment X X X X X X X  X X X X  X X X X  
  Housing  X  T X X   X  X X  X X  X  
  Support for SMEs and agricultural 
producers   X X X X  X X X X  X X X  X X 
  Support for strategic sectors  X X X     X      X    
  Direct transfers to households T   T  X        X     
  Other T  X  X   X  X X X       
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
Note:  T: Temporary measures. 
 
With regard to the impact of the measures announced, apart from the differences to be 
expected between initiatives based on tax cuts and those based on public-spending hikes, in Latin 
America and the Caribbean tax incentives and deductions, often referred to as “tax spending”, are 
notoriously difficult to quantify and their impacts difficult to estimate24. 
An assessment of the fiscal cost of anti-crisis measures planned up to 2009 in six of the 
region’s largest countries shows that the results vary considerably from one country to another, as 
shown in figure I.1425. Argentina has intervened the most actively, with measures that entail a cost of 
                                                        
24
 Although the methodologies used to calculate these effects are difficult to compare, the countries of the region draw substantially 
on “tax spending”, which ranges from around 2% of GDP in Argentina, Brazil and Peru to over 5% of GDP in Chile, Guatemala 
and Mexico. This level of tax expenditure has diminished the countries’ tax bases. For a more detailed account of tax spending in 
the region, see Jiménez and Podestá (2009).  
25
 The evaluation included all measures that have been announced and have a fiscal cost Therefore, cost estimates are not limited to 
a particular stimulus plan but also comprise additional expenditure items. The calculation of costs is based on announcements and 
not on actual spending, which can only be assessed subsequently, when information becomes available on the degree of 
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around 6.0% of GDP, of which over 90% is to be allocated to boost spending under public works 
programs. The cost of the package of measures in Brazil is approximately 3.6% of GDP, of which 
85% has been allocated to increase spending and 15% for tax cuts or increased tax benefits. The cost 
of interventions by the governments of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru is estimated at some 2.0%-
2.8% of GDP. In Chile 46% of the overall amount is being channelled into tax cuts and benefits, while 
in Colombia, Mexico and Peru all measures are geared towards increased spending.  
 
FIGURE I.14  
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES) FISCAL COST OF ANTI-CRISIS MEASURES  
PLANNED FOR 2009 a 



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean, 2008-2009a (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, July 2009.  
a 
 GDP 2008 
b 
 The measures are to be implemented in 2009, except for the reduction in stamp duty, which continues into 
 2010. 
c 
 Includes a measure for a period after 2009. 
 
The steep drop in fiscal revenue, together with credit constraints derived from the slow return 
to normalcy in financial markets, considerably restricts the manoeuvring room to finance public 
policies, which raises valid doubts as to some governments’ capacity to finance and carry out the 
spending required by these measures.  
Although a large proportion of the measures were adopted by central governments, many 
have required —or will require— human or financial resources from subnational governments as well 
as coordinated actions among various levels of government. This increases the need for 
intergovernmental coordination and constitutes an additional source of vulnerability in fiscal policy 
during the crisis since, although the finances of subnational governments have improved in recent 
years, this improvement has been attributable not to better tax collection by local and intermediate 
governments, but in large measure to growing transfers from national governments. Total transfers 
grew by two GDP points between 1997 and 2007, while tax receipts for subnational governments rose 
                                                                                                                                                                     
implementation. Furthermore, as the cost estimates are for 2009, in the case of multi-year plans, an estimate of the portion of costs 
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from 2.1% of GDP to 2.7% in the same period. In some cases, subnational public debt remains high 
and accounts for a significant portion of total public debt. 
5. Final considerations  
In mid-2009, there are signs of a slowdown or even a turnaround in the economic slump, with an 
incipient improvement in some economic and financial indicators, even though it remains to be seen 
whether this trend will eventually firm up. The banks’ situation has improved, as indicated by changes 
in the level of risk perceived by the financial market for interbank lending, which, after spiking 
sharply, has gradually returned to pre-crisis levels. 
 
FIGURE I.15  
INTERBANK MARKET INTEREST RATE  














Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from Bloomberg.  
Note:  The TED spread is a measure of the risk that a bank will default and corresponds to the difference between 
 short-term rate on interbank loans and the risk-free rate (three-month Treasury bills). 
 
As to the possibility of rebuilding sources of wealth, there has been a widespread, albeit 
partial, recovery of stock markets in both developed countries and emerging markets, and housing 
prices have stopped falling in the United States. In keeping with these indicators, economic agents’ 
perception of where the crisis is heading appears to be beginning to change. Indicators of consumer 
and business confidence suggest a gradual reversal in the pessimism that has pervaded the most recent 
period, especially since late 2008. This positive development could herald the start of a gradual 
recovery in the second half of 2009, although it will be slow and not without risks.  
Financial markets will take time to return to business as usual and the availability of funds on 
the international markets will remain tight for some time. Deleveraging and slow credit growth will 
continue until banks have addressed their capitalization needs and solved the problems posed by their 
holdings of financial assets of dubious value and non-performing loans. Moreover, the erosion of 
wealth (particularly non-financial wealth) has ceased but has yet to go into reverse, and this is placing 







































































































in the United States
7 September 2008:
announces the take-over of the country’s
 two largest mortgage companies.
   Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
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The slow recovery may well encounter some bumps along the road which could further delay 
an emergence from the crisis. Close attention must be paid to the emerging economies of Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic nations, in which significant disequilibria comparable to, or even worse than, 
those seen in Latin America and the Caribbean in past crises have arisen. Some European banks in 
these countries are exposed enough to warrant concern that a worsening of the situation in Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic nations could set off contagion in Western European economies. In addition, a 
prolonged period of sluggish demand and economic activity at the global level could damage the asset 
positions of large groups of agents badly enough to deal a blow to financial systems.  
It is thus difficult to predict when the crisis will end and what the path to recovery will look 
like. One possibility, provided that the events described in the preceding paragraph do not occur, is 
that domestic demand will slowly recover in the developed countries on the back of a gradual return to 
normalcy in financial markets, an incipient process of recovery in the value of assets that make up the 
wealth of the private sector, particularly in the developed countries, and a change in the expectations 
of economic agents. The decline across the array of available indicators in the financial and real 
sectors alike is already slowing up and even showing some signs of reversing itself as uncertainty 
about the global economy abates, thanks to strong commitments from economic authorities 
(particularly in developed countries but also in the developing world) to implement measures to 
mitigate the effects that the crisis is having on domestic demand.  
External demand fell, and domestic demand slowed, as reflected in both private consumption 
and investment, was expected to drop in Latin America in late 2008 and the first part of 2009, owing 
to declining national income (caused, in turn, by falling raw materials prices), rising unemployment 
and tighter credit, all exacerbated by lower expectations.  
In mid-2009, however, the slowdown in international trade appeared to abate, commodity 
prices began to recover, access to credit improved and indicators began to point to rising expectations. 
In line with these developments economic activity in the region is expected to begin to recover in the 
second half of the year, and, in fact, the downtrend is already showing signs of easing up in several 
countries. Given the extremely low starting point, this partial upturn will not be sufficient to make up 
for the contractions —or slowdowns— posted in the fourth quarter of 2008 and in the first quarter of 
2009. As a result, annual GDP growth will be negative (-1.9%) for the first time in seven years. The 
slump in economic activity will take a toll on the labour market: unemployment and the rate of 
informal employment may be expected to rise, leading to higher poverty.  
As noted above, a gradual recovery is expected to begin in the second half of 2009 and to 
consolidate in 2010, when the region could return to positive growth, though at rates well below those 
posted in recent years and insufficient to reverse the declining social indicators resulting from the 
economic contraction in 2009. To speed up the economic recovery and raise employment and thus 
help the region to return to the poverty-reduction track it veered away from in 2009, the governments 
will need to increase their counteract the impacts of the crisis through public policy. Increased 
government capacity will depend, however, among other things, on the amount of available resources.  
Given that the macroeconomic space for public policymaking has narrowed, the international 
financial institutions now need to assume an active role in providing resources to finance 
countercyclical policies and measures to offset the impact of the crisis. Thanks to the debt reduction 
and behaviour displayed in recent years, the region is in a position to borrow sustainably, particularly 
from these financial institutions.  
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FIGURE I.16  
LOANS EXTENDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND  














Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the 
 International Monetary Fund.  
 
International financial institutions will be called on to play an even more active role if the recovery 
of the international financial system is delayed and if access to external financing remains precarious. In 
such a situation, a number of countries could have difficulty in meeting their external obligations.  
The manner in which countries are granted financing from international financial institutions 
is also important. At the very least, conditionalities must not be procyclical, as they often were in the 
past. And, importantly, the costs and terms of financing must fit the needs of developing countries. 
Much would also be gained if the institutions were to work together in a coordinated, consistent and 
complementary fashion in order to reinforce the effects of their policies26. 
The resources to augment the lending capacity of the international financial institutions must 
be raised very quickly in order to provide the liquidity necessary to broaden the policy space for 
hastening the recovery of the region’s economies. This will help to prevent, or at least lessen, residual 
economic, social and political impacts that would be very difficult to remedy down the line.  
Beyond the current economic context, the crisis provides an opportunity to reflect upon the 
kinds of macroeconomic policies that would best facilitate a sustained growth trend in the wake of the 
turmoil and would limit the vulnerability of the region’s economies to both external and domestic 
shocks. Much has been achieved in this regard in the region, but much more remains to be done. The 
importance of saving resources in favourable times with a view to financing countercyclical policies at 
some future point is perhaps one of the most important lessons to emerge from this crisis27. 
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  Some of these issues are examined in a recent interesting publication of the Inter-American Development Bank (2009).  
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Chapter II. Crisis, volatility and fiscal policy in 
Latin America 
José María Fanelli28 and Juan Pablo Jiménez29 
1. Introduction30 
This paper analyzes the relation between macroeconomic fluctuations and fiscal policy in Latin 
America, in order to identify structural and behavioural factors relevant to formulating fiscal 
stabilization policies (countercyclical and macroeconomic adjustment policies). Empirically, the study 
draws on the experience of the region during the second period of globalization, which began in the 
late 1970s. Analytically, the main point of reference is the literature on countercyclical fiscal policy 
and macroeconomic volatility in Latin America31. Although the present focus goes beyond specific 
situations and circumstances, particular attention will be devoted to evaluating the new demands and 
constraints that are likely to affect fiscal policy as a consequence of the macroeconomic imbalances 
associated with the crisis.  
The negative forces associated with the financial crisis that originated in the developed world 
are being transmitted through all of the channels that connect Latin America with the global economy: 
capital flows, foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances. At the same time, the price and volume 
of exports are declining, risk premiums are rising, access to capital markets is either nonexistent or 
limited, and flows of FDI and remittances are decreasing. As is inevitable in such circumstances, the 
simultaneous effect of these factors, as they move through the various channels, creates substantial 
macroeconomic imbalances. The decline in exports directly depresses aggregate demand and the 
tightening of financial constraints and the decline in FDI affect investment demand and the demand 
for durable consumer goods, while limiting government’s capacity to adopt countercyclical measures. 
                                                        
28
  Researcher, Center for the Study of State and Society (CEDES) and consultant, ECLAC. 
29
  Economic Affairs Officer, Economic Development Division, ECLAC.  
30
  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean forum entitled 
“Fiscal policies in times of crisis: volatility, social cohesion and the political economy of the reforms”. The authors are grateful to 
Ramiro Albrieu and Andrea Podestá for their assistance and to Osvaldo Kacef, Rafael López Monti, Leandro Cabello and the 
participants in the forum for their comments. 
31
  On volatility in the region, see Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007-2008 and the accompanying 
annotated bibliography. On countercyclical fiscal policy, see Bello and Jiménez (2008) and Perry and others (2008).  
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Although remittances vary in importance from one country to another, they represent, for some 
countries, a substantial portion of disposable income, and thus a reduction in their flow can cause a 
drop in domestic demand and weakness in the current account balance. 
Initially there was speculation that the region might be able to remain detached from the 
turbulent events affecting the United States and Europe. Today, however, no one doubts that the 
governments of the region will face serious macroeconomic challenges. This applies to both overall 
fiscal policy and stabilization policy. Although, at the start, the central banks made strenuous efforts to 
inject liquidity into the financial systems to try to ensure the normal functioning of local credit 
markets, the sharp drop in confidence, as well as significant differences in the degree of monetization 
and in the depth of financial markets, have made it necessary to adopt other types of measures. 
Liquidity must be ensured and interest rates kept as low as possible, but liquidity itself does not 
necessarily guarantee greater access to credit, nor does a greater supply of credit guarantee increased 
demand for goods. Although monetary and exchange-rate policies must be part of an orderly and 
coherent set of measures, fiscal policy is the strongest tool in cases such as the present one. In crafting 
solutions, authorities will likely confront additional pressures due to tensions between the different 
policy-making segments of government, as well as between government and specific social and 
productive sectors. In the fiscal realm, the most critical tensions are likely to involve: (i) ensuring the 
sustainability of public debt vs. mitigating the social and financial effects of the global crisis; (ii) 
protecting the liquidity of the financial and payment system through monetary or fiscal supports vs. 
maintaining international reserves and controlling inflation; (iii) ensuring macroeconomic stability vs. 
providing subsidies to specific sectors in order to prevent sectoral and social conflicts with major 
political consequences; and (iv) subsidizing sectors with high exposure to the international crisis vs. 
resorting to protectionism.  
Not surprisingly, intense efforts are underway throughout Latin America to identify effective 
measures to protect the region’s economies from the macroeconomic effects of the crisis. If these are 
successful, imbalances will be minimized and potential conflicts will be averted. Given these 
concerns, it seems useful to consider the experience of the region with regard to countercyclical fiscal 
policy and crisis management. A deeper understanding of the relation between volatility and fiscal 
policy may provide useful guidance in designing policies that take optimal advantage of the existing 
policy space, which is rather limited under the current circumstances. 
The following section will briefly examine the available evidence regarding the regional 
effects of the crisis, so as to assess the magnitude of the present turbulences and determine the types of 
demands and challenges that may be expected to arise concerning countercyclical fiscal and 
macroeconomic adjustment policies. It will be argued that the shocks associated with the international 
crisis are primarily taking the form of trade collapses and sudden stops in capital flows32. It will also 
be argued that the form and intensity of the impacts in each of the region’s economies depend on 
structural factors such as the size of the economy, the volume of capital flows and the country’s trade 
specialization. Section II discusses a number of stylized facts regarding volatility in Latin America, in 
an attempt to understand their implications for fiscal stabilization policy. We will call attention to the 
fact that the meaning of “stabilization” can be ambiguous. One of the functions of fiscal policy, in 
addition to its role in allocation and distribution, is to stabilize the cycle. But the meaning of the word 
can vary greatly depending on whether the situation being described is normal or exceptional. In the 
former case, as we shall see, stabilization involves implementing countercyclical policy, while in the 
latter case it refers to macroeconomic adjustment. This ambiguity has led to failures in both designing 
and coordinating policy. We therefore propose the notion of “policy space” as a means of avoiding 
ambiguities in the characterization of the stabilizing function of fiscal policy (section III). Section IV 
examines the anatomy of two different types of exogenous international shocks: trade collapses and 
sudden stops of capital inflows. We also analyze how these two types of shocks interact with 
countercyclical fiscal policies. The two types of shocks were selected because of their importance 
                                                        
32
  On sudden stops and their effects on macroeconomic dynamics, see Calvo and others (2006). 
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during the second globalization period, and because the available evidence indicates that the effects of 
the current crisis are similar in nature to those that accompany such shocks. The paper focuses on the 
challenges confronting countercyclical fiscal policy, as well as on the problems of policy coordination 
that are associated with these shocks in Latin America. The final section of the paper discusses the 
specific elements of fiscal stabilization policy that should be included in attempting to curb volatility 
in the region and, in the context of the current crisis, delineates the factors that constrain and place 
demands upon fiscal policy with regard to its stabilization function. 
2. Transmission of the crisis to Latin America and the 
associated fiscal policy challenges 
In the five years preceding the current crisis, growth rates in Latin America—as well as in the global 
economy—were high. Growth was particularly strong in countries that export natural resources, as 
their positions were enhanced by major improvements in the terms of trade. Economies that depended 
on energy imports, on the other hand, felt the effects of rising oil prices, although for many countries 
the problem was balanced by increased remittances resulting from the high level of economic activity 
in the United States. Moreover, the growth rate in South America (which is a major exporter of natural 
resources) was greater than in the rest of Latin America. In the five-year period from 2004 to 2008, the 
region’s median annual growth rate was 5.7%. This contrasts significantly with the preceding five 
years (1999-2003), when there were episodes of financial instability and the average growth rate 
barely exceeded 1%. The current crisis puts an end to this positive scenario, and projections for this 
year are for negative growth. 
Initially, the financial channel played a central role in transmitting the crisis to the region, as 
reflected in the quantity of capital inflows, as well as in risk premiums. The margin between the risk-
free rate and the average rates for the region has increased noticeably (approximately 500 basis points, 
as measured by the EMBI) between the trough of early 2007 and the first quarter of 2009. 
Nevertheless, the current level remains far below the peaks reached during the Russian and Argentine 
crises (1,100 basis points and 1,400 basis points, respectively). 
This more moderate risk-premium response is consistent with the fact that Latin America’s 
macroeconomic fundamentals are sounder than they were at other times of international turbulence. In 
early 2008, a number of the region’s largest countries—Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, among others—had twin 
central-government and current-account fiscal surpluses. 
In this context, it is not surprising that the importance of the public debt as a risk factor has 
declined. A number of factors account for this fact: changes in macro variables (the exchange rate and 
the level of economic activity), debt restructuring initiatives, and the recognition of contingent 
liabilities (see figure II.1)33. 
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 Figure II.1 shows the variation in public indebtedness on the basis of the five components that appear in the equation below. The 
first term on the right side of the equation represents the contribution of the primary fiscal balance; the second represents the 
effect of the interest rate; the third represents the contribution of economic growth; the fourth represents the effect of the exchange 


























 For further details on the variation of the debt, and the calculation method used, see Aliaga, Jiménez and Tromben (2009). 
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FIGURE II.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT 

















Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
 Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
Although the generation of fiscal and current account surpluses was the result of country-
specific fiscal and monetary policy decisions, there is no doubt that the sudden stop episodes that 
occurred between 1998 and 2002 were followed by a tendency to accumulate international reserves as 
insurance against these types of shocks. 
Figure II.2, showing net capital flows for Latin America’s seven largest economies, indicates 
that the reversal in net flows occurred before the growth rate dropped34. This suggests that financial 
constraints have played a leading role in the economic slowdown. With the increased uncertainty 
created by the crisis, investors’ emphasis shifted toward high-quality assets, to the detriment of riskier 
ones, including real estate. Thus, the fact that the capital flow reversal coincides with key financial 
events in the United States and Europe, and that the reversal occurred in a context of high growth and 
greater macroeconomic stability in the region, suggests that the event is exogenous to Latin America 
and has the characteristics typical of a contagion-induced sudden stop. The main way in which the 
contagion was transmitted was through a flight to quality and the decisions of investors in developed 
countries, who liquidated their positions in emerging countries. 
 
                                                        
34
  Net capital income is defined as gross capital income minus interest payments. 
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FIGURE II.2 
LATIN AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): NET CAPITAL FLOWS 













Source:  Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
 Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
Trade has also been a very active channel of transmission of the crisis, with the negative trade 
shock being reflected in both price and volume. Figures II.3A and II.3B show the recent changes in export 
volumes and terms of trade. The shock seems to have been somewhat stronger for the region’s small 
countries than for the large ones. The exports of the seven largest countries declined less than those of the 
other countries. The terms of trade plummeted from their peaks of 2007 and 2008, and are now at the same 
level as at the beginning of the above-referenced five-year period—a level that, in any case, could be 
considered relatively satisfactory. Indeed, some products seem to have found a floor, possibly due to the 
increased structural presence of China and India in the international market (Lederman and others, 2006).  
As figure II.3B shows, the growth rate of Latin American export volumes is negative, 
reflecting the sharp downturn in world trade. There is also a danger that protectionism will increase, 
and that the countries most affected by the sudden stop will implement aggressive real depreciations 
of their currencies in order to shore up their foreign trade positions. In fact, as a result of increased 
uncertainty, a number of the region’s large countries have implemented nominal depreciations in 
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FIGURE II.3A  






















Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
 Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
FIGURE II.3B 
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TABLE II.1 
LATIN AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): RECENT CHANGES IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES 
 January 2008 March 2009 Devaluation (%) 
Argentina  3.16 3.66 15.81 
Brazil 1.78 2.33 30.69 
Chile 481.56 603.28 25.28 
Colombia 2,012.42 2,498.02 24.13 
Mexico 10.93 14.71 34.67 
Peru 3.00 3.22 7.43 
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2,148.80 2,152.03 0.15 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of information provided by the Centre of International Studies of the 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina. 
 
An intensification of the trade shock would have major fiscal consequences, on top of those 
already present, for countries in which government revenues are tied to natural resources.  
As noted in chapter I, remittances, tourism and FDI have also been affected by the crisis, but 
the importance of these factors varies significantly from one country to another, with the effect of the 
crisis (as a proportion of GDP) being inversely related to the size of a country’s economy. For 
example, while FDI in 2008 moved within a band of 1% to 3% in the largest countries, it reached 6% 
in Costa Rica, and twice that figure in the Dominican Republic. In the case of tourism, the situation is 
similar, though the differences are less pronounced. In terms of remittances, Mexico is the largest 
recipient in absolute terms, but even as a proportion of income, remittance income in the seven largest 
economies does not, in any instance, come close to what is typical for the Central American and 
Caribbean economies. Therefore, the impact of reduced remittances, in terms of foreign trade balance 
and the level of economic activity, will be much more severe in these latter economies, and will have 
the strongest effect on the purchasing power of low and middle economic strata. In cases where 
governments depreciate their currencies, this effect will be mitigated, but a similar effect will not be 
possible in dollarized economies. Moreover, the impact on the external sectors of small energy-
importing countries has been buffered to some extent by the reduction in oil prices. 
In short, although the shocks act through different channels, the effects of the international 
crisis on national economies are likely to take forms similar to those seen in the case of sudden stops 
and negative trade shocks. Thus, although the effects of the crisis differ from what has been seen in 
past exogenous trade and financial shocks, the resulting imbalances may share a number of features 
typical of such shocks. In particular, there will be distributive tensions and this will most likely affect 
the space available for fiscal policy. 
The demand for fiscal policies to stimulate economic activity is increasing. Governments are 
expected to buffer recessive forces by increasing spending or reducing taxes. Counter-cyclical policies, 
nonetheless, will be difficult to implement in a context of falling revenues. This is why easier access to 
compensatory financing from multilateral and regional institutions would be highly beneficial under the 
current circumstances. The projected sudden downturn in regional growth will have a negative impact on 
employment, poverty, income distribution and financial constraints. ECLAC projects an increase in 
unemployment from 7.5% in 2008 to around 8% in 2009, as well as increased informality. The increase in 
unemployment will have a greater impact on lower income households, while the increase in informal 
employment will reduce the median incomes of informal workers. At the same time, the reduction in 
remittances will affect low- and medium-low income households—this in an environment in which poor 
households have been most severely affected by increased inflation (food prices) during 2008. Moreover, 
the pressures associated with these factors are not yet being fully felt, given the fact that the region had 
enjoyed a period of growth that featured increased employment, declining unemployment, and somewhat 
improved income distribution. 
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The authorities’ initial reaction to the crisis has been to institute countercyclical programmes to 
mitigate the effects of the recession. As ECLAC (2009) shows, the initiatives have favoured spending over 
tax cuts, and social spending over jobs programmes. In the fiscal realm, governments have increased 
spending (investment projects) while lowering taxes or increasing subsidies. Thus, governments have been 
using the space they had gained previously on the basis of a more orderly macroeconomy. 
Nevertheless, the space for fiscal policy might shrink rapidly if the international situation 
does not improve. In crisis situations, where revenues are falling and new priorities emerge, 
previously available policy instruments tend to disappear. During difficult financial periods, ensuring 
the sustainability of the public debt generally takes on special importance, thus competing with the 
goal of stabilizing the economic cycle. The trade-off between stabilizing the debt and stabilizing the 
cycle was very apparent during the most recent period of sudden stops in the region. As may be seen 
in table 2, the ratio between public debt and GDP increased significantly between 1998 and 2002; 
thus, it is not surprising that the most highly indebted countries have opted to generate fiscal and 
current account surpluses; a strategy that proved effective in achieving stabilization and reducing debt 
levels. It is clear that having a lower debt-output ratio helps create manoeuvring room for 
countercyclical policy. 
While it is certainly true that countries that took advantage of good times to lower their debt and 
strengthen their fiscal position will have greater room for implementing counter-cyclical policies, the reality 
is that the current crisis is deep and global in scope, which, ceteris paribus, increases the size of the fiscal 
stimulus needed. In today’s circumstances, the region’s countries cannot rely on the expansionary effect of 
increased export volumes or on an improvement in the terms of trade, which played a major role in 
overcoming the consequences of the period of sudden stops between 1998 and 2002.  
The current situation highlights the importance of redesigning the international financial 
architecture to improve access to financing, thus providing increased room for fiscal policy to operate 
without jeopardising debt sustainability. The agreement among the Group of 20 (G-20) to increase 
availability of funds for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a positive sign. To be effective, 
however, the effort must be specifically directed to increase the space for implementing 
countercyclical fiscal measures. Otherwise, there is a risk that compensatory credits will be used to 
finance capital flight during periods of financial instability, rather than to stabilize economic activity. 
Viewing the problem from this perspective, it becomes clear that it is essential to coordinate the use of 
fiscal instruments with monetary, exchange rate and financial policy.  
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TABLE II.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS PUBLIC DEBT BALANCE OF THE NON-FINANCIAL 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
(Percentages of GDP) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 41.5 39.4 42.6 49.3 53.1 64.8 184.4 156.9 143.3 87.6 76.3 66.7 64.3 
Bolivia (Plur. 
State of) 
65.8 61.0 60.4 64.3 65.8 76.7 80.2 89.5 83.9 78.3 52.6 40.0 35.9 
Brazil 31.9 32.9 39.4 48.5 47.7 50.8 59.6 53.7 49.3 46.7 46.0 46.1 38.7 
Chile 18.3 16.8 17.4 19.0 18.6 20.2 22.1 19.5 16.8 13.0 10.6 9.1 12.1 
Colombia 20.4 23.9 26.1 34.5 39.5 42.9 49.5 46.7 42.4 38.9 36.5 32.6 31.5 
Costa Rica … … … … 41.8 43.2 45.1 45.6 46.9 43.0 38.4 31.9 29.8 
Ecuador 64.4 56.6 62.5 94.0 81.7 62.7 54.3 49.2 43.7 38.6 32.3 30.0 26.1 
El Salvador … … … 28.3 30.0 33.6 38.6 40.3 40.5 39.7 39.7 36.6 35.2 
Guatemala 18.3 18.5 19.4 22.7 21.2 21.7 19.6 22.0 22.4 21.5 21.9 21.9 20.3 
Haiti 43.3 45.3 41.1 42.7 49.1 50.7 66.5 63.5 51.1 47.5 38.1 34.4 35.2 
Honduras 75.7 67.8 62.8 66.0 55.4 53.5 55.1 59.9 59.4 44.8 30.2 18.3 18.8 
Mexico 35.6 29.3 31.2 28.3 25.3 24.1 25.7 26.1 24.2 23.0 22.7 23.0 27.6 
Nicaragua 129.4 122.4 125.4 120.2 114.7 111.3 134.1 138.0 100.7 92.8 69.1 43.0 37.4 
Panama 73.5 67.1 64.8 67.2 66.5 71.1 69.4 67.0 70.4 66.2 61.0 53.7 45.4 
Paraguay 16.5 23.2 23.5 33.5 35.3 44.0 63.0 46.9 41.7 32.8 24.8 20.3 18.2 
Peru 47.8 32.6 43.0 48.1 45.2 44.2 45.7 47.4 41.7 38.2 31.2 27.2 23.8 
Dominican 
Republic … … … … … … … … … … … 19.0 20.7 
Uruguay 27.9 27.8 28.6 30.9 35.9 46.7 106.0 100.4 78.9 70.4 62.7 54.0 52.7 
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of) 




47.3 43.5 44.8 48.6 47.4 49.6 64.5 62.2 55.3 47.5 39.9 33.0 30.9 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on official information. 
 
In short, the region’s experience with trade shocks and sudden stops suggests that the 
authorities may be compelled to: 
• Make adjustments in the policy targets, in order to deal with the fact that funds that were 
previously available have evaporated. The need to lower targets because of reductions in 
tax and financial revenues will produce conflicts. For example, if less money is available, 
the following questions arise: To what extent should subsidies to productive sectors be 
adjusted during a recessive period? What poverty reduction goals are realistic? In attempts 
to promote growth, at what pace should infrastructure projects be pursued? One key 
challenge will be finding ways to make these adjustments so that the conflicts they 
engender will have a minimal impact on macroeconomic balance and the business climate. 
ECLAC – Project Documents collection Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives 
 40
• Make difficult choices among alternative fiscal objectives, reallocating available 
resources towards macroeconomic objectives. Countercyclical policy and anti-crisis 
adjustments require money, thus creating dilemmas such as the following: Should 
adjustments be made in public investment, in social spending, or in both areas in order to 
preserve a balanced budget and protect debt sustainability, even at the cost of a decline in 
economic activity and jobs? How can transfers to subnational governments be adjusted to 
maintain the solvency of the federal government? 
• Strengthen coordination between fiscal, monetary, financial and public debt management 
policies. For example: Should the emphasis be on inflation objectives or on achieving 
exchange rate stability through intervention in the exchange market? Should short-term 
fiscal financing be emphasized in order to minimize the cost of the debt, or should longer-
term and more expensive financing be favoured? Should greater priority be placed on 
price stability or on currency depreciation aimed at compensating for depreciations in 
neighbouring countries and for protectionism on the part of other countries? 
Depending on the particular country, the relevance and importance of these imperatives will 
vary. Two key factors are the fiscal behaviour during the previous period of bonanza and the 
availability of financing and the actions of international lending institutions. Below, we analyze the 
relation between macroeconomic volatility and the stabilization function of fiscal policy in Latin 
America. If these looming policy challenges are to be successfully met, there must be an 
understanding of how these two elements interact in the context of the region. 
3. Volatility and fiscal stabilization policy 
The policy space that a government has to carry out its stabilizing function is determined by three key 
variables: the amount of resources available to finance countercyclical and adjustment initiatives; the 
number of independent instruments available to meet the proposed objectives; and the degree of 
competition between countercyclical fiscal policy and other policies placing claims on the use of funds 
and instruments. One distinctive characteristic of the region’s policy space is that it can shrink or 
expand rapidly when shocks occur. Shocks alter the policy space not only because they affect the 
amount of resources available, but also because they determine the intensity with which other policies 
compete with stabilization policy. For example, in cases of negative shocks such as the present one, 
sectoral demands increase, intensifying competition for the use of both funds and policy instruments, 
which are structurally scarce in the region. 
These facts create a two-way relationship between the fiscal stabilization function and 
macroeconomic shocks. While fiscal policy seeks to remedy the imbalances created by the shocks, the 
very same shocks and imbalances, by changing the amount of manoeuvring room available, restrict 
the policy-making ability of authorities. This is evident in the case of fiscal policy, where decreased 
output is accompanied by decreased tax collections and lower ability to borrow because of the 
procyclical nature of access to capital markets35. 
We will use later the notion of fiscal space to clarify this issue. It may be helpful to mention 
two central points of the argument being presented here. First, the way in which the two-way 
relationship between shocks and policy space operates depends on the particular characteristics of the 
shock. Exceptional shocks, whether trade-related or due to sudden stops of capital inflows, can have 
effects on the policy space that are qualitatively different from those associated with a normal shock. 
Second, very similar shocks can give rise to different interactions between policy and macroeconomic 
spaces when the economies in question differ in their degree of vulnerability. Case studies provide 
                                                        
35
  Some econometric work on countercyclical fiscal policy, given the reciprocal causality between the variables, places special 
emphasis on controlling for endogeneity. The treatment of failures of the financial market, on the other hand, has received less 
attention. See, for example, Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), Fatás and Mihov (2007) and Kaminsky and others (2004). 
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evidence that both the degree and form of the imbalances, and the ability to implement policy 
responses, depend on the degree of vulnerability to the specific shock occurring. The fact that 
vulnerability depends on a number of risk factors that may or may not be present, and that combine in 
different ways, introduces an idiosyncratic element that must be taken into account in the analysis. 
It follows that the degrees of freedom available for decisions on fiscal policies varies 
according to the specific shocks and imbalances involved. From this perspective, it may be a mistake 
to assume that the number of policy instruments and their degree of independence are invariant 
throughout the economic cycle. Case studies indicate that authorities usually have less space to 
manoeuvre in the trough of the cycle, and that the space can be minimal when production slumps in 
the wake of a sudden stop. Indeed, it is precisely the lack of instruments and funds to deal with a 
slump in output that tends to lead to a crisis which, in turn, might have irreversible effects on the 
economy (ECLAC, 2008a). 
Given the problems of identification and exchangeability associated with econometric studies 
(see Durlauf and others, 2006), many researchers choose an approach more akin to the case study 
methodology (see ECLAC, 2008a; Spilimbergo and others, 2008). The idea is to identify stylized facts 
that complement econometric studies, making it possible to develop richer guidelines for policy design 
and implementation. While not neglecting econometric findings, this method more closely resembles 
an episodic approach. It uses stylized facts to analyze the interaction of shocks, macroeconomic 
imbalances and changes in the fiscal policy space, in an attempt to understand the meaning of the 
stabilizing function of fiscal policy in a volatile context such as that of Latin America. The word 
“stabilizing” is used in more than one meaning, which is a source of confusion. There is a need to 
reformulate the vision of countercyclical fiscal policy to have a broader concept that takes into account 
all the dimensions of the stabilization fiscal role in the region. In order to detail these ideas more fully, 
the remainder of this section will present a set of stylized facts relating to volatility, showing their 
connection with the stabilizing function of fiscal policy. 
3.a. Volatility in Latin America 
In recent years, knowledge of the region’s aggregate fluctuations has improved. Among the most 
important findings regarding the relation between fiscal policy and volatility are the following: 
• Shocks with permanent effects on the economy are frequent in Latin America. Shocks 
that lead to lasting changes are associated with crisis episodes, changes in the economic 
structure (external and institutional shocks), and random disturbances that influence long-
term trends (ECLAC, 2008a; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004). 
• Macroeconomic volatility in the region is high, and far greater than is usual in developed 
countries. Measured as a function of the variance of the growth rate between 1951 and 
2008, volatility in Latin America is 50% greater than in Europe and the United States. In 
addition, there is evidence that the greater volatility itself has an effect on the 
performance of the economy in terms of growth, consumption smoothing, and the 
vulnerability of specific groups. Thus, researchers have emphasized that reducing 
excessive volatility should be an integral objective of growth policy (ECLAC, 2008a; 
Catão, 2007; Loayza and Hnatkovska, 2005).  
• Crisis episodes are very frequent, and are usually accompanied by a collapse in 
production or, at least, by an interruption in the growth process (ECLAC, 2008a; Goyal 
and Sahay, 2006). 
• External shocks—changes in access to external funding, and changes in the terms of 
trade—are closely associated with national macroeconomic fluctuations, both normal 
ones and those related with exceptional or crisis episodes (ECLAC, 2008a, Edwards, 
2007; Catão, 2007). 
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• The sudden reversals of capital flows associated with contagion phenomena tend to create 
periods of turbulence that affect many of the region’s countries simultaneously (a 
phenomenon seen a number of times during the second globalization period, which began 
in the late 1970s). This suggests that the current global crisis will be a crucial determinant 
of the macroeconomic dynamic of the region overall—and it should be borne in mind that 
certain consequences may prove to be irreversible (Calvo and others, 2006; Catão, 2007; 
Fanelli, 2008). 
• Aggregate fluctuations are often accompanied by pronounced changes in the 
sustainability of public and foreign debt, and by changes in the fragility of the financial 
system. Evidence indicates that the stock-flow balances, the interrelationships among the 
balance sheets of key aggregate agents, and capital losses and gains, are central 
determinants of financial stability, and hence of macroeconomic fluctuations (Fanelli, 
2008; Easterly, 2000; Heymann, 2007). 
• The reformulation of governance structures (contracts, property rights and regulations) 
usually plays an important role in the adjustment process that follows a shock, especially 
if the shock has caused a crisis or collapse in production. Modifications in governance 
structures range from changes in the composition of public spending and redesign of 
labour contracts and rules governing distributions among central and subnational 
governments, to refinancing, and reform of banking regulations, capital movements, the 
pension system and tariff structures (ECLAC, 2008a; Fanelli, 2007). 
This list of stylized facts shows that macroeconomic volatility involves a variety of stochastic 
processes that can affect the economy in both the short and long term. Therefore, “fiscal mechanisms 
for filtering macroeconomic shocks” may be a more apt description of the mechanisms associated with 
the stabilization function of the government than “countercyclical fiscal mechanisms”. This phrasing 
highlights the fact that the disturbances that require policy responses are not necessarily stationary or 
cyclical, and do not necessarily represent deviations within a corridor of stability around a trend. The 
treatment of phenomena such as shocks that affect the trend, structural changes, and non-convergent 
trajectories requires a more complex battery of fiscal responses. Notably, macroeconomic imbalances 
may be associated with trend shocks and structural changes that serve to accelerate growth. If the 
nature of the perturbation causing the fluctuation is not precisely identified, it is difficult to judge 
whether the increased volatility is good or bad. Attempting to artificially reduce volatility may have 
undesired consequences, reducing growth by eroding incentives to take risks, or aborting a process of 
structural change. It should be emphasized that the objective of fiscal policy is to filter out the 
negative effects of the perturbations, without affecting the positive ones associated with structural 
changes that result from the disappearance of obsolete sectors, increasing sectoral differences in 
productivity, or the reform of inefficient governance structures. One consequence of this analytical 
approach is that it promotes stronger efforts to identify the characteristics of shocks and the responses 
that follow, in varying contexts—a largely unexplored field of analysis. 
It is worth mentioning one important difference between the approach that emerging 
economies take to the fiscal stabilization function and the narrower, more short-term approach taken 
by developed countries. In emerging economies, reducing excessive volatility (both cyclical and trend 
volatility) is regarded as an independent objective that is valuable, for two reasons, both of which 
concern long-term goals36. First, this type of volatility is detrimental to growth (Easterly and others, 
2000; Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Second, the risk associated with excessive income volatility 
disproportionately affects the vulnerable segments of the population that lack the means to protect 
themselves from such risks; thus, repeated recessions ultimately generate social exclusion, low 
accumulation of human capital, structural duality and poverty traps (Fatás, 2002; Barlevy, 2004). 
                                                        
36
  For a definition of excessive volatility, see Fanelli (2008) and ECLAC (2008a). 
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Based on these facts, it is understandable that the intention of fiscal stabilization policy is rarely 
limited to smoothing out temporary fluctuations from the trend. In supporting policy, arguments are 
frequently put forth invoking the need to ensure the solvency of the public sector, stabilize the economy 
in order to promote growth, achieve investment levels that ensure access to foreign credit, or eliminate 
regressive inflationary taxes that stand in the way of financial deepening. These fiscal policy objectives 
seem directed more at the factors affecting the economic trend, or at correcting an explosive path, than at 
correcting temporary deviations with regard to potential output. It would therefore seem wrong to group, 
under the countercyclical rubric, policies that have quite different contents and objectives, and that thus 
demand different instruments and types of coordination. 
Much can be learned in Latin America about the diversity of the tasks involved in the 
stabilizing function of fiscal policy, precisely because, unlike the developed world, where excessive 
volatility and macroeconomic crises are rare, such events, although exceptional, have been more 
frequent in Latin America. This is reflected, for example, in the far more complex form in which fiscal 
stabilization policy is conceived and practiced. Except in special cases, stabilization in the 
industrialized countries involves adopting countercyclical policies, with the objective of smoothing 
out fluctuations around a trend (see, for example, Auerbach, 2002). In addition, it is implicitly 
assumed that, with or without stabilization policy, the economy will always move within a narrow 
corridor around potential output (which is always difficult to define) and will by itself tend to return to 
the trend37. Not surprisingly, given this view, automatic stabilizers are relied upon as the predominant 
tool for making countercyclical policy38. In Latin America, automatic mechanisms are much less 
relevant, and discretionary initiatives are therefore more common. The components normally defined 
as automatic stabilizers are income tax (on the revenue side) and unemployment insurance (on the 
spending side). Both, however, play a less relevant role in Latin American budgets. 
In Latin America, stabilization—in the sense of smoothing out the cycle—is only applied in 
normal times, when the economy is moving within the corridor. When a sufficiently large shock 
occurs, or when the mechanisms that propagate the shock automatically destabilize the economy, 
threatening to put it on a non-convergent path, the “stabilization” that typifies normal periods is, not 
surprisingly, replaced by an alternative meaning of the term. This usually occurs when the public debt 
becomes unsustainable, or when the financial system’s net worth becomes negative. If the economy 
violates the condition of transversality and, without prior indication, adopts an explosive path, 
“stabilization policy” comes to mean macroeconomic adjustment policy, making it necessary to 
reform some economic parameter (tax burden, elimination of public spending programmes, or 
financial or other property rights) in order to deactivate the mechanisms that are causing the stability 
problem. Because the current situation in the developed world is exceptional, there is greater interest 
in understanding the policy challenges associated with “stabilization” in this second sense of the term 
(see, for example, Spilimbergo and others, 2008). Thus, a mandatory first step should be to more 
precisely define the use of the word “stabilization” in the context of countercyclical policy, since the 
interpretation of the term changes the policy content in an essential way. 
4. Countercyclical fiscal policy 
The stylized facts regarding volatility indicate that crises and shocks with permanent effects are 
frequent in the region. Thus, in designing fiscal stabilization policies in Latin America, one must 
differentiate normal shocks, which induce stationary fluctuations around a trend, from exceptional 
shocks, which may have irreversible effects. 
                                                        
37
  Here, the notion of “corridor” is used in Leijonhufvud’s sense (1981). According to that author, when the economy is outside the 
corridor that exists in the neighbourhood of full employment, economic agents have difficulty coordinating their plans, because of 
effective demand failures. This is due to the fact that when the economy is far from full employment, there are no mutually 
consistent rules or expectations to bring the economy quickly back to full employment. 
38
  In the literature, automatic stabilizers are defined as those mechanisms in the budget that act countercyclically, independent of any 
government intervention, reducing variations in output (Suescún, 2007; Auberbach and Feedberg, 2000). 
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One well-known obstacle to designing fiscal measures for exceptional events is that measures 
for dealing with non-stationary shocks must have a significant degree of discretionality. In the case of 
a non-stationary event, it is impossible to know precisely, ex ante, how the trend will evolve—much 
less how the structure of the economy and its forms of governance may change as a result of the 
shock. Thus, it is very difficult, ex ante to answer with a reasonable degree of precision questions 
fundamental to the success of fiscal policy in its stabilising function. These include questions such as: 
How will the size and distribution of fiscal revenues and the tax base change? What sectors will merit 
assistance once the consequences of the shock are known, in terms of relative effects on sectoral 
productivity, international competitiveness and income distribution? What type of spending, and what 
sectoral distribution of spending, will most effectively address the shock? Which agents will be 
impacted most in terms of liquidity and solvency? How should regulations be changed to reflect the 
new situation? What new forms of private sector contractual arrangements will emerge, with the 
potential to expand or shrink the policy space—e.g., when term reductions for contracts deprive the 
public sector of long-term financing instruments? 
Since the region has greater exposure to exceptional and non-stationary shocks, discretionary 
fiscal responses are frequent. Moreover, given the weakness of institutions and the major constraints 
in terms of political economy, it should be no surprise that these discretionary responses have not been 
of high calibre, and that, therefore, the question of discretionality has remained at the centre of the 
debate on fiscal stabilization policy. 
One proposal put forth repeatedly in recent years to address this issue has been to limit 
discretionality, to the extent possible, in making decisions on policy responses. The proposed method 
for accomplishing this was to impose predetermined rules on fiscal policy (Perry, 2003). In practice, 
this means renouncing the use of special measures to manage the consequences of exceptional events, 
unless one simply assumes that such events will not occur in the future—an assumption not justified 
by available evidence concerning volatility. The empirical evidence on fiscal policy in the case of both 
Latin America and the European Union, suggests that authorities find the cost of inaction in the face of 
exceptional events to be greater than the benefit of avoiding discretionary responses. When macro 
circumstances are deemed exceptional, the rules are modified39. Indeed, this has been explicitly 
recognized by including escape clauses in fiscal regulations. Beyond a recognition of these facts, there 
must be a better understanding of the relation between normal and exceptional conditions. 
Specifically, there needs to be greater clarity on how this relationship operates in different stochastic 
and institutional contexts, along with a determination of what the proper fiscal responses would be to 
the occurrence of different types of stationary and non-stationary shocks. 
Governments, as well as the overwhelming majority of analysts, agree that the current crisis 
in the United States and Europe is an exceptional event. Thus, analysis of the fiscal stimulus policies 
being implemented to prevent a depression will produce valuable lessons on the relationship between 
rules, automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal responses. From an analytical perspective, one 
advantage is that this exceptional event has occurred in a context in which moderation of the cycle and 
the operation of automatic stabilizers were the norm rather than the exception. In this sense, the crisis 
resembles a natural experiment. Taking these factors into account, we shall use some of the events that 
are presently occurring to identify five points considered central to understanding the macroeconomic 
challenges facing fiscal policy in Latin America. 
First, when shocks of exceptional size and nature occur, uncertainty about the effects of fiscal 
stabilization policies increases. As is clear from Spilimbergo and others (2008), policy makers today 
face serious difficulties in assessing one element that is essential in calculating the necessary fiscal 
stimulus, namely, the value of the associated multiplier. Existing estimates of the value of the 
multiplier under normal conditions differ significantly. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the value 
of the multiplier calculated under normal conditions applies to shocks and fiscal responses of the 
magnitude of the present circumstances (Spilimbergo and others, 2008). 
                                                        
39
  On the question of fiscal rules and discretionality, see, for example, Dos Reis and others (2007), Perry (2003) and Perotti (2007). 
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Second, during a crisis situation, the demand for coordinated policy increases exponentially, 
due largely to increased competition from other policies for the use of funds and instruments. This 
applies particularly to the coordination of countercyclical fiscal policies with monetary, public debt 
and financial crisis management policies (Togo, 2007). Governments are allocating enormous fiscal 
resources to stabilize the banking system and stimulate the economy, and as a consequence, the fiscal 
deficit and the debt-GDP ratio will rise above the goals established prior to the shock. Thus, anti-crisis 
policies may supersede the objective of maintaining debt sustainability, thereby placing rigid 
limitations on the fiscal policy space available to future governments. These countercyclical fiscal 
actions may also dominate monetary policy objectives. Many analysts suggest that the significant 
increase in the money supply and in public spending will lead to a sharp upturn in inflation further 
downstream. The shift from inflation objectives to quantitative easing merely describes the dominance 
of countercyclical policy over inflation objectives. Obviously, short-term measures to prevent the 
economy from falling prey to high unemployment seems well-advised, but it will undeniably make it 
more difficult in the future to coordinate fiscal policy with monetary and public debt policy. 
Third, debt sustainability takes on a major role when there is a shock of unusual magnitude. 
The quantitative effects of the fiscal stimuli being implemented are highly dependent on the course of 
the financial markets and on the uncertainty factor. This is reflected, above all, in the discussion 
concerning sustainable levels of public debt. Many analysts believe that a large fiscal stimulus, added 
to the enormous resources being demanded to stabilize the banking system, could move the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio toward a less sustainable level40. This produces a rather paradoxical situation that, 
in itself, constitutes a source of uncertainty. Given a particular fiscal policy, the task of calculating the 
sustainable debt level requires knowing what long-term interest rates and growth rates will be, yet 
these variables will only be known once the economy stabilizes around a new equilibrium, following 
the shock41. Thus, short-term attempts to stabilize the economy and revitalize private spending require 
that economic agents assume that the increase in the public debt is sustainable. For agents to invest 
and commit themselves for the long term, it must be clear that the economy will converge toward a 
new stable equilibrium. However, it is precisely the difficulty that economic agents confront in 
ascertaining which way the economy is heading that provokes uncertainty, puts a brake on spending, 
and threatens to coordinate expectations on a bad equilibrium similar to the liquidity trap. Evidence 
from the developed world indicates that the difficulty in using fiscal stimuli is a function of the 
indebtedness of the public sector, and an inverse function of the ability of monetary authorities to 
resist a massive outflow of capital. 
Fourth, fiscal stabilization measures are being accompanied by initiatives that, in addition to 
being countercyclical, encompass major reforms of governance structures (contracts, regulations). A 
prerequisite to coordinating expectations on an equilibrium outside the trap of high unemployment is 
ensuring that there will not be a collapse in the financial system or in production. To achieve this, 
governments have committed themselves rather explicitly to a policy of rescuing entities that are too 
large to fail, an approach that entails the ex post reformulation of regulations and contracts. A side 
effect of such reformulation of governance mechanisms is that it increases moral hazard and the 
perception that the rules of the game are unstable. In these situations, the need to stabilize the 
economy takes precedence over the need to have stable economic institutions—a situation that affects 
incentives to invest. It is not clear that fiscal and other stimuli will have the same effects on private 
spending in such an environment as would be true under normal circumstances. This is particularly the 
case in smaller countries that are more deeply affected by the crisis. 
The fifth and final point relates to how the political economy of the crisis can affect fiscal 
stabilization policy. As has been noted, gearing expectations toward equilibrium—achieving full 
                                                        
40
  For a view that emphasizes the question of the debt, and the need to coordinate it with other policies or regimes, see, for example 
Cochrane (2003), who has persistently focused on the issue of whether fiscal policies are effective in the current situation. The 
alternative view is represented by the International Monetary Fund. See, for example, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (2009) and 
Freedman and others (2009). Also relevant is the discussion of debt sustainability in Buiter (2009). 
41
  This is especially the case if one considers that some consequences of the crisis will be irreversible and will therefore affect 
growth and yields in the long term. 
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employment and avoiding the trap of high unemployment—requires that the government give clear 
signals that the public debt is sustainable, particularly in the case of small countries. The strongest way 
of signaling this is to make it clear that future taxes will be raised to service the debt. This creates a 
problem of political economy: if a private investor today has a profitable project and the liquidity to 
carry it out, why should he invest and demonstrate to the government his ability to generate profits, 
when he knows that political economy constraints will very likely cause the government to ultimately 
increase taxes on those who have profited, rather than lost, in the crisis? This expectation of future 
appropriation of private gains depresses investment and makes it difficult to coordinate expectations 
on the best equilibrium. A problem similar to that of potential appropriation applies to the uncertainty 
regarding the rules of the game and the moral hazard associated with financial rescue operations. This 
does not mean that the economy will be unable to coordinate on an equilibrium outside the trap; it 
does, however, mean that businesspeople will demand a higher profit margin for investing (given the 
greater risk in a tense institutional environment)—a situation that might delay the recovery process. 
The purpose of this brief discussion of the problems of countercyclical policy in the 
industrialized countries is to illustrate how crises and major shocks transform and increase the problems 
that countercyclical policy inevitably faces. This transformation is no surprise, of course, to those 
familiar with fiscal problems in Latin America, where, because of the frequency of crises, problems of 
public debt sustainability are common, as is uncertainty about the effects of fiscal stimuli, lack of 
coordination among different policies, changes in the rules of the game, as well as changes in allocating 
the tax burden as a result of macroeconomic adjustment and pressure from distributive conflicts. 
Whether in relation to Latin America or to the crisis in the developed world, these five points 
highlight the need for a comprehensive and consistent view of the set of fiscal tools for dealing with 
macroeconomic fluctuations, in order to use them in a coordinated fashion and be able to assess the 
constraints that limit the space for policy making. The fact that policies with very different objectives 
are often termed countercyclical creates confusion. It seems reasonable, at a minimum, to distinguish 
between fiscal policies for normal situations and fiscal policies for exceptional circumstances—e.g., 
between policies that seek to coordinate expectations in situations where there are two equilibria, and 
policies that seek to smooth out fluctuations around an equilibrium; or between discretionary 
adjustment policies designed to redirect the economy from an explosive path, and marginal 
discretionary policies that seek only to complement the normal function of automatic countercyclical 
stabilizers. The evolution of fiscal policy regulations in the European Union suggests that introducing 
the distinction between normal and extraordinary situations and studying the effects of discretionary 
responses to unusual shocks can be highly useful (Fatás and Mihov, 2009). 
Notably, general interest in countercyclical fiscal policy was driven in the 1930s by the search 
for discretionary fiscal tools to bring the economy out of the high unemployment trap created by 
exceptionally intense shocks. Equally notable is the fact that confidence in discretionary fiscal policies 
gradually weakened in tandem with the changes that occurred in the economic structure of the 
developed world. For as the public sector grew in size (while income taxes and unemployment 
programmes also grew), automatic stabilizers became more important; as financial markets deepened, 
greater space for monetary policy developed; and, finally, the absence of a slump in production led to 
a period of very moderate cycles in which fiscal activism seemed an anachronism. The corollary of 
this evolution was the formation of a new consensus: the notion that discretionary fiscal policy should 
not be used for countercyclical purposes, since this function was covered by the automatic stabilizers 
(Auerbach, 2002), and that monetary policy should focus on ensuring that any temporary disturbance 
does not jeopardize price stability. Indeed, many writers attributed the apparent stability of the 
economy to the quality of monetary policy, dismissing the argument that it could be simply the result 
of good luck, i.e., a long period of time without extraordinary shocks (Stock and Watson, 2003; 
Blanchard and Simon, 2001). A paradoxical side of this evolution in fiscal thinking is that the 
consensus reached its peak just at the moment when authorities were forced to act with great 
discretionary force to address an exceptional shock, in a context of relatively ineffective monetary 
policy in the industrialized countries. 
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Although this reference to the industrialized countries is intended to highlight the need for an 
approach to countercyclical fiscal policy that emphasizes both the specific characteristics of particular 
perturbations and the automatic-discretionary relationship, any analogy between the emerging world and 
the developed world has limited applicability, due to the inherent structural differences. 
A number of differences are particularly noteworthy. First, as will be seen below, there was 
no significant moderation of the cycle in Latin America. Second, access to capital markets is distinctly 
procyclical and, at least until the current crisis, sudden stops of capital flows did not occur in the 
wealthy countries. The fact that capital markets remain open even in recessionary times is clearly 
beneficial to the developed countries, since it prevents a shrinking of the space available for 
countercyclical fiscal policy precisely when it is most needed. It should be borne in mind that fiscal 
deficits must be financed regardless of whether they are generated by automatic or discretionary 
mechanisms. Third, automatic fiscal mechanisms to stabilize the economic cycle play a much larger 
role in economies with a sizeable public sector. Fourth, problems regarding the sustainability of the 
public debt are not comparable, although debt-to-GDP ratios are not necessarily higher. In particular, 
changes in risk tolerance on the part of investors in Latin America, and variations in the real exchange 
rate, have very pronounced effects (Blanchard, 2004). Finally, as is well known, the problem of 
unstable governance structures and potential appropriation of investments places much tighter 
constraints on the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus in Latin America. This means that the increase in 
expected profits required to bring the economy out of a low growth trap is much greater. 
In light of these differences, it is not surprising that the “Great Moderation” consensus that 
originated in the developed countries has always proven somewhat abstract for Latin American policy 
makers. Regional authorities operate in an environment in which a slump in production is an ever-
present threat, monetary policy autonomy is limited or nonexistent, and automatic stabilizers are weak. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that, for Latin American authorities, discretionary fiscal measures have 
always occupied centre stage. This means that there are probably important lessons to learn from Latin 
America’s experience, in terms of the relation between discretionary policies and cyclical fluctuations. 
In summary, from the perspective of the present analysis, the more traditional conception of 
countercyclical fiscal policy has two weaknesses. The first is that, while countercyclical policy 
essentially involves initiatives designed to smooth out temporary deviations from long-term trends, 
much of the volatility in Latin America, as noted here, derives from trend shocks, not from cyclical 
deviations around a trend. Thus, structural changes are often associated with reforms and with 
international or political events that put the economy on a explosive path, outside the corridor of 
normalcy. It therefore seems inappropriate to focus solely on stationary phenomena. Indeed, such a 
focus would be inappropriate today, even for the developed countries, given that the crisis may have 
irreversible effects (for example, on the banking system and the level and distribution of wealth 
among families) and that it threatens to ultimately put public indebtedness on an unstable path that 
will require an adjustment of governance structures. Thus, it would seem more appropriate to include, 
under the rubric of fiscal stabilization policy, the entire set of initiatives designed to address the 
aggregate fluctuations, and reserve the concept of countercyclical fiscal policy to situations in which 
only stationary phenomena are involved. Under this scenario, the stabilization function of fiscal policy 
would involve the following elements: 
• Countercyclical policies, that are designed to deal with the economic cycle, i.e., 
temporary deviations from an existing trend. 
• Macroeconomic adjustment policies to manage the consequences of permanent shocks by 
changing a number of rules. Here, the objective may be to structurally reduce excessive 
volatility, or (in the case of multiple equilibria) to coordinate decisions in order to put the 
economy in a particular equilibrium deemed to be superior to another. 
• Anti-crisis policies, whose objective may be to correct the direction of an economy that is on 
—or is in danger of embarking on— an unstable path or to correct situations in which no 
equilibrium exists. 
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Strictly speaking, anti-crisis policy is a type of adjustment policy, but because of its 
importance it has been classified as its own type of policy. This distinction is apt, inasmuch as it 
shows how policies with differing content and objectives, and requiring different instruments, appear 
together under the umbrella of stabilization policy. 
If anti-volatility policy is conceived as risk management policy, with the policy designer 
playing the role of risk manager, the three types of policy can imply actions in three different 
dimensions: risk prevention and mitigation –which are measures to moderate the consequences of 
shocks by taking precautions before they occur– and rescue or assistance measures implemented once 
the shock has occurred. 
Finally, three further points: First, each of these types of policy, because of the very nature of 
the problems it must address, requires not only fiscal spaces of differing size, but a consideration of 
the specific context, which will affect the size of the space, since structural and political constraints 
vary according to the characteristics of the situations involved. Second, in addition to the three types 
of policy already cited, there are other anti-volatility structural reform policies that are much longer-
term in scope, and that may be designed to alter the structure of the economy in order to reduce 
volatility directly or increase policy space. Examples of such reforms are: adopting measures to 
increase the diversification of trade so as to reduce exposure to terms of trade shocks; increasing trade 
openness as a means of aligning the economy with international inflation; promoting financial 
development to create greater independence between fiscal and monetary policy; and reforming 
economic institutions to reduce macroeconomic volatility by extending the duration of contracts. 
Lastly, like any classification that attempts to identify the elements of a complex phenomenon such as 
anti-volatility policy, this classification merely attempts to impose a degree of analytical order, not to 
draw arbitrarily strict lines between different types of policy. For example, it is difficult to separate 
adjustment policies from structural reform or anti-crisis policies. This is especially true in view of the 
fact that governments often take advantage of the room that a crisis provides for autonomy, in terms of 
political economy, making it possible at times to temper the demands of special interest groups and 
successfully launch reforms that would meet resistance in more normal periods. 
The following section shows how fiscal authorities in the region, in attempting to bring about 
stabilization, use the three policies: anti-cyclical policy, adjustment policy and anti-crisis policy. 
Given the hypotheses that trade shocks and sudden stops of capital flows have accounted for the most 
important exogenous perturbations and play a central role in crisis situations, the following section is 
devoted to these shocks. 
5. External disruptions and fiscal policy:  
the anatomy of two shocks 
Next is an examination of how sudden stops of capital flows and exogenous trade shocks relate to the 
space available for fiscal stabilization policy. The analysis follows three lines. First is a discussion of an 
argument outlined in the foregoing section: that the fiscal policy space must not be conceived statically, 
since shocks affect its central components, i.e., the resources and instruments available to authorities, as 
well as pressure from competing policies. Second, the analysis focuses on vulnerability to trade shocks 
and sudden stops, underlining the fact that an economy’s starting point at the time a shock occurs affects 
its subsequent course, and thereby affects the components of the policy space. It will be seen that lack of 
space for fiscal stabilization policy when a shock occurs is an element of vulnerability42. Third, it will be 
shown how difficult it can be to solve the problems of policy coordination that arise from exceptional 
trade or financial shocks—problems that can lead to situations in which one policy predominates over 
another, or directly dominates the response to crisis situations. 
                                                        
42
  On the fiscal situation in the context of the present crisis in Latin America, and the policy space, see Bárcena and others (2009). 
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To illustrate the importance in Latin America of the types of shocks being analyzed here, 
table 3 shows past periods of trade shocks and sudden stops in the largest countries43. This draws on 
information from Calvo and others (2006) for these countries. A similar methodology was used to 
identify trade shocks. 
 
TABLE II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): TRADE SHOCKS AND SUDDEN STOPS 
 Trade shocks Sudden stops 
Argentina 1986-1987; 1993; 2002-2003 1980-1984; 1994-1996; 1998-2004 
Brazil 1986; 1999-2003 1981-1985 
Chile 1985-1986; 2002-2003 1981-1986; 1998-2000 
Mexico 1986; 1992-1994; 2003 1982-1985; 1994-1997 
Colombia 1983; 1985; 2002-2004 1998-2002 
Peru 2001-2004 1981-1986; 1997-1999 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1986-1988; 1998; 2002-2003 1980-1986 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
 the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
5.a. Sudden stops, trade shocks and their effects  
on the primary deficit 
First, as a general indicator of the changing fiscal space, an overview of the features of sudden stops 
and trade shocks is presented, in order to show how they relate to vulnerability and provide a 
description of the channels through which they affect the public deficit. The main objective here is to 
illustrate the way in which these factors create conflicts between different fiscal policy objectives. The 
following subsection discusses the problems of policy coordination and dominance that arise in the 
case of exceptional shocks, as well as the dilemmas they create for the fiscal stabilization function, 
particularly as regards countercyclical policy vs. adjustment policy. 
Sudden stops or reversals of capital flows will be discussed first. To stylize this type of shock, 
we shall draw on facts that appear repeatedly in the literature (for example, in Calvo and others, 2006; 
Kaminsky and others, 2004; Ortiz and others, 2007; and Bordo, 2006). Diagram II.1 provides an 
overview of this type of shock, the imbalances it causes, the risk factors that determine vulnerability, 
and the channels through which the shock affects the fiscal position, as represented by the primary 
fiscal deficit (defgp). 
 
                                                        
43
  For a recent discussion of the observed effects of the trade and financial shocks in the region, as compared with previous shocks, 
see Pineda and others (2009). 
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DIAGRAM II.1 












Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
The first box on the left shows an important feature of this type of shock: its exogenous 
nature, associated with contagion or portfolio decisions that are correlated because of the illiquidity of 
international investors. This type of shock is systemic, inasmuch as it affects all components of the 
banking system and of the capital markets. According to Calvo and others (2006), two of its 
distinctive features are the increased risk premium that must be paid by the country affected, and a 
decline in capital flows. As was seen in section I, both of these phenomena were present in the periods 
following crises in a number of the region’s countries, although the rise in the risk premium was less 
intense than the decline in capital flows. The effect on capital flows was greater in the larger countries, 
which have more access to capital markets. In the smaller countries, the reduced supply of foreign 
funds took the form primarily of a drop in FDI, which was closely linked to increased financial 
uncertainty, as well as being a reaction to the trade shock. 
The box in the upper centre of the diagram lists the principal effects that the literature 
associates with sudden stops: a reversal in the current account, declining investment and real 
depreciation. Nominal depreciation is an important instrument for achieving real depreciation in 
countries that have a degree of monetary autonomy. In dollarized countries such as Ecuador and El 
Salvador, on the other hand, the change in relative prices can only take the form of price deflation, 
which itself can provoke new macroeconomic imbalances, as (evidence suggests) occurred in 
Argentina during the convertibility period (Fanelli, 2008). Beyond this, sudden stops regularly lead to 
marked declines in the demand for domestic financial assets. To soften these pressures, authorities are 
generally forced to intervene in currency markets, though this usually entails conflicts with established 
monetary rules. Such is the case currently in countries like Chile and Mexico that were following an 
inflation target regime and found themselves compelled to alter their strategy of intervention in the 
foreign-exchange market in order to alleviate some of the pressure and prevent excessive depreciation.  
As the dotted box on the right shows, the severity of the imbalances depends largely on how 
vulnerable an economy is, which in turn depends on the status of the risk factors generally cited in the 
literature, which are listed in the box. Their importance varies, of course, according to the structural 
features of both the economy and the particular situation. 
The first of these factors is the degree of both public and private debt dollarization. This has 
played an important role in Latin America since the debt crisis of 1982. The most recent traumatic 
episodes occurred between the Russian crisis of 1998 and the Argentine crisis of 2002. Since sudden 
stop episodes provoke major changes in the real exchange rate, debtors with dollar-denominated 
liabilities usually experience a sharp rise in their debt/assets ratio. As this produces a general increase 
in financial leverage, systemic financial fragility rises as well. Thus, the greater the depreciation-
induced upward correction in the value of the debt, as a percentage of assets, the steeper is the rise in 
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leverage and fragility. It also follows that firms operating in the tradables sector will be least affected, 
since, in that case, the value of assets will tend to rise with the depreciation.  
The second factor in the list is the ratio of public debt to output. This is important because the 
greater this ratio is, the more pronounced the effects under examination here will be. Note that even if 
the public debt is not dollarized, a reversal of capital flows will increase interest rates, and 
correspondingly increases the funds required to meet interest expenses. This effect was very 
pronounced in Brazil in the first half of the 2000 decade, as Blanchard (2004) demonstrates. 
A third risk factor is associated with the level of economic openness. The more open the 
economy, the greater the size of its tradables sector, and hence the smaller the effect of the increased 
leverage produced by the real depreciation. This is true for both the public and private sectors. If a 
major portion of public sector revenues derives from the tradables sector—either because this is the 
tax base or because the revenue includes dividends from public enterprises that export—there will be 
less vulnerability associated with the dollar-denominated public debt. Thus, in assessing the fiscal 
effects of a sudden stop, one must consider the characteristics of the assets that serve as collateral for 
dollar debts (Caballero, 2000). Evidence on the decline of fiscal resources, estimated by ECLAC 
(2009) to be on the order of two percentage points of GDP in 2009, suggests that the financial position 
of a number of the region’s governments is being impacted. In this connection, note that the 
conjunction of a trade shock with a financial shock intensifies the effects of both. In the context of a 
sudden stop alone, the tradables sector (which may include the State) remains capable of driving an 
export-led recovery, since it is less affected financially. This is not the case, however, when a trade 
shock accompanies the sudden stop. 
An additional reason for the relation between the openness of an economy and its vulnerability 
is that, ceteris paribus, the smaller the tradables sector is as a percentage of the economy, the greater is 
the proportion of domestic absorption that must be sacrificed to gain an extra dollar through reduced 
imports—this being the typical form of short-term external adjustment (Fanelli, 2008). Thus, a lack of 
openness may ultimately exacerbate the economic slowdown if authorities compensate for the sudden 
stop of financial flows by reducing imports. Case studies suggest that, to achieve a slowdown of imports, 
authorities must implement a greater real exchange rate correction (Fanelli, 2008). A major correction of 
relative prices and the level of economic activity aggravates the problem—for both government and 
business—of excessive financial leverage. However, the greater the amount of dollarized revenue that 
the State has, due to either import taxes or natural resources, the smaller this effect will be (Jiménez and 
Tromben, 2006; Sabaini and Jiménez, 2009). 
An economy’s financial openness also has an effect on vulnerability: the greater the financial 
openness, the greater the capital flows, and hence the more risks the economy faces if flows are 
reversed (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones, 2008). Note that this argument assumes that capital flows are 
procyclical—as is normally the case in the region (Fanelli, 2008). If there were fewer failures of 
capital markets, access to foreign capital markets could be used to smooth out the cycle, since 
domestic agents (both public and private) could borrow at the trough of the cycle, and generate 
surpluses to repay the loans at the peak. The procyclical behaviour of flows is facilitated when 
financial contracts are short-term. When bad times loom, it is easy to jettison instruments with 
domestic risk and flee to higher-quality assets. It is a stylized fact that contracts tend to become shorter 
in direct relation to inflation and volatility of quantities, from which it follows that this risk factor is 
particularly important in the most unstable countries (Fanelli, 2008). This factor tends to influence 
fiscal authorities to the extent that, as liquidity is abruptly reduced, the private sector postpones 
meeting its tax obligations, or resorts to evasion, to finance short-term working capital. This effect can 
be significant, and in fact acts as quite a powerful automatic stabilizer, since, when rising interest rates 
affect working capital in emerging countries with short contracts (Cavallo, 1977), the normal effect 
that increased interest rates have on aggregate demand is aggravated by the negative effect on the 
supply of goods, due to the greater difficulty of financing working capital. Delayed tax payments 
soften this effect–at the expense, of course, of aggravating the public sector’s problems in obtaining 
credit in the context of a sudden stop. 
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Other vulnerability factors that were identified in the analysis of sudden stop events are: a 
poorly regulated and supervised banking system, excessive short-term bank deposits and loans, and 
fixed exchange rate regimes. Moreover, these factors may interact perversely, since, if financial assets 
are short-term, it is easier for investors to flee to higher quality at signs of weakness in the banking 
system. This generates a process of deleveraging that makes banks illiquid and leaves businesses 
without credit for investment or working capital. This latter factor tends to add supply problems to 
aggregate demand problems. Also, capital flight increases the likelihood that authorities will be forced 
to devalue the currency to protect constantly falling reserves. In a number of countries, this pattern of 
vulnerability factors ultimately provoked twin crises: exchange-rate and financial (Kaminsky and 
Reinhardt, 1999). This type of crisis usually threatens the sustainability of public debt, since along 
with any effects that the real depreciation has on the real weight of the public debt—and in addition to 
the slump in economic activity, which reduces the denominator of the debt-GDP ratio—the public 
sector faces the problem of finding funds to shore up the financial system, at the same time as its 
revenue is reduced by the working capital effect mentioned above. 
Since, in general, the public sector acts not only as a lender, but also as an insurer of last 
resort (see Fanelli, 2008), it follows that the combination of factors most threatening to the 
sustainability of the public debt is a highly dollar-indebted non-tradables sector combined with a 
closed economy, a weak banking system, short contracts, a fixed exchange rate and a public sector 
whose revenue is highly dependent on the non-tradables sector— precisely the factors that were so 
notably present when Argentina experienced the sudden stop of its recent crisis, and found itself in 
default. To a greater or lesser extent, these factors were also present in other recent crises: in the 
Dominican Republic, where financial crisis led to a sharp increase in public debt (Fanelli and 
Guzmán, 2008); in Brazil, where increased interest rates, in an environment of political uncertainty as 
Lula Da Silva took office, led to a very significant increase in the public debt (Blanchard, 2004); and 
in Chile in the 1980s, where it took several years to escape from a course of low debt sustainability, 
although this was eventually achieved with great success (Magendzo and Titelman, 2008). 
The four lower boxes of diagram II.1 show the imbalances induced by sudden stops. The 
slump in output, the lack of sustainability of the public debt, and financial crisis are the three most 
visible and important imbalances, but the distributive conflicts that inevitably accompany these 
phenomena and express themselves in the area of political economy must also be taken into account. 
The sudden stop is an exceptional situation, and hence a good way of illustrating how 
imbalances create demands and constraints that change the fiscal space, and how their nature makes it 
essential to distinguish between countercyclical policies and adjustment policies associated with the 
two meanings of “stabilization” discussed above. To underline this fact, each of the four boxes 
representing the imbalances includes the primary fiscal deficit equation (defgpi) with the superscript i 
added (i = cd; cp; rf; sos) to indicate that this is the deficit associated with the imbalance represented 
in the box. Asterisks have been added to some of the variables in the defgpi equation to indicate that 
the imbalance represented in the box affects this variable directly, apart from any measures by fiscal 
authorities. This may reflect new demands (pressures for subsidies in the context of the imbalance), 
automatic responses (e.g., VAT, or postponed payment of taxes to finance working capital) or loss of 
an instrument because of the exceptional situation (rationing of credit). 
The collapse of output box has an asterisk for the cyclical component of spending (gc) and the 
tax collections component (tc), which are affected by the terms of trade (ToT) and changes in the gap 
between actual and potential output (gap). On the other hand, the discretionary components of spending 
(gd) and taxation (td) are not necessarily affected by the shock. The evolution of these variables 
determines the size of the deficit under a production collapse (defgpcp). If public debt is available as an 
instrument, the placement of new debt will provide sufficient fiscal space to finance this deficit. If the 
government has been following a constant structural deficit rule (td - gd = constant) because it considered 
such a level of discretionality optimal, it presumably was not experiencing problems in obtaining 
financing to cover occasional increases in the cyclical deficit. This additional cyclical deficit is equal to 
ECLAC – Project Documents collection Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives 
 53
(gc - tc). A sudden stop is not a stationary cyclical movement, but an exceptional event that produces a 
collapse, therefore the cyclical deficit to be financed will likely be very great. 
The political economy pressures associated with the collapse will be significant (as the box at 
the left indicates) and will depend in great measure on the political environment. Nevertheless, there is 
one that is highly relevant when a sudden stop occurs: the relation between central and subnational 
governments. When the economy is subjected to a financial shock, subnational governments have 
more difficulty obtaining credit (if they are permitted to borrow) in a context of declining collections. 
Thus, they lobby for more transfers, and this affects the discretionary component of central 
government spending (gd), or the tax component (td) if there are demands to increase taxes in order to 
finance the transfers. Accordingly, asterisks have been placed on those variables. The political 
economy pressures determine a distributive-conflict deficit (defgpcd). 
We now turn to imbalances of a financial nature. The two boxes at the lower right indicate 
that sudden stops produce instability in the banking system and can jeopardize the sustainability of the 
public debt. As a result, two objectives of stabilization policy will compete with countercyclical 
objectives: maintaining financial stability and ensuring the sustainability of the public debt. If 
financial imbalances destabilize the banks, a probable market reaction will be to ration credit for the 
public and private sectors. Thus, when there is instability in the banking system, the government can, 
at most, generate a deficit of defgprf. The maximum financing that the government can obtain will be 
determined by the amount of rationing imposed by the market, which will be equal to the difference 
between the net placements of public debt (∆dg) and interest payments on that debt (gi), an amount 
that may even be negative. Since the loss of public debt placement as an instrument is a direct result of 
financial instability, these two latter variables appear with an asterisk in the banking instability box. 
Experience in the region indicates that the level of deficit defgprf allowed by the financial restriction 
under a sudden stop tends to be negative. In this way, an exceptional shock can endogenously and 
markedly reduce policy space. 
In situations of financial instability, the public sector is forced to provide subsidies that are not 
necessarily budgeted, such as central bank rescue operations that will appear on the central bank’s 
balance sheet, not on the government’s. However, since investors assess the government’s ability to pay 
as a whole, risk premiums may rise even if the government adjusts the deficit to the availability of funds, 
and the cost of servicing the debt (r) will simultaneously rise, because of doubts regarding the 
sustainability of the debt once the central bank cost of the rescue is taken into account. Similarly, a 
collapse of output may lead to a reassessment of the capacity for long-term growth (y), which also affects 
sustainability. To reflect this fact, the last box at the right presents defgpsos as the maximum primary 
deficit permitted by the fact that the public debt-GDP ratio cannot be greater than it was in the previous 
period (dt-1). Since the sudden stop affects growth and interest rates independently, asterisks have been 
placed on the variables r and y. Revised market expectations regarding long-term growth and interest 
rates may ultimately put the debt in an unsustainable position regardless of governmental decisions. If 
the debt becomes unsustainable for these reasons, the objective of reversing the situation by increasing 
the primary surplus to the level required by defgpsos will compete with the countercyclical objective. 
Fiscal adjustment policy to stabilize the debt will compete with countercyclical fiscal policy designed to 
stabilize the level of economic activity. 
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DIAGRAM II.2 














Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Diagram II.2 provides an overview of the imbalances and vulnerability factors associated with 
a trade shock44. As may be seen in the upper left box, a variety of events can trigger a trade shock, and 
all have occurred in Latin America. In the current situation, however, global recession is clearly the 
cause. According to a recent IMF study (Terrones and others, 2009) on the developed countries, it is 
the consequences of this type of shock that tend to be most lasting and hardest to reverse. Diagram 2 
also shows that the global recession can be felt in different ways: worsening terms of trade, declining 
export volumes, decreased remittances, a drop in tourism and declining foreign investment, especially 
in countries where free zone exports play an important role. All of these effects are present today. The 
terms of trade effect is particularly important in South America. In other subregions, such as Central 
America and the Caribbean, the falling price of oil is having a positive effect on the smallest countries, 
which are net importers. 
In terms of macroeconomic imbalances, the effects are similar to those of a sudden stop. 
However, this observational equivalence hides differences that are significant for our present purpose, 
mainly because the relevant vulnerability factors are not necessarily the same, and because the effects 
on the fiscal variables, and hence on the policy space, are different.  
The upper right box in diagram II.2 shows the risk factors that determine vulnerability. 
Although some of the macroeconomic vulnerability factors are shared by the two types of shock—
e.g., dollarization and high public debt—the real factors are more important in the case of a trade 
shock. Economies that specialize excessively in a few products, as is the case of most of Latin 
America’s economies, are particularly vulnerable macroeconomically, both to terms of trade shocks 
and to external demand in general. In a shock of this type, macroeconomic adjustment tends to require 
significant changes in relative prices. Thus, price inflexibility is a second risk factor, particularly 
important in economies with fixed or dollarized exchange rates. Structural duality is also a 
vulnerability factor that impedes rapid adjustment in response to a shock. For example, if there is a 
very large difference in productivity between export sectors and traditional sectors, it will be difficult 
for an exchange rate correction alone to increase the production of tradable goods. Adjustment is also 
difficult when the production of exportable goods is regionally very concentrated, and when there are 
strong political economy pressures to avoid the adjustment. 
As for the case of sudden stop, the four lower boxes of diagram II.2 show the most important 
macroeconomic imbalances associated with trade shocks, and each box shows the defgpi 
corresponding to the particular imbalance involved. Variables that tend to move independently are 
marked with asterisks. Note, however, that although the effects on the primary surplus may operate 
through the same variables as they do in sudden stops (the asterisk appears on the same variable), the 
                                                        
44
  On trade shocks, see Terrones and others (2009), Funke and others (2008), ECLAC (2008a) and Pineda and others (2009). 
Decline in output 
defgpcp = gd + gc* – td – tc*
Unsustainable public 
debt
defgpsos = (y*– r)dt-1
Distributive conflict 
(political economy)







•Regional concentration of exportables
•Poor business climate (FDI)
Structural change
Unemployment/Obsolescence
defgpest = gd* + gc – td* – tc
• Global recession
• Idiosyncratic shock










•Lower current account balance
•Real depreciation
•Declining investment
•Nominal depreciation / deflation
ECLAC – Project Documents collection Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives 
 55
form in which this occurs may be very different, and thus the stabilization policies required may 
differ. As diagram II.2 shows, three imbalances of major importance that are also present in the 
sudden stop scenario are declining output, debt sustainability problems and the imbalances associated 
with distributive conflicts. A fourth important source of imbalances, characteristic of high-intensity 
trade shocks, is the structural change normally provoked by shocks with these features. 
The structural change box has asterisks for spending and discretionary taxes, since such 
change tends to create specific demands for subsidies and tax exemptions on the part of the sectors 
affected by the trade shock. From a more positive perspective, public investment in infrastructure and 
human capital also tends to be necessary as part of the effort to adapt the country’s trade specialization 
profile to the new circumstances. This is most applicable if the effects are highly concentrated 
regionally or sectorally. These pressures determine a level of deficit defgpest. In their effects relating to 
pressure for discretionary policies, structural changes are similar to the demands that arise in 
distributive conflicts in general. Thus, after a severe trade shock, there will be a deficit associated with 
the distributive conflict (defgcd), and it may be very sizable. The features of the current crisis suggest 
that the demand for policies to mitigate its social effects will be in the spotlight in the near future. 
In the financial area, two realities that differ from those of the sudden stop scenario have 
important consequences for the fiscal policy space. The first is that a trade shock does not destabilize 
the banking system, for this occurs only in cases where the banking system is in a vulnerable situation 
that is further aggravated by the illiquidity created by the shock. Therefore, the box for banking 
instability does not appear in this diagram. A benign financial scenario can be a very positive factor in 
increasing policy space to stabilize the economy after a trade shock. In principle, a country with a 
good credit history can obtain financing to maintain its level of economic activity and thus prevent a 
collapse in the growth rate. This means that, depending on the circumstances, the net financing 
variable (∆dg -gi) may or may not have an asterisk. In any case, access to credit today is very limited 
due to the sudden stop, and credit can only be relied upon from the multilateral institutions. Even in a 
less adverse financial situation, a large trade shock may affect the sustainability of the public debt. In 
particular, if the shock is very strong and judged to be of lasting effect, sustainability will be affected 
by the expected decline in the economy’s growth rate. As a result, the y variable in the equation for the 
maximum primary deficit compatible with a constant debt appears with an asterisk here. Whether the r 
variable will have an asterisk or not depends on the course of the financial factors already cited.  
5.b. Exogenous shocks, policy space and coordination 
The stylized facts analyzed here show that a great diversity of elements independently affect the 
government’s primary deficit in situations of trade shocks and sudden stops. The facts also indicate 
that only by chance will the primary deficit levels compatible with the state of the cycle (defgcp), the 
distributive conflicts (defgcd), the sustainability of the public debt (defgsos), the structural change 
(defgest) and financial stability (defgrf) be equal. The scarcity of funds and instruments usually force a 
choice of priorities regarding objectives (and, accordingly, as to the amount of the primary deficit). 
The process of establishing priorities among objectives and allocating the use of scarce instruments 
among different policies requires a significant degree of coordination. Moreover, to be successful, 
policy coordination requires that incentives for the agents be responsible for implementing the policies 
in a decentralized fashion are in line with the objectives. This is difficult to achieve when 
decentralized agents have very different amounts of political power, and are able to act for their own 
interests and objectives, or can make use of instruments that were reserved for other policies. When 
this occurs, some policies prevail over others, leading to failures in the coordination sought by the 
central government. Worse yet, when power is highly dispersed, lack of coordination can lead to a 
fiscal crisis that prevents the government from taking initiatives to stabilize the economy, thus 
aggravating the effects of the shock. Diagram II.3 presents a stylized view of the relation among 
shocks, imbalances and coordination.  
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DIAGRAM II.3 













Source:  Prepared by the authors. 
 
Diagram II.3 underlines three points. The first is the fact, already cited, that each type of 
imbalance affects the government budget differently, and creates a need to define objectives and 
assign instruments so as to define a unique value for the primary fiscal surplus, which appears in the 
central box. The second point is that rules established beforehand for the use of funds and instruments 
will not necessarily be enforced during the actual event. This will depend on the government’s 
capacity to coordinate policy. The lower part of the diagram shows that, based on that capacity, the 
three possible results are coordination, policy dominance and crisis. In principle, the coordinated result 
should be the best, although it is not difficult to conceive of situations in which dominance could work 
effectively. The problem with the dominance scenario is that it is never clear whether it is, in fact, the 
objectives of the executive branch that ultimately prevail, rather than those of society at large. The 
crisis case is worse yet, because in such cases the situation is over-determined, and the final result of 
inconsistently applied measures will be indeterminate. 
Naturally, the greater the existing policy space, the greater will be the ability to coordinate 
policy. As has been pointed out, however, the policy space is not invariable with respect to the type 
and size of the shock and the economy’s vulnerability to it. It is to be expected, therefore, that the 
greater the shock, the more competition there will be among policies, both in terms of appropriation of 
available resources and in terms of the use of scarce instruments. Below, it will be discussed how the 
fiscal space changes, and the types of coordination problems that appear in the context of the two 
types of shocks being examined.  
As noted, during a sudden stop episode, the authorities have less resources they can allocate 
to stabilize the economy. In particular, the combination of a collapse in output with a reversal of 
capital flows is extremely difficult to manage. In these cases, external financing disappears precisely 
when tax revenues are diminishing. Resources must be allocated to sustain the banking system, and 
the amount of interest that must be paid on the public debt tends to increase. The latter is particularly 
true when short-term debt constitutes a high proportion of total public debt and the debt must be rolled 
over in a context of increasing risk premiums, as occurred in Brazil at the beginning of the 2000s 
(Blanchard, 2004) and in Argentina in the period that began in 1999 (Fanelli, 2008). 
As to the amount of competition between different objectives, sudden stops tend to create 
significant dilemmas: the goal of softening the collapse of output is pitted against other objectives, 
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the settlements system, ensuring the sustainability of the public debt, providing incentives for the 
competitiveness of the tradables sector, and cushioning the effects of the crisis on the poorest 
segments of the population. Case studies and episode studies provide evidence of how, in practice, the 
authorities resolve these conflicts between countercyclical policy and adjustment policy, designed to 
prevent the economy from embarking on a explosive path. Specifically, given the need to increase the 
deficit in order to stabilize aggregate demand and bring it to the defgpcp level, while at the same time 
ensuring the sustainability of the debt by generating a deficit equal to defgpsos, the second objective 
tends to prevail. When funds are needed to sustain the banking system, resources to stimulate the 
economy are pulled back. Thus, financial stabilization and public debt policy tend to prevail over the 
stabilization of aggregate demand. This dominance effect is not necessarily present in cases where the 
intensification of the financial constraints does not reach the level of a sudden stop, when neither 
financial stability nor debt sustainability is jeopardized, and when the government can therefore 
finance a countercyclical deficit. If the shock does not eliminate financing as an instrument, the 
government can allow a level of deficit equal to defgpcp, thus regaining its ability to adopt 
countercyclical policy. This level of deficit does not necessarily entail discretionary measures, and 
might be compatible with a constant structural surplus rule.  
In the case of financial shocks, the ambiguity of the term stabilization is apparent. If the 
financial shock takes the form of a sudden stop, debt markets close down, production collapses and 
interest rates increase significantly. If, as a consequence, the public debt is likely to become 
unsustainable, stabilization will mean implementing anti-crisis policies to keep the public debt, and 
hence the economy, from taking an explosive path, even at the expense of deepening the collapse in 
production. If, on the other hand, the financial shock does not become a sudden stop, and only takes 
the form of increased cost for short-term financing in public debt markets, then to “stabilize” will 
involve acting countercyclically to soften the decline in production, even at the cost of increasing the 
deficit and the public debt. This distinction between adjustment policy and countercyclical policy is 
useful as an illustration of the fact that the size of the available fiscal space is not independent of the 
type of shock occurring. In the case of fiscal measures to stabilize the economy after a sudden stop, it 
is by no means correct to state that the discretionary decisions of the authorities were procyclical. 
Rather, one must recognize that the policy of stabilizing the banks or the public debt, or both, takes 
precedence over the objective of stabilising production, notwithstanding pressure from other parts of 
the public sector for coordinated action to mitigate the effects of the shock on the productive structure 
and on vulnerable sectors of the society. 
This only reconfirms the point made by Tobin (1999) and Togo (2007), namely, that lack of 
policy instruments is associated with market failures. Here, we put forward a corollary to that 
argument: if the sudden stop aggravates the failures of the market, eliminating the public debt market 
through rationing, it is logical that this should intensify the scarcity of instruments. And if this is the 
case, it is also logical to suppose that the size of the policy space is not invariable with respect to the 
shocks. From this perspective, it is not appropriate to assess the procyclicality of fiscal policy 
econometrically, assuming that the space, and hence the degree of freedom to make discretionary 
decisions, remains constant over time and is independent of the type of shock affecting the economy.  
In reality, a sudden stop can significantly change the size of the fiscal space by reducing the 
number of policy instruments. Due to market failures, different policies tend to compete to use the 
same channels to influence objectives. This effect, which Tobin (1999) has dubbed the “common 
funnel”, produces correlations among the instruments, and this reduces the possibility of having a 
sufficient number of instruments to meet the policy objectives. For example, central banks are 
generally expected to use the domestic short-term bond market to carry out monetary policy, and in 
the absence of a domestic long-term bond market treasuries are expected to finance the fiscal deficit in 
external foreign markets, so as to prevent fiscal policy from interacting with monetary policy. When a 
sudden stop closes the markets, however, the treasury is forced to resort to domestic short-term 
markets. This leads to the common funnel effect: while the central bank intervenes in the market to 
meet inflation objectives, the treasury seeks to finance the deficit that arises from the countercyclical 
or adjustment objectives. Another common case of competition for use of instruments occurs when 
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balancing the budget requires a marked nominal depreciation, but the central bank is fearful of floating 
the exchange rate because of the need to maintain banking stability, and postpones the depreciation by 
sterilization operations. (On this type of problem, see Kaminsky and others, 2004). In this case, the 
exchange-rate instrument cannot meet two objectives simultaneously, and the result tends to be 
procyclical reductions in spending to prevent greater depreciation. If the central bank is hesitant to 
float the exchange rate and the treasury hesitates to implement adjustments, the result will be a failure 
of coordination that will lead, first, to a rapid loss of reserves, and then to a disorderly depreciation 
and problems of public debt sustainability. This is aggravated when the exchange rate is unavailable as 
an instrument, as is the case with fixed exchange-rate regimes. 
The stylized facts relating to exogenous trade shocks suggest that the effect of these shocks on 
the size of the fiscal space can be as great as that of sudden stops. However, because of the differences 
in the macroeconomic adjustment dynamics and the vulnerability factors mentioned above, the 
problems of stabilization and competition between policies for use of the fiscal space also differ. One 
important point is that the effect of sudden stops on the fiscal space takes the form, above all, of 
financial constraints, while trade shocks primarily affect fiscal resources for conducting fiscal 
stabilization policies. In addition, the specific form in which this occurs is highly dependent on the 
structure of the economy.  
One paradigmatic case is variations in resources induced by terms of trade shocks. There are 
three possible scenarios: (a) countries where the public sector owns a significant proportion of the 
natural resources (e.g., copper in Chile, or oil in Mexico and in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); 
(b) countries that tax exports, such as Argentina; and (c) economies that subsidize energy 
consumption, such as the Dominican Republic. While negative shocks from natural resources prices 
reduce resources in the former two cases, they increase them in the third. This differential effect is 
important for the policy space. In the case of governments whose revenues are positively correlated 
with natural resources prices, the policy space moves procyclically in relation to the global cycle. 
When the global economy slows down, the funds available for countercyclical policy also diminish, 
and it becomes more difficult to obtain external credit since, as Caballero (2000) points out, when 
international prices fall, the value of debt collateral follows suit. These facts have two implications. 
First, in defining the relationship between the cyclical and structural deficits it is essential to take into 
account not only the gap in output but the terms of trade. Second, even when a government is 
sufficiently solvent to make debt payments, a trade shock can create serious short-term liquidity 
problems as the value of collateral drops. 
When there is a trade shock without a sudden stop, the government’s resources diminish, but the 
option of borrowing does not. If the trade shock is transitory, the government has more possibility of 
implementing countercyclical policy and financing a larger fiscal deficit. It is also probable that the 
increased demands for assistance by sectors suffering from the shock will be addressed to a greater 
degree, and that pressure from distributive conflicts will be correspondingly reduced. This possibility 
shrinks considerably when the sustainability of the debt is in doubt. In fact, if sustainability is not a 
problem, the groups affected by a shock may exert very strong pressure—not only because they enjoy 
political representation, but because if they perceive that the government has some room for 
countercyclical policy they will exert pressure for discretionary initiatives to soften the external shock. In 
reality, when there is room for countercyclical policy and sectoral pressures are strong, such that the 
deficit required to satisfy these demands (defgcd) is high, the central issue is preventing the realization of 
such a deficit from ultimately jeopardising the sustainability of the debt. In such situations, a structural 
deficit rule can be a great help, because it is a functional instrument for rationalising discretionary 
spending. The government may argue that although it is capable of making and funding countercyclical 
policy, the primary deficit should not be far from the amount of the cyclical deficit (defgpcp). Obviously, 
it can also invoke the argument that an excessive increase of the deficit in a context where the value of 
collateral has fallen as a consequence of the shock could worsen government’s liquidity position. This 
second argument, however, will probably carry less weight in the political arena. Since structural deficit 
and liquidity management policy is invoked to ensure the sustainability of the debt and satisfy the 
demands for discretionary spending coming from the most vulnerable sectors and from domestic 
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producers, it is not surprising that the technical need to better coordinate adjustment and countercyclical 
policy becomes, in the political arena, a struggle between “national interests” and producers on one hand, 
and domestic “rent-seekers and global financial capitalism” on the other. Nevertheless, political 
economy issues are beyond the scope of this article. The point being put forth here is that distributive 
conflicts have a role in determining how problems of policy dominance are resolved, and also, therefore, 
in determining the size of the policy space. 
Trade shocks are not always negative, and thus in good times, government resources increase 
significantly, especially in countries where the State receives some of the profit from natural 
resources. Jiménez and Tromben (2006) analyze this issue in Latin America and show that the 
magnitude of the increase can be very significant. In these cases, the best option seems to be to 
accumulate a sovereign fund in good times, which can be used to finance initiatives that soften the 
effects of adverse shocks. Accordingly, the analytical approach to the fiscal space should have a 
significant intertemporal dimension. The example of Chile, which is the country in the region that has 
advanced furthest on this path, suggests that better intertemporal distribution of resources could 
contribute to structurally increasing the fiscal stabilization space. A fund accumulated on the basis of 
good-times surpluses would be a contribution to mitigating the impact of financial constraints in bad 
times, and thus preventing adjustment policies from prevailing over countercyclical ones. At the same 
time, we have seen that one stylized fact of Latin American macroeconomy is that consumption is 
highly volatile, and this is particularly detrimental to the most vulnerable sectors. It follows that more 
stable consumption levels could significantly improve wellbeing of the poor (ECLAC, 2008a). 
However, it should be emphasized that creating a fund of this sort does not obviate the need 
for policy coordination, since such funds could have negative side effects in countries exposed to 
sudden stops and procyclical capital flows. The existence of such a fund could ultimately create 
incentives to take financial risks in good times, if market participants perceive that it will always be 
possible to flee to quality in bad times. Thus, the creation of a stabilization fund must be accompanied 
by appropriate financial regulations to prevent this. Appropriate economic policy must also 
complement the existence of the fund. New governments will always be tempted to draw on 
accumulated resources to increase discretionary spending. However, Latin America has progressed in 
its macroeconomic management during the good times that ended with the high-risk mortgage crisis, 
which suggests that it may in the future be in a position to address the complex tasks involved in 
structural enlargement of the fiscal space. 
6. Final remarks 
Viewing the region’s situation from the perspective of the analysis set forth here, an abnormally sharp 
recession induced by trade shocks or sudden stops, or both, is a very concrete threat. As regards 
financial imbalances and public debt sustainability, the situation for the time being appears better than 
it was during other episodes of contagion, such as those of 1998-2002 (Bárcena and others, 2009). 
There is little room for optimism, however, since the constraints already operating have been 
sufficient to create major recessive forces, and financial balances seem to be occurring in a razor’s-
edge context. In reality, the fact that the financial toll has been less severe in the current crisis than in 
the last episode of contagion could have to do with the reasons put forward at the beginning of the 
crisis regarding Latin America’s decoupling. The hope at that time was that progress in controlling the 
risk factors that determine vulnerability—accumulation of international reserves, reduction of public 
debt levels and de-dollarization of liabilities—had driven an effective decoupling process. Some 
progress had also been made in controlling the weaknesses of the financial system—though to certain 
countries these were not a problem, simply because their lack of financial development prevented 
over-leveraging. Despite these advances, however, the decoupling did not materialize. As we have 
seen, capital flows flagged, a number of countries were obliged to use their reserves, and the level of 
economic activity has been falling. 
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It emerges from this analysis that fiscal policy spaces are not invariant, and, more 
importantly, that they are sensitive to pre-shock behaviour and tend to undergo significant changes 
with large shocks. There is no doubt that the current shocks have reduced fiscal policy space and will 
create challenging dilemmas by increasing competition between policies for existing resources and 
instruments. Thus, the ability of the governments to coordinate policy will depend critically on factors 
such as the organization of the public sector and the effectiveness of the bureaucracy and institutions 
in managing conflicts when policy spaces are reduced. For example, it will be more difficult to 
coordinate policy in decentralized countries where subnational governments have a great deal of 
political weight, or where there is more demand for job or social assistance policies. Moreover, as is 
well-known, the proper use of resources and policy instruments depends on the quality of the 
bureaucracy and the credibility of institutions. 
One point to underline is that, above all, the sudden stop puts forces in motion that tend to 
restrict the fiscal space precisely when the authorities most need it. In this sense, the fiscal space 
behaves procyclically: it shrinks with negative shocks, and increases once capital movements recover 
and the sudden stop episode is past. Therefore, it is crucial to create incentives to increase the fiscal 
space in boom times. One question confronting fiscal stabilization policy is: what factors can reverse 
the conditions that come together to create a sudden stop? This is a key element in deciding where to 
focus fiscal efforts in a situation of very limited policy spaces and exceptional shocks. Although it is 
beyond the scope of the present paper to explore this question, the authors believe that the distinction 
made here between the different meanings of “stabilization” in relation to fiscal policy is central, as 
are the distinctions between adjustment policy, countercyclical policy and anti-crisis policy. One 
example will suffice to illustrate the complexity of the dilemmas involved. 
The stylized facts discussed here underline the importance of the changes in governance 
(regulations, ownership, contracts) that crises usually induce, and the way in which this creates a need 
for higher private-sector profitability to compensate for institutional risk (i.e., a poor business climate). 
Escaping exceptional recession traps requires exceptional increases in profitability. In Latin America, 
such exceptional profits typically appear after sharp currency depreciations in the wake of shocks. 
Depreciation works to reduce real wages and the cost of non-tradable inputs for the tradable sector. 
Although the decline in non-tradable sector wages and income can intensify the recession in the short 
term, the generation of exceptional profit opportunities in the tradable sector is crucial for reversing the 
negative expectations of some key investors when a productive collapse has occurred. As a general rule, 
the reversal of profit expectations in the short term tends to be more important in the export sector than 
in the import substitution sector, due to the presence of low domestic demand. In Latin America, traps 
are overcome when the tradable sector succeeds in regaining its profitability. When this recovery is 
insufficient, as it was in the lost decade of the 1980s, where the international situation provided no help 
via exports, recessions are prolonged and economies remain caught in the trap. 
Since governments in Latin America represent a good portion of the tradable sector, and 
tradables are a key factor in recession/expansion dynamics, it is surprising that the literature on the 
cyclical behaviour of the public sector devotes so little attention to this point. For example, 
governments whose revenues are linked to natural resources typically confront the dilemma of 
whether to depreciate the currency to re-establish debt sustainability and obtain resources in a situation 
of rationed credit, or avoid depreciation in order to protect wages and the level of economic activity in 
the short term. Thus, for example, a sudden stop poses the dilemma of whether to re-route what is a 
probably an unstable path in terms of debt, by generating a primary surplus, or to implement 
countercyclical policies in the traditional sense. In light of these facts, it is hardly surprising that one 
should often see recovery of the fiscal surplus precede an economy’s escape from productive collapse 
in Latin America. By ensuring the sustainability of the debt through depreciation, the public sector 
simultaneously restores the profitability of the tradable sector, and reduces the likelihood that property 
rights will be violated as a result of the public sector finding itself without funds. Thus, under such 
circumstances, acting countercyclically in the short term might be the only way to stabilise the 
economy. Once the private sector’s perception that the State is likely to appropriate profits subsides, 
investment increases sharply and begins, along with exports, to help pull the economy out of the trap. 
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In the new environment, fiscal policy space expands, and the government is likely to be pressured into 
compensating those who were losers in the crisis. One must, of course, take account of the fact that the 
perceptions of private interest groups, as to the latitude that the public sector has available to meet 
their demands, also changes with the cycle, and may vary procyclically.  
If the current situation is viewed from this perspective, the most serious problem is the fact that a 
sudden stop is coinciding with a trade collapse generated by the global recession. Under these conditions, it 
appears unlikely that exports will provide the effective demand that the economy needs. Thus, although the 
tradable sector must not be neglected, all available credit margin must be used to prevent a deepening of the 
cycle. If the recession worsens, international trade cannot be relied upon to avert the recession trap. In such 
a situation, countercyclical financing from international institutions is essential. 
The analysis here shows that the diagnosis and cure in situations where procyclical fiscal 
decisions are discretionary and politically autonomous must differ from what is called for in situations 
where procyclical discretionary initiatives are designed to adjust the needs to the funds available, or to 
serve the imperative of protecting the sustainability of the public debt. When the decisions are 
autonomous, the problem is one of political economy, but when financial constraints compel 
decisions, the problem becomes the lack of instruments, in conditions that intensify failures of the 
financial markets. It is in the latter case that the assistance of international institutions is most 
important. Greater access to credit, with funds and instruments being provided at a critical moment, 
can temper the financial constraints and expand the countercyclical fiscal policy space, reducing the 
need for excessively severe adjustment policies. If the problem is one of political economy, and the 
need for adjustment derives from excessive spending, it becomes more likely that the new resources 
will be used ineffectively. However, since it is clear that the sudden stop we are seeing today is 
exogenous and originated in the developed world, the increased availability of multilateral funding 
will be of great assistance. External support makes even more sense considering that the combination 
of sudden stop and trade shock aggravates market failures, generating an endogenous and procyclical 
contraction of the policy space. 
Currently, major efforts are being made to adapt the international financial architecture to the 
needs of the moment. In this context, the recapitalization of the IMF, the greater role of the emerging 
countries via the G-20, and the reformed Financial Stability Forum are auspicious signs. Nevertheless, 
a long road remains to be travelled. For example, little progress has been made in articulating 
multilateral initiatives with regional ones along the lines suggested by Ocampo (2008) and Park 
(2008). From a Latin American perspective, it seems obvious that the region should make use of 
institutional structures and draw on successful experiences of collaboration (e.g., the Latin American 
Reserve Fund) to design regional responses to global problems. 
From the perspective of the analysis presented here, one of the central issues requiring further 
thought is the relationship between international efforts and the national policies that accompany 
them. What should the content of these policies be, and how can they best be coordinated with 
international efforts? It is in the interest of the global economy to prevent the recession in Latin 
America from deepening to a point that the decline in the region’s exports aggravates a similar decline 
in the rest of the world. One key challenge for fiscal policy in Latin America is to update the content 
of policies to take into account findings on volatility and on the current exceptional trade and 
international finance situation. However, examining the content of anti-volatility policies only makes 
sense if governments have sufficient space (funds and instruments) to formulate macroeconomic 
policy and coordinate it with other policy areas.  
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Chapter III. The role of tax policy in the context of 
the crisis: possibilities and limitations 
Juan Carlos Gómez Sabaini45 and Juan Pablo Jiménez46 
1. Introduction47 
The financial crisis has had a significant impact in Latin America and the Caribbean, moving through 
all of the various channels that connect Latin America with the rest of the world: trade, capital flows, 
remittances and foreign direct investment. This has resulted in a series of simultaneous negative 
effects on the region’s economies: declining exports (in terms of both volume and price), severe 
limitations on access to capital markets, a decrease in remittances and a reduction in the flow of 
foreign direct investment. 
These factors affect public finances, while at the same time limiting governments’ ability to 
respond. Tax revenues are declining significantly as a result of the economic slowdown/recession and 
the drop in commodity prices. Moreover, the fiscal stimulus packages implemented by the countries 
will cause a further decline in their fiscal balances. To compensate for the distributive costs of the 
crisis, the countries have adopted contingency measures. Finally, in tandem with shrinking fiscal 
balances, the flow of external financing has slowed significantly. This worsening in fiscal 
performance comes on the heels of several years of improved performance in the region’s public 
accounts, which had allowed for a lowering of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
The seriousness of the worsening fiscal situation, along with the possibility that it could lead to 
solvency problems, is closely linked to the pre-crisis fiscal position, and will be affected by how long the 
crisis lasts. The crisis and its impacts vary from country to country, demanding different responses, due 
both to differences in the causes and effects, and to countries’ differing capacities and resources. 
                                                        
45
  ECLAC consultant. 
46
  Economic Affairs Officer of the Economic Development Division of ECLAC. 
47
  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the Forum “European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean – Fiscal 
policies in times of crisis: volatility, social cohesion and the political economics of the reforms”. The authors wish to thank Juan 
O’Farrell and Andrea Podestá for their assistance as well as Oscar Cetrángolo, Osvaldo Kacef, Teresa Ter-Minassian and the 
participants at the forum for the comments and suggestions. 
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This document focuses in particular on the impact of the crisis on tax revenues, and on the countries’ 
policy responses to the crisis. It also examines potential lines of action that countries could undertake. 
The present report approaches this situation by analysing tax issues and examining how they 
interact with the current economic situation. It begins by presenting an assessment of the principal 
stylised features of the changing fiscal and tax policy of the last several years. It then looks at the 
possible impact of the crisis on this situation, and the level of risk to which each country is exposed. 
Following this, it examines the main fiscal and tax measures adopted, as well as issues of political 
economy that could hinder the implementation of reforms to address the crisis. Finally, it presents 
some thoughts on which paths would be most advantageous over the coming years. 
2. What has occurred in Latin American and the Caribbean over 
the last decade with regard to fiscal and tax policy? 
The past decade has been marked by various fiscal-policy reforms. On the revenue side, the decade 
continued previous years’ pattern of declining revenue from foreign trade, with import substitution 
leading to the rapid expansion and strengthening of value added taxes across the region48. 
The downsizing of the public sector’s role as a provider of various public goods and services was 
consolidated. This included attracting private capital to the development of public services infrastructure49. 
During the 1990s, many of the region’s countries reassigned powers and authorities among 
the different levels of government, a process commonly known as “decentralisation”, although the 
actual measures deviated from the concept50. As a result of this process, subnational governments now 
play a more important role in public administration, with greater participation in execution of the 
public budget. 
Also during this period, a number of the region’s countries reformed their pension systems, 
introducing components of individual capitalisation51, a trail that Chile blazed for the region in 1981. 
As will be seen in more detail below, these reforms have had a major impact on the public finances of 
the region’s countries. 
As regards the performance of public accounts, two periods of change in the last decade can 
be clearly distinguished, the first running from 1998 to 2001, the second from 2002 to 2008. 
During the earlier of these two periods, fiscal policy unfolded against a challenging 
macroeconomic backdrop, both domestically and internationally. In some cases, aggravating factors, 
such as the weakening of the United States and a decline in the terms of trade among petroleum-
dependent economies, also played a role. 
In the more highly indebted countries, the volatility of capital markets, deteriorating 
international financial conditions, and the constraints this imposed on the ability of public sectors to 
access financing had a major impact. 
Given this situation, the region’s economies had less freedom in their fiscal policies. One 
manifestation of this was that most of the governments in those years were executing or negotiating 
programmes with the IMF involving restrictive economic policies —policies that, in some cases, 
unwittingly intensified the effects of the economic cycle. 
Moreover, the unfavourable macroeconomic circumstances affected, directly or indirectly, the 
tax revenues of nearly all countries in the region. 
                                                        
48
  For more detail, see Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini (2007). 
49
  For more detail, see Lucioni (2009). 
50
  For an overview of fiscal decentralisation processes in the region, see ECLAC (2003).  
51
  According to ECLAC (2006), the reforms introduced may be classified in three broad categories: substitutive, those that include 
parallel regimes, and those based on instituting mixed models. 
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While more expansive fiscal policy tools may have been called for during the recession years, 
few countries adopted a fiscal management approach during those years that would have provided 
greater political space to establish effective fiscal policies.  
Furthermore, the various structural reforms carried out during the 1990s did not bring greater 
solvency to governments or solve the problems associated with high levels of debt. On the contrary, many of 
these policies postponed necessary reforms by creating temporary solvency, paving the way for major capital 
inflows (some involving privatisations), thus aggravating fiscal imbalances (lack of equitable reforms to social 
programmes in some countries), reducing government resources (through economic liberalisation and reduced 
tariffs) and intensifying pressures that led to increased spending (decentralisation). 
This period was one of major deterioration in the fiscal accounts of the region’s countries, 
which, on average, did not show a primary surplus, making it clear that, even apart from the debt 
problem, governments were experiencing serious financial problems. In 1998, while the simple 
average primary balance for the central governments in the region was close to equilibrium, 2001 
marked the highest primary deficit (0.7% of GDP) of the last ten years. If one takes into account the 
overall deficit (including interest on the public debt), the average deficit rose from 1.2% of GDP in 
1997 to 3.3% in 2001 (see figure III.1). 
 
FIGURE III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REVENUE, EXPENDITURES, AND PRIMARY 
AND OVERALL BALANCE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, 1990-2008 














Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
Thus, the fragile condition of the region’s public sector left little room for using fiscal policy 
to foster macroeconomic stability. While uncertainty regarding resources forced governments to pare 
spending as much as possible, efforts to limit the deficit were hindered by negative effects from 
external factors. The attempt to achieve greater fiscal solvency conflicted with recommendations for a 
countercyclical fiscal policy. This, along with the difficulty of financing higher temporary fiscal 
deficits in the domestic and international credit markets during a crisis, skewed fiscal policy toward a 
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At the same time, the emphasis during this period on rebuilding the credibility of 
macroeconomic authorities and on establishing budget deficit goals that would remain constant 
throughout the economic cycle partially weakened the effect of the automatic stabilisers, thus further 
increasing the procyclical nature of fiscal policy. 
Capital expenditures proved to be the variable in budgetary spending adjustments, reaching, 
in 2000, their lowest level for the period. Capital investment and transfers, given their more flexible 
nature, were the areas of adjustment most frequently relied upon to meet fiscal goals. In much of the 
region, the norm was to cut infrastructure investment, as well as capital transfers to key productive 
sectors, while postponing public enterprise projects. 
Finally, the slowdown in economic activity in 2001 directly affected the changing debt ratios 
of the region’s countries. The macroeconomic reality and the budget deficits, added to currency 
depreciation in many of the countries, led, in many cases, to an increase in public debt. Thus, the end 
of this period saw a large increase in debt, adding even greater inflexibility to fiscal policy. The 
region’s public debt as a percentage of GDP in the non-financial public sector rose from 43% in 1997 
to a peak of 65% in 2002. 
This situation illustrates a special characteristic of public finances in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: when capital flows fall drastically, the public sector’s financing needs rise, both because of 
the slowdown in economic activity and because the cost of the external public debt, in national 
currency, increases. 
In contrast, the 2002-2008 period saw a sharp improvement in the budgetary balance for the 
region’s countries. Of the 19 countries commonly cited, only five still had a primary central 
government deficit as of 2008, a significant contrast with 2002, when 11 countries had such deficits. 
The vulnerability of the region’s countries to external factors decreased during this period, 
due to the improved public accounts balance and the decline in public debt as a percentage of GDP. 
On the basis of changes in fiscal variables, this period can be subdivided into two parts, the 
first running from 2002 to 2004, the second from 2005 to 2008. While the fiscal improvement of 
2002-2004 was based on greater tax revenue and the fact that spending, on average, grew less than 
GDP in the region52, the growth of the primary surpluses between 2004 and 2008 was due to a sharp 
increase in revenue that more than compensated for the increased public spending. 
The marked increase in fiscal revenues of recent years has brought public resources, on 
average, to unprecedented levels in the region. While tax collections averaged 15.6% of GDP during 
1990-1995, they rose to 17.4% in 2001-2005, and to 20% for the last three years of the period. 
A number of factors converged in the latter years to produce the high levels of tax revenue. 
The significant increase in economic activity had a strong impact on tax collections. Indeed, the higher 
level of activity produced a rise in tax revenue not only because of the changing composition of GDP, 
but also because of improved tax enforcement53. At the same time, increasing prices for some 
countries’ primary products have contributed to higher tax revenues54 55. 
                                                        
52
  This situation is largely a result of the change in relative prices caused by the devaluation of some of the region’s currencies 
(Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay) at the end of the last decade and the beginning of the current one. While public spending is, for the 
most part, denominated in local currency, the income generated from the tradables sectors of the economy changes in tandem with 
the dollar. To see this effect at work in the end of convertibility in Argentina, see Cetrángolo and Jiménez (2003), and for more 
detail regarding the effect of exchange rate shocks on fiscal sustainability, see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007). 
53
  In general, the elasticity of tax collections is greater than one. In the expansion phases of the cycle, they increase more than 
proportionally, due to the fact that growth produces an increase of the formal economy and generates more than proportional 
growth in imports and the associated taxes. In recessive phases, on the other hand, collections fall more than proportionally due to 
the fact that the same mechanisms operate in reverse, as well as from increased tax evasion. 
54
  An additional explanation of this increase is the large rise in tax rates over of the last few years. As regards the value added tax 
(the main source of tax revenues in the region), its average rate as of May 2007 was 14.7%, whereas it was 11.7% in 1994. 
55
  In addition, it should be noted that a number of the region’s countries have fully implemented taxes that are normally considered 
emergency measures, including the financial transactions tax currently in place in Argentina, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru. 
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This increase in prices of the region’s commodities exerted a significant upward pressure on 
tax revenues. The governments of the region have developed different ways of taking fiscal advantage 
of these resources. In the case of agricultural products, Argentina has financed a substantial portion of 
its spending with funds generated by export duties. The governments of countries with major non-
renewable resources have various mechanisms for using this circumstance to fiscal advantage, and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela created new taxes to 
increase revenue from their non-renewable resources56. Taken together, income from these sources led 
to average growth in total fiscal revenue in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico of 27.9%, 7.7%, 8.3% and 29.4%, respectively, during the 1990s, and of 34.3%, 17.8%, 
13.6% and 37.1% in 2006-2008, thus exerting a major effect on total revenues (see figure III.2).  
 
FIGURE III.2 
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES)a: FISCAL REVENUES OF COUNTRIES 
SPECIALIZING IN PRIMARY PRODUCTS 




















Source:  Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a
  Includes Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and the 
 Plurinational State of Bolivia.  
 
Two aspects of tax policy are noteworthy. The first is the increase in the tax burden between 
1990 and 2008. From an average level of 13.3% of GDP in 1990-92, it rose (if one includes social 
security) to 17.6% in 2005-2008 (see figure III.3). In absolute terms, it rose by 4.3% of GDP, or 32%. 
Despite the positive trend, it should be noted that the revenue of the region’s countries is low, 
both in relation to their needs and with respect to their level of development. Figure III.4 shows the 
revenue levels of each country for 2008 as a percentage of GDP. 
 
                                                        
56
  For more detail, see Jiménez and Tromben (2006).  
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FIGURE III.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHANGING TAX BURDEN IN LATIN AMERICA 













Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
Note:  The figures correspond to central government, except in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the 
 Plurinational State of Bolivia, where they refer to the general government. 
 
FIGURE III.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): TAX BURDEN BY COUNTRY, 2008 














Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
Note:  The figures correspond to central government, except in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the 
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In terms of the relation between tax burden and level of development, Figure III.5 shows that 
only five Latin American countries have tax burdens that are high or appropriate for their level of 
development, while the tax burden in the remaining 14 countries is below what these countries should 
have, based on their per capita GDP. 
 
FIGURE III.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: WORLDWIDE COMPARISON OF TAX BURDEN VS. PER 
CAPITA GDP IN PPP 














Source: Jiménez J.P. and A. Podestá (2008), “Tributación y equidad: desafíos para América Latina”, Santiago, Chile, 
 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
 
Another important factor to bear in mind is the high volatility of tax revenues in Latin 
America. The average volatility in the region, as measured by its standard deviation, is nearly three 
times greater than in the developed countries. This has important consequences in terms of the ability 
of the public sector to play a stabilising role. In addition, excessive tax revenue volatility has a major 
impact on the most vulnerable segments of the population, since it leads to fluctuations in social 
spending by the government. 
Structurally, another important factor has been the growth in the value added tax (VAT), both 
in absolute terms and proportionally. While the VAT represented an average of 3.3% of GDP and 
24.4% of tax revenues at the beginning of the 1990-1992 period, the figures for 2005-2008 were 6.4% 
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FIGURE III.6 















Source: R. López Monti, “Real volatility and cyclical fiscal policy in Latin America and developed countries”, Santiago, 
 Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009, unpublished. 
 
FIGURE III.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPARISON OF TAX STRUCTURES 














Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
The rising VAT in all of the countries has clearly been one of the most significant phenomena 
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income tax responsible for 38.8% and wealth taxes a mere 6.4%, while taxes on foreign trade pushed 
in the opposite direction, accounting for -11.2% of the total change (see table III.1). 
 
TABLE III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: APPROXIMATE PROPORTIONAL WEIGHT OF FACTORS 
ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGE IN OVERALL TAX BURDEN, 
1990-1992 AND 2005-2008 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Category 1990-1992 2005-2008 Absolute change Percentage change 
Income 2.9 4.5 1.7 38.8% 
Property 0.4 0.7 0.3 6.4% 
VAT (general, on goods and services) 3.3 6.4 3.1 72.9% 
Excise tax on goods and services 1.9 1.7 -0.2 -4.4% 
Foreign trade 1.8 1.4 -0.5 -11.2% 
Other taxes 0.7 0.4 -0.3 -8.1% 
Social security 2.3 2.5 0.2 5.7% 
Total tax revenues 13.3 17.6 4.3 100.0% 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
 
These tax averages for the region certainly have their extremes: at one end, with the highest 
levels, the countries that led the rise in the regional tax burden, such as Brazil and Argentina; at the 
other extreme, countries like Mexico and Guatemala, where there has been the least amount of change 
in tax burdens (see figure III.8). 
 
FIGURE III.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DISPERSION OF TAX BURDEN, BY COUNTRY 
1990-1992 AND 2005-2008 





















Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: The figures correspond to central government, except in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the 
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An overview of the regional situation, which has been analyzed in various studies on the 
issue, reveals some facts that are pertinent to the current situation. These (not listed in order of 
importance) are as follows57: 
• The personal income tax, which is focused on wages and salaries, may require 
compensatory measures to avoid both erosion of family incomes and increased tax 
inequity vis-à-vis exempt sources of income such as capital gains. 
• Not only has the increase in income tax been concentrated principally on corporate 
profits, but there are also some features that contribute to lower tax revenues, such as the 
absence of transfer fees, the use of imperfect standards on the future treatment of business 
losses, and the lack of controls on movements relating to tax havens, as well as treatment 
of corporate financing that is more favourable to third party funds than to reinvestment of 
profits within a business. In crisis situations, these elements erode the tax base and have a 
negative effect on countries’ income tax collections. 
• The favourable change in the tax burden has been sustained, given the increases in both 
private and public consumption, since the latter is also subject to value added tax for 
goods and services acquired. 
• The process of concentrating taxation on a few, essentially selective, taxes, has pros and 
cons in terms of rapidly capturing new resources, since a strong dependency on the VAT 
makes revenue extraordinarily dependent on consumption, the area most sensitive to 
crisis situations. 
• This feature is intensified by the high proportion of VAT revenues that derive from 
importation of goods, since these imports change in crisis situations even more markedly 
than final consumption, especially in the present circumstances, in which the erosion of 
international trade has been so rapid. 
• Selective taxes on consumption have focused, in the last few years, on alcohol and 
tobacco and on other consumer goods, as well as on fuels and crude oil as intermediate 
goods. In the former case, the reduction in private sector income affects revenue, while in 
the latter, revenues are hurt by the lower level of economic activity. In neither case are 
the taxes countercyclical. 
• The area in which the crisis has an immediate effect on revenue is that of imports. The 
effects on the VAT have already been noted, but no less important, or even more 
important for small countries, are the effects of declining import duties in many 
countries, where customs revenues are falling steadily from one day to the next. 
• Although there are no clear and precise indicators showing that tax administration 
improved substantially in the region’s countries during the high-growth period, there is a 
general sense that it is better than it was. If true, the region is better equipped than in 
previous crises to deal with increasing tax delinquency (whether due to evasion or late 
payment), a phenomenon that can be expected to occur. 
• Measuring greater administrative efficiency by increases in collections can lead to serious 
errors, since it is strongly affected by changes in exogenous variables. Unfortunately, few 
studies have attempted to quantify progress in administrative efficiency, and those that 
exist are inconclusive. 
• One favourable indicator would seem to be the increased productivity of the VAT and 
reductions in the level of VAT evasion in countries where that tax is levied. The former 
factor, however, is due principally to increasing the tax base by eliminating exemptions 
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  Álvarez (2008), Arias (2008), Cabrera (2008), Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini (2008), Jorrat (2008) and Roca (2008). 
ECLAC – Project Documents collection Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives 
73 
for goods that were previously exempt, and by incorporating formerly exempt services in 
the tax base. 
• Meanwhile, although absolute levels of VAT evasion remain high, the decline in the rates 
may be considered a favourable factor in the context of improving tax administration. 
However, the asymmetry between VAT evasion and the high levels of failure to pay 
income tax shows that considerable overall improvement in the region’s tax systems is 
still needed. 
In short, a brief analysis of past changes indicates that there has indeed been progress in the 
area of taxation in Latin America and the Caribbean, in term of both public revenues and changes in 
tax structures. These advances, however, are focused on the VAT and the concentration of taxes, 
which have put more emphasis on solvency and economic efficiency than on distributive issues and 
compensatory policies. 
The current tax structure within the region has serious problems in terms of its capacity to 
improve income distribution. Moreover, the reforms of the last two decades demonstrate that 
improving the distributive effect has not been a policy priority, and that any actual improvements in 
income distribution (e.g., as a consequence of replacing inflationary financing by taxation in the 
public sector) have occurred only as an indirect result, rather than as an explicit aspect, of the reform 
policies (Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini, 2007). 
Following this line of analysis, it is instructive to refer to a simulation study on the tax 
reforms needed to improve income distribution (Gómez Sabaini, 2006). As figure 9 shows, all of the 
tax categories in the Latin American tax systems, except for income tax, are regressive, with after-tax 
Gini coefficients (Gpost) higher than pre-tax coefficients (Gpre). 
 
FIGURE III.9 
LATIN AMERICA: REGIONAL AVERAGE INCOME CONCENTRATION INDICES 














Source: C. Gómez Sabaini, “Evolución y situación tributaria actual en América Latina: una serie de temas para la 
 discusión”, Tributación en América Latina. En busca de una nueva agenda de reformas, ECLAC books 
 No. 93 (LC/G.2324-P), O. Cetrángolo and J.C. Gómez Sabaini (comps.), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
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3. How is the international crisis likely to impact tax systems? 
Although it is still difficult to determine the magnitude of the impact of the crisis on tax revenues in 
the countries of the region, criteria can be established to differentiate between those with exportable 
primary products that represent potential large tax bases (such as oil, copper, natural gas and 
commodities) and those that lack such natural resources and whose tax revenues depend on income 
levels and domestic economic activity. 
As ECLAC (2008c) points out in relation to the first group, a number of the region’s 
countries garner major tax revenues from the exploitation of basic resources, that is, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador and Colombia (petroleum), the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
(gas), Chile and Peru (mining), and Argentina (agricultural goods) (see figure III.10). 
 
FIGURE III.10 
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): REVENUES OF COUNTRIES WITH ECONOMIES 
BASED ON PRIMARY PRODUCTS 














Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
The second group includes mega-economies in the region, such as Brazil, which has achieved 
a sustained increase in its tax revenues during the past decade, as well as other economies where the 
tax burden has risen only slightly, or has even fallen somewhat, as in Central America.  
In the case of the first group of countries, fiscal resources are highly volatile, given the 
pronounced price instability of the goods in question, especially during times when consumption in 
the developed countries is declining sharply due to the economic crisis. 
In the current crisis, a number of different factors strongly impact tax revenues from these 
goods, affecting either their prices or the volumes sold. There has been a notable drop in the prices of 
commodities, which, after reaching near-historical levels, have begun to fall significantly, as shown in 
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FIGURE III.11 














Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of information provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
 Development (UNCTAD). 
 
At the same time, the recession in the developed economies and the significant slowdown in 
the developing countries will have a negative impact on trade flows, since there will be a decline in 
demand for Latin American goods and services. Figure I.2 of chapter 1 charts the abrupt slowdown in 
world and regional growth. 
As regards the slowdown in Latin America and the Caribbean in particular, ECLAC estimates 
that, on average, the economy will contract by 1.9% in 2009; that the countries most affected will be 
Mexico (-7.0% growth), Costa Rica (-3.0%) and Paraguay (-3.0%), while Haiti, Panama, Peru, and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia will maintain positive growth of 2.0% or higher (see figure III.12). 
As mentioned above, this recession/slowdown reduces international trade flows, negatively 
affecting the tax revenues of both groups of countries. However, the effect on exports will not be the 
same across all of the region’s countries, but rather will depend on the export destinations and types of 
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FIGURE III.12 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
A fourth element affecting the level of economic activity and tax revenues is the downturn in 
private consumption, both by residents and by the tourist industry, which has become quite significant 
in many countries. The reduction in domestic consumption is also affected by the lower levels of 
remittances sent by citizens living abroad, as shown in figure 8 of chapter I. Naturally, the importance 
of remittances varies widely from country to country, being most significant in the Caribbean and 
Central America and, within South America, in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and in Ecuador. 
Thus, a 20%-30% decline in remittances means a corresponding decline of between US$ 10 billion 
and US$ 20 billion in resources. 
Fifth, tightened credit in the production and consumption sectors, along with growing uncertainty, 
is delaying investment decisions in a wide range of activities, leading to a loss of work income and 
employee benefits. This has an immediate impact on tax revenues from payroll and wage withholding and, 
in a less immediate way, leads to less money in the form of advance payments on worker benefits. The loss 
of income tax revenue on business profits will be recovered only in the long term, since nearly all of the 
countries have provisions allowing losses to be charged against future profits. 
Sixth, although the slowdown in traditional and non-traditional exports —including maquila 
activity in countries where such activity is important— does not have an immediate impact, since 
these activities are not taxed, the slowdown nevertheless has a highly significant impact on taxes from 
wages, salaries and benefits. 
Seventh, these economic and financial conditions are clearly producing some shrinkage, 
along with a decrease in tax compliance. Although the countries have adjusted the interest rates they 
charge for late payments, the financial constraints of the last few months can be expected to increase 
late payment of taxes. 
Finally, the rapidity of the onset of the crisis during 2008, which took a number of countries 
by surprise —despite the fact that it had been evident in the United States since the second half of 
2007—created distortions in budget estimates for 2009. It must be borne in mind that the budget 
process generally begins six months before the start of the fiscal year, and at the time in question 
many countries did not yet have estimates projecting the end-2008 situation. Moreover, budgets are 
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stage. Thus, revenues were calculated based on higher commodity prices than projected later for 2009, 
and the explicit purpose of the actual or projected measures was in many cases to weaken the effects 
of what at the time was accelerating inflation. These circumstances led to an underestimation of tax 
revenues, with significant differences between amounts budgeted and subsequent realities. 
A comprehensive analysis of tax revenues reveals a series of common facts, and confirms the 
impact of the elements cited above. On the one hand, there has been an immediate initial impact on 
import taxes, with reductions of around 20% over the previous year. Although the reduction in imports 
has an immediate effect on revenues during slowdowns, these revenues also recover quickly when 
economic conditions change. 
On the other hand, the decline in imports not only impacted revenue from import 
tariffs/duties, but also had an effect on the value added tax charged at customs. This is especially 
worrisome in terms of the inflow of public funds, given the importance of customs-generated VAT, 
which in many countries is between 40% and 50% of total VAT revenues. 
Given the diversity of circumstances affecting the countries, it is difficult to determine the 
quantitative impact of the loss of tax revenue. As mentioned above, however, one can, for the 
purposes of analysis, differentiate between the situation in countries that have received significant 
revenue from natural resources in the last few years and those that lack such sources of revenue. 
Although the current status of public accounts and fiscal policy in the region is undeniably 
better than in previous crises, some warning signs can be detected with regard to the capacity of public 
sectors to successfully deal with the crisis. Much of the improvement in the fiscal situation during the 
last several years is the result of the steady increase in commodity prices between 2002 and 2008. 
Thus, a sharp decline in these prices could seriously jeopardise the fiscal achievements. As shown in 
detail in ECLAC (2008b), the structural fiscal balance of the region’s countries is, on average, less 
favourable than the observed fiscal balance58. This is true for the region overall, but is particularly 
notable in countries that produce exportable commodities, for which the gap between structural fiscal 
balance and observed balance widened considerably in 2007 and in the first half of 2008. Although it 
is difficult to project, the estimated fiscal position for 2009 indicates that a significant portion of the 
2007-2009 revenues was composed of extraordinary revenue, and hence will be difficult to sustain. 
The increase in fiscal revenue between 2002 and 2008 is strongly linked to tax revenues from 
the exploitation of natural resources. In countries like the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, these revenues are responsible for over 30% of fiscal 
resources, and they are also important in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru, where they have on 
average represented between 14% and 18% of the total. According to Jiménez and Tromben (2006), 
the changing revenue from these sources is substantially more volatile than revenue from other 
sources —a point confirmed dramatically by the most recent quarters. 
Estimates made by ECLAC (2009a) project a drop in tax revenue of about 5.6 percentage points 
of GDP in 2009 in the countries that specialize heavily in primary products and in which taxes from 
natural-resource-based activities account for over 30% of tax income. In countries somewhat specialized 
in commodities, the projection is a drop of 1.7 points, and in the remaining countries, a drop of 0.5% of 
GDP as a result of the decline in economic activity. Thus, the overall impact on public revenues from 
contracting demand and declining prices in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean is expected 
to be around 1.8 percentage points of GDP (see table III.2). 
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  For more details on measurements of cyclically adjusted performance, see ECLAC (2008b).  
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TABLE III.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ESTIMATED DECLINE IN FISCAL RESOURCES 
FROM 2008 TO 2009 
(Percentages of GDP) 
 
Variation 2008-2009 Share in average variation 
Countries highly specialized in commodities -5.6 -1.2 
Countries somewhat specialized in commodities -1.7 -0.3 
Countries not specialized in commodities -0.5 -0.3 
Total   -1.8 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
The region is expected to shift from posting an average primary surplus of 1.3% of GDP to 
recording a primary deficit in the order of 0.9% of GDP in 2009. This will depend largely on the 
extent to which the increases that have been announced in public spending to counteract the effects of 
the crisis actually occur. 
As a result of these various factors, the abrupt slowdown of the regional economy in 2009 
may be expected to have a negative impact on income distribution and poverty levels, since 
unemployment and informal employment are expected to increase, median incomes of workers are 
expected to fall (especially in the informal market), and less income is expected to be available due to 
the decline in remittances. Notably, poor households were most affected by the increase of inflation in 
2008, which was due primarily to rising food prices. 
Fiscal and tax policies intended to confront the economic and financial crisis must take 
account of these circumstances and be designed accordingly. 
In view of this situation, how much macroeconomic latitude do the countries have in 
addressing the crisis and implementing countercyclical policies? 
The region has grown in unprecedented fashion for over five years and has maintained a 
current account surplus. In addition, fiscal accounts have improved as a consequence of an increase in 
public revenue and responsible management of spending, which led to a significant decline in debt as 
a percentage of GDP in the non-financial public sector (from an average of 65% in 2002 to 
approximately 30% in 2008). At the same time, the region experienced an improvement in debt 
management through a variety of debt issuances and restructurings that made it possible to improve 
both the maturity profile and the interest rates. At the same time, the region’s capital inflows, the 
current account surplus, and FDI led to a significant accumulation of foreign currency, reaching an 
average of approximately 15% of GDP. 
All of these factors have made it possible to reduce the region’s vulnerability. Thus, the 
countries of Latin America find themselves in a better macroeconomic position than was the case 
during past crises, as shown by the following chart. 
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FIGURE III.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AND 
FISCAL BALANCE, 2006-2007 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: The data refer to the central government except in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico 
 and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where the data refer to the non-financial public sector.  
 
In 2006-2007, a number of the region’s countries had twin surpluses (in their current accounts 
and fiscal accounts), but in 2008 this situation began to change, and most of the countries now have 
twin deficits, which are expected to become more pronounced in 2009 (see figure III.14). 
 
FIGURE III.14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AND 
FISCAL BALANCE, 2009 




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: The data refer to the central government except in the cases of Ecuador and Mexico where the data refer to 
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In short, the challenge of fiscal policy will be to manage the inevitable drop in revenue 
(associated with the economic slowdown and the decline in commodity prices) while protecting 
expenditures in certain categories (education, social protections, infrastructure) that are vital in 
preventing increased poverty —a prerequisite to future growth. Fortunately, the region’s governments 
are not exacerbating the crisis; thus, stimulating the economy with fiscal interventions remains an 
option. In practice, the room for fiscal manoeuvre varies widely from country to country, and will 
depend on the presence of savings accumulated during good times, the rigidity of expenditures, the 
duration of the crisis and the capacity for prudent borrowing. 
4. The level of exposure of fiscal income in the international crisis 
4.a. Preliminary considerations 
The uncertainty generated by the international crisis and the limited predictability of its effects calls 
for the detailed analysis of its evolution and its impact on the economy. The goal of this exercise as 
carried out here is to analyze the channels by which the crisis is affecting fiscal income in the 
countries of the region and to clarify each country’s situation in this regard. 
The effect of the international crisis on fiscal income in the region will differ from one 
country to another, and the scope of the impact on tax collection in each will depend not only on the 
characteristics of the crisis itself, but also on the country’s tax system —specifically, on its structure, 
level of collections and specific sources of revenue. 
The following analysis has two objectives: 
1. To describe the channels via which the current crisis is affecting tax collection in the region. 
2. To provide an indication of each country’s risk exposure vis-à-vis tax revenues in relation 
to the rest of the region.  
First, we will present the attributes that have been selected as relevant to the analysis of the 
exposure of a country’s tax system and describe each country’s position regarding each variable, on 
the basis of an analysis of collection data. 
Next, the level of exposure of each country with respect to each variable will be calculated, 
and the countries will be grouped into three categories according to whether their exposure is high, 
medium or low. 
4.b. Explanation of the variables used in developing  
the exposure ratio 
In defining the ways in which the current crisis will impact revenues, it should be noted that this is an 
external crisis transmitted through the channels that link Latin American and Caribbean economies to 
the rest of the world. 
Because of this, the main effects in the region are: a decline in foreign trade (in both imports 
and exports and a worsening of the terms of trade), stringent limitations on access to capital markets, a 
drop in remittances, and a reduction in foreign direct investment. This, in turn, indirectly reduces 
domestic economic activity, consumption and corporate profits. How do these effects relate to tax 
collections? What are the most sensitive sources of revenue in this context? These are the questions 
that have guided the selection of variables used to assess the risk exposure that the crisis produces vis-
à-vis tax revenues.  
Before going through them, it is important to clarify some points about the conceptual 
framework and the reasoning behind their selection. 
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First, the choice of variables has also been affected by the information that was available, thus 
limiting to some extent the precision of the indicators. One clear example of this can be seen if one 
attempts to compare the efficiency of different tax administrations. Given the premise that the most 
efficient are best positioned to confront the crisis and minimize their loss of revenue by virtue of their 
more rigorous enforcement of tax regulations, we have, in the absence of a better indicator, used the 
productivity of VAT as a reflection of a country’s tax administration capacity. 
Second, the level of exposure gauged in this analysis refers solely and exclusively to the risk 
each country faces of losing tax revenue and not to its fiscal strength in terms of anti-cyclical funds to 
offset the shortage of resources, reserves accumulated prior to the crisis that can be used to tackle it 
now or the country’s borrowing capacity.  
Third, if a certain attribute is highlighted as increasing the vulnerability of the country’s tax 
revenues in the current crisis, this does not imply that this feature should be viewed as a problem and 
tackled as such. The analysis presented here does not recommend reforms, it merely identifies through 
which channels the crisis is affecting tax revenue.  
Finally, the list of variables is by no means exhaustive and only includes attributes that 
directly affect tax revenues.  
The features of the tax system, then, considered in our analysis are: 
1. Natural-resource-based revenue as a proportion of total income 
2. The tax burden 
3. Import taxes as a proportion of total revenue 
4. VAT as a proportion of total revenue 
5. Productivity of VAT 
6. Remittances from abroad as a proportion of GDP 
7. Social security contributions as a proportion of total revenue 
8. Income tax collected from business as a proportion of total revenue 
On the basis of the analysis of these eight variables, the countries are grouped into three 
categories of exposure (high, medium or low). The criterion used for this breakdown was whether 
countries were, insofar this indicator showed them to be, below, within or above 20% of the simple 
regional average according to data for 200759. 
4.b.1. Natural-resource-based revenue as a source of financing 
As indicated above, dependence on taxes from natural resources exploitation is one of the greatest risk 
factors at times when international crises trigger declines in commodity prices. 
Although this price instability strengthened current income and fiscal balance for many of the 
region’s countries between 2003 and 2008, providing greater fiscal space for dealing with the crisis, it 
also increased vulnerability to sharp reductions in revenue. At the same time, having a large amount of 
revenue based on natural resources exploitation acts in many countries as a barrier to establishing 
traditional and more stable taxes such as the income tax. This is true for Ecuador and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, for example, and results in a lower tax burden in some countries, such as Mexico. 
Among the most exposed countries in this respect are the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(over 50% of whose total revenues derive from oil), Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
(with approximately 35% of revenues from oil and natural gas, respectively), Ecuador (25% from oil), 
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  For methodological reasons, it was considered appropriate to modify this criterion in the case of natural-resource-based revenue 
and income from remittances, as explained in the footnotes to the corresponding tables. 
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Panama (22% related to the Canal) and Chile (18% from copper). Countries with similar but less 
dependent situations are Peru and Colombia (16% from mining, and 13% from oil, respectively) and 
Argentina (9% from exportation of agricultural goods)60. 
 
TABLE III.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): FISCAL REVENUES DERIVED 
FROM NATURAL RESOURCES, AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE, 2007 
Greater than 24.7% Between 24.7% and 1% Less than 1% 
VEN MEX BOL ECU PAN CHL PER COL ARG BRA CRI GTM NIC PRY DOM SLV URY 
50.6 35.4 34.5 24.7 21.8 17.6 15.7 13.4 8.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note:  Countries were grouped into: those whose fiscal revenue from natural resources as a percentage of total revenue 
 is above the average (24.7%); those whose revenue from natural resources is below average but more than 1% of 
 total revenue; and those whose fiscal income from natural resources is less than 1% of total revenue. 
 
4.b.2. The tax burden 
One major factor when trying to mitigate the effects of the crisis is the State’s ability to reform tax 
systems, modify the tax burden or create new sources of funds. In this sense, the institutional rigidity of 
some of the region’s countries, and the constraints that this places on their tax systems, constitutes one of 
the principal causes of the low tax burden. Moreover, during crises there is a need for institutions that are 
capable of bringing about needed reforms and that do not block necessary changes. 
Those countries that have had low tax revenues for long periods tend to have greater funding 
problems during crises, generally because of the fact that institutional and political constraints make it 
difficult to increase tax income.  
By way of regional comparison, the countries with the highest tax burdens, such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, with levels of over 20% of GDP, have historically shown greater ability to 
collect taxes than countries with low tax burdens, such as Mexico, Guatemala and Paraguay, where 
tax revenues represent barely 10% of GDP, and where structural problems with tax collections are 
aggravated during crises.  
This argument is supported by the fact that the tax burden in the countries of the region with 
lower burdens varied far less during the period in question than in those with high burdens. When 
countries are grouped according to their tax burden, it becomes apparent that the group with the 
highest (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) increased, on average, their income by 7% of GDP, while 
those with the lowest (Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Paraguay) increased theirs by 
only 2.6%. The differences are even greater when comparing, for example, Brazil with Mexico: the 
former posted an increase of 10.7% of GDP, the latter a drop of 1.3% in terms of GDP.  
 
                                                        
60
 Argentina is a special case, since the export duties were imposed in 2002 for various reasons, particularly due to the severe 
devaluation of the peso that year, with the sharp increase in international prices playing a role starting in 2004. Since exportable 
goods are part of the basic basket of consumer goods, export duties were raised to prevent the increasing international prices and 
changes in the exchange rate on the basic basket from affecting consumer goods.  
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TABLE III.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): TAX BURDEN 1990-1992 AND 2005-2007 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Country 1990-1992 2005-2007 Variation 
Group 1: Low tax burden 10.3 12.9 2.6 
Mexico 11.8 10.5 -1.3 
Guatemala 8.8 12.0 3.2 
Paraguay 9.9 13.0 3.2 
Ecuador 10.3 14.4 4.2 
El Salvador 10.8 14.7 3.9 
Group 2: Medium tax burden 13.4 18.1 4.7 
Dominican Republic 8.6 15.2 6.6 
Panama 14.1 15.5 1.3 
Peru 13.1 16.3 3.3 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 17.3 16.4 -1.0 
Colombia 10.9 18.2 7.3 
Chile 17.0 20.1 3.1 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 10.4 20.1 9.7 
Nicaragua 11.7 21.2 9.5 
Costa Rica 17.2 21.4 4.2 
Group 3: High tax burden 21.7 28.7 7.0 
Uruguay 23.0 23.9 0.9 
Argentina 18.5 27.8 9.3 
Brazil 23.7 34.4 10.7 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: The figures correspond to central government, except in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and 
the  Plurinational State of Bolivia, where they refer to the general government. 
 
 
For these reasons, we have taken tax burden as a key indicator of the impact of the crisis on 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): TAX BURDEN, 2007 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Less than 15.5% Between 15.5% and 23% Greater than 23% 
MEX GTM PRY ECU SLV COL DOM PAN VEN PER BOL CHL NIC CRI URY ARG BRA 
11.7 12.5 12.9 14.4 15.0 15.8 16.0 16.6 17.0 17.2 20.1 21.3 21.9 22.5 24.1 29.1 36.2 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Notes: 1. Includes social security contributions and the figures correspond to central government, except in the cases 
 of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where they refer to the general 
 government.  
 2. The ranges were determined by taking the average +/- 20%. 
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4.b.3. Import taxes as a proportion of total tax revenue 
One of the major consequences of the financial crisis has been a significant reduction in international 
trade, which, for the region, entails not only a problem for exports, but also a reduced capacity to 
import, and hence a decline in import tax collections. 
The problems associated with a taxation system that depends on foreign trade have been 
amply discussed in the literature, and the experience of the Latin American countries since the 
beginning of the twentieth century abounds in funding problems associated with drops in the volume 
of foreign trade. The commercial opening undertaken in previous periods reduced the importance of 
import taxes to its current level, which averages 6.8% of total tax revenue for the countries as a whole. 
However, for some countries, the weight of these taxes continues to be considerable, and it has 
therefore been considered appropriate to include this criterion as a risk factor in the face of the crisis. 
The countries in which import taxes have the greatest weight are Panama, Paraguay, the 
Dominican Republic and Ecuador, with levels near 10% of total tax revenue. At the other extreme 
(under 3%) are Mexico, Chile and Brazil. 
 
TABLE III.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): IMPORT TAXES 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL TAX REVENUES, 2007 
Greater than 7.5% Between 7.5% and 5.1% Less than 5% 
PRY PAN DOM ECU VEN GTM SLV COL URY CRI BOL NIC PER ARG MEX CHL BRA 
10.8 10.7 10.7 10.3 9.1 9.0 6.7 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.4 4.7 3.8 3.1 2.5 1.6 1.3 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note:  The ranges were determined by taking the average +/- 20%. 
 
4.b.4. VAT as a proportion of total tax revenue 
The rising tax burden of the last two decades in the region’s countries was based on the expansion of 
the value added tax, making it the most important source of tax revenue. 
The high and growing dependence on VAT has increased dependence on domestic private and 
public consumption as a source of fiscal income —a source that shrinks quickly in response to crisis. 
This problem is intensified by the large role of import-VAT revenues, which change even more quickly 
than does final consumption during crises, especially in circumstances such as the present one, where the 
decimation of international trade has been so rapid. Although VAT paid at the time of import is later 
credited against domestic sales, its capture at the moment of entry into the country improves fiscal cash 
flow. The lack of solid statistics on this matter, however, precludes it from this analysis. 
The countries in which VAT plays the largest roles are Guatemala (48% of total tax revenue) 
and —each with 45%— the Plurinational State of Bolivia, El Salvador and Paraguay. At the other 
extreme are Costa Rica (27%) and Panama (13%). VAT in the remaining Latin American countries 
accounts for between 30% and 40% of total tax revenue.  
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TABLE III.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): VAT 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX REVENUE, 2007 
Greater than 43.2% Between 43.2% and 28.8% Less than 28% 
GTM BOL SLV PRY ECU URY CHL BRA ARG NIC COL VEN PER MEX DOM CRI PAN 
48.1 45.8 45.5 45.3 39.0 38.0 37.8 37.2 36.9 34.8 34.6 33.6 33.5 31.3 30.7 27.5 13.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: The ranges were determined taking the average +/- 20%. 
 
As mentioned above, the reduction in the VAT has been intensified (i) by the decline in imports; 
(ii) by the inefficiency of tax administration and high evasion rates; (iii) by the decline in remittances, 
which are of great importance in some countries and strongly affect consumption levels; and (iv) by the 
decline in tourism, which principally affects the Central American and Caribbean countries. 
4.b.5. The productivity of VAT 
As indicated above, there have been no regional studies to provide clear indicators of the quality of tax 
administration. As a result, evasion rates, the productivity of the VAT, the degree of automation of the 
collecting agency, and the costs of collection are commonly assumed to reflect administrative efficiency.  
However, comparable information for the 17 countries is not available for all these indicators. 
In the case of evasion, only a minority of countries have reliable, methodologically equivalent data on 
the topic, making comparison inappropriate. 
Therefore, we have used VAT productivity (collections obtained in relation to the rate 
applied) as an indicator. The productivity ratio of the tax provides an idea of the tax structure, as well 
as the efficiency with which it is administered, and we may therefore consider it to be a variable that 
reflects the administrative capacity of the institutions involved. 
VAT productivity increased in the last 20 years, as a result of efforts made to strengthen 
collections, improve tax administration and reduce evasion —but, above all, owing to a broadening of 
tax bases as a result of eliminating exemptions for some goods and by incorporating services, which 
had been excluded from the tax base. 
 
TABLE III.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (12 COUNTRIES): PRODUCTIVITY OF VAT, 2007 
 PAN MEX DOM PER COL URY CHL ECU CRI ARG VEN BOL 
VAT collections as 
percentage of GDP 
3.7 4.9 5.8 5.5 9.1 7.9 5.6 6.2 10.4 6.1 5.7 9.2 
VAT rate (as of 2007)  15.0 16.0 17.0 16.0 23.0 19.0 12.0 13.0 21.0 12.0 11.0 13.0 
VAT productivity 20.8 24.4 30.7 33.9 34.6 39.7 41.7 47.0 47.7 49.6 51.8 71.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and KPMG (KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey, 2007). 
Note: 1. Countries for which no information was available were attributed with average exposure. 
 2. The ranges were determined taking the average +/- 20%. 
 
Believing that greater productivity in VAT collection implies more efficient tax 
administration and a better state of preparedness for crisis, the present exercise considers countries 
with more productive VATs to be better equipped for the crisis. These include the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Chile. 
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4.b.6. Income from remittances from abroad 
Before assessing each country’s situation regarding remittances, we will explain the reasoning behind 
the inclusion of this “non-tax” variable. 
Remittance levels have risen significantly in the last five years: by ECLAC estimates, they 
reached US$ 69 billion in 2007, and in some countries, such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, they 
accounted for 20% of GDP. Given that the sharp rise in unemployment in the developed countries is 
affecting immigrant workers in particular, remittance flows from those countries to Latin America are 
plummeting. The incomes of sizeable segments of society have therefore dropped, which is resulting 
in lower consumption levels and tax revenues. Furthermore, families that receive remittances from 
abroad spend most of their income on consumer items, making this effect even more intense. 
To appreciate the magnitude of the remittances received by some of the region’s countries 
and their impact on consumption, the remittance inflows of three countries were correlated with 
private consumption (see table III.9). The remittance/private consumption ratio was particularly high 
in the three countries under study (11.7% in Ecuador, 19.6% in El Salvador and 17.1% in Guatemala), 
which suggests that remittances account for a significant portion of consumption in those countries 
and that any decline in remittance levels severely depresses consumer tax revenues.  
 
TABLE III.9 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND REMITTANCES 
(Millions of 2007 dollars) 
 Private consumption Remittances Remittances / 
Private consumption 
Ecuador 29 138.0 3 394.8 11.7% 
El Salvador 19 562.0 3 835.3 19.6% 
Guatemala a 28 453.0 4 873.8 17.1% 
Source: For remittances: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); for private 
 consumption: central banks of the respective countries. 
a
  The data on private consumption for Guatemala is for 2005, the ratio for 2007 should therefore be lower.  
 
Of the countries included in this study, those with the highest levels of remittances are El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, where these represent approximately 19% of GDP, and Guatemala, where they 
represent approximately 15% of GDP (2007 figures). For present purposes, we consider remittance 
levels above 5% of GDP to be “high”. In addition to the countries mentioned above, this group includes 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador (see table III.10). 
 
TABLE III.10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES):  
REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2007 
More than 5% Between 5% and 1% Less than 1% 
SLV NIC GTM BOL DOM ECU PRY CRI COL MEX PER CHL PAN URY ARG BRA VEN 
18.8 18.8 14.5 8.9 8.6 7.4 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.1 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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4.b.7. Social security contributions as a percentage of total tax revenue 
Following VAT in the weighting order, is revenue from social security. Since it can be assumed that 
contributions to the social benefits system decline more, proportionally, during crises than does GDP, 
there will be a major loss of revenue associated with social security contributions during times of crisis. 
The contraction of credit in productive and consumption sectors, as well as increasing 
uncertainty, is delaying investment decisions in a wide range of activities, while also decreasing 
formal employment and increasing informality. This has an immediate impact on public revenue from 
payroll and wage-based taxes. Thus, countries that have a large flow of tax revenues from social 
security contributions will see their revenue diminish significantly. These countries include Brazil, 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX REVENUE, 2007 
Greater than 19% Between 12.5% and 19% Less than 12.5% 
PAN CRI ECU URY BRA MEX NIC ARG COL SLV PRY BOL PER CHL VEN GTM DOM 
34.1 29.3 28.1 25.6 24.7 23.3 17.8 16.9 14.4 10.8 9.7 9.1 9.0 6.3 5.1 1.3 0.4 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note:  The ranges were determined taking the average +/- 20%. 
 
4.b.8. Income tax collected from business as a proportion of total tax revenue 
Another factor taken into account was income tax, and income tax collected from businesses in 
particular. Although a decline in revenue from personal income tax has a more immediate impact on 
tax revenue, the small proportion of total tax income that it represents and the minimal amount of 
resources it generates in terms of GDP (between 1% and 2% on average) mean that a drop in personal 
income tax collection is not that significant. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that personal 
income tax is generally levied on the highest salaries, and wage-earners in this income bracket can be 
expected to be the least affected by the crisis. 
Income tax collected from business, on the other hand, represents on average 18.4% of total 
tax income and should therefore be considered a factor when determining the exposure risk of a 
country’s fiscal income within the context of declining economic activity and corporate profits. 
On this premise, the greater the weight of income tax collected from business, the greater the 
country’s exposure should be. The countries with the highest proportion of corporate income tax in 
their total tax revenue (34%) are Chile and Peru, where this tax is levied on the profits of natural-
resource-based companies. Next come the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Guatemala, with 
24%, and at the other extreme are Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic and Uruguay, where 
income tax collected from business accounts for less than 13% of total tax receipts. 
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TABLE III.12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): INCOME TAX 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2007 
Concept CHL BRA PER ARG NIC PAN MEX SLV DOM CRI URY GTM BOL ECU PRY 
Income tax 8.4 7.7 7.2 5.4 5.4 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.0 
Corporations 7.3 5.1 5.9 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.7 1.7 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.1 2.0 
Physical 
persons 
1.2 2.6 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.4 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
TABLE III.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): INCOME TAX FROM BUSINESS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX REVENUE, 2007 
More than 22.1% Between 22.1% and 14.7% Less than 14.7% 
PER CHL VEN GTM MEX SLV PAN PRY NIC BOL ECU BRA ARG CRI URY DOM 
34.1 34.1 24.1 24.0 21.0 17.9 17.2 15.5 15.2 15.1 14.6 14.2 12.9 12.9 10.8 10.5 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
 and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note:  The ranges were determined taking the average +/- 20%. 
4.c. Quantifying the analysis and determining the ratio 
In the tables presented for each of the variables, the countries are grouped into three categories 
according to their level of exposure to the crisis. To quantify the relative position of each country with 
regard to the different variables, high exposure was weighted by 2 (two), medium exposure by 1 (one) 
and low exposure by 0 (zero). Thus, in the analysis, the countries that are more vulnerable to revenue 
losses during the crisis will accumulate more points. 
 
TABLE III.14 
WEIGHTING OF THE EXPOSURE LEVELS 
Exposure High Medium Low 
Range More than 20% above the 
average value 
Between 20% below and 
20% above the average  
More than 20% below the 
average 
Weighting 2 1 0 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Notes: 1. For tax burden and VAT productivity, the quantification process is inverted, as an increase in these  variables 
 implies lower exposure. 
 2. For income from taxes on natural-resource-based activities: a 2 was awarded to countries that were above 
 the average for the countries that have such resources; a 0 was awarded to those that do not have such income 
 or in which such income is less than 1% of total tax revenue; and a 1 was awarded to those between these two 
 extremes. 
 
It is important to note that this classification reflects a country’s situation in comparison with 
the other countries in the region. A low exposure rating therefore only refers to the country’s level of 
exposure in relation to the other countries in the analysis and in no way reflects a judgment regarding 













































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): EXPOSURE LEVELS 
(In percentages) 
Country 
Fiscal income from 
natural-resource-
based activities 






















Group 1: High exposure 
Ecuador 24.7 1 14.4 2 10.3 2 39.0 1 47.0 1 7.4 2 28.1 2 14.6 0 11 
Guatemala 0.0 0 12.5 2 9.0 2 48.1 2 na 1 14.5 2 1.3 0 24.0 2 11 
Mexico 35.4 2 11.7 2 2.5 0 31.3 1 24.4 2 2.4 1 23.3 2 21.0 1 11 
Panama 21.8 1 16.6 1 10.7 2 13.0 0 20.8 2 2.1 1 34.1 2 17.2 1 10 




34.5 2 20.1 1 5.4 1 45.8 2 71.0 0 8.9 2 9.1 0 15.1 1 9 
Paraguay 0.0 0 12.9 2 10.8 2 45.3 2 na 1 3.1 1 9.7 0 15.5 1 9 
El Salvador 0.0 0 15.0 2 6.7 1 45.5 2 na 1 18.8 2 10.8 0 17.9 1 9 




50.6 2 17.0 1 9.1 2 33.6 1 51.8 0 0.1 0 5.1 0 24.1 2 8 
Dominican 
Republic 0.0 0 16.0 1 10.7 2 30.7 1 30.7 2 8.6 2 0.4 0 10.5 0 8 
Chile 17.6 1 21.3 1 1.6 0 37.8 1 41.7 1 2.2 1 6.3 0 34.1 2 7 
Nicaragua 0.0 0 21.9 1 4.7 0 34.8 1 na 1 18.8 2 17.8 1 15.2 1 7 
Peru 15.7 1 17.2 1 3.8 0 33.5 1 33.9 1 2.3 1 9.0 0 34.1 2 7 
Group 3: Low exposure 
Costa Rica 0.0 0 22.5 1 5.6 1 27.5 0 47.7 1 2.8 1 29.3 2 12.9 0 6 
Uruguay 0.0 0 24.1 0 5.8 1 38.0 1 39.7 1 0.7 0 25.6 2 10.8 0 5 
Brazil 0.0 0 36.2 0 1.3 0 37.2 1 na 1 0.4 0 24.7 2 14.2 0 4 
Argentina 8.6 1 29.1 0 3.1 0 36.9 1 49.6 0 0.6 0 16.9 1 12.9 0 3 
Average    19.1  6.3  36.0  41.1     15.6  18.4   7.8 
Average + 20%  22.9  7.6  43.2  49.3     18.8  22.1   9.4 
Average - 20%  15.3  5.1  28.8  32.9     12.5  14.7   6.3 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a
  As percentages of total tax revenue. 
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Table III.15 shows the situation of each country with regard to each variable, as well as the 
corresponding weighting and the total score thus obtained. The countries are listed in descending order 
according to this score and divided into three groups: those with high, medium or low levels of exposure. 
This table therefore not only presents the exposure level of each country but also why it is 
more or less vulnerable than the others. The results position Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Panama 
as the most exposed countries (Group 1). The Plurinational State of Bolivia, El Salvador, Paraguay, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru and Chile follow 
next as members of the medium-exposure group (Group 2), and the least exposed countries are Costa 
Rica, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina (Group 3). 
These divisions reflect the fact that while the countries in Group 1 (high exposure) have a 
medium or high level of exposure in all the variables, the opposite holds for the countries in Group 3, 
whose exposure level is low in the vast majority of variables and medium in just a few.  
Figure III.15 summarizes the results obtained from the analysis and orders countries 
according to their relative exposure rating within the region. 
 
FIGURE III.15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): RELATIVE LEVEL OF EXPOSURE OF TAX 




















Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
 the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
It should be noted that the findings refer to the possible loss of tax revenue as a percentage of 
total revenue and not in terms of GDP. Some countries may lose more in GDP terms although the drop 
may not be significant in terms of total tax income; the exposure level determined here is therefore 
lower. This begged the question as to what the results would be if exposure levels were calculated not 
in terms of percentages of total tax revenue but as percentages of the tax burden, in other words in 
terms of GDP. 
Using this criterion, the findings were that the gap between the most and least exposed 
countries narrows and most countries end up in the medium exposure risk category on account of the 
fact that the level of exposure of countries with high tax burdens (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) 
increases, while those with low tax burdens (Mexico and Guatemala) decreases. This is most clearly 
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percentages of total revenue and in terms of percentages of GDP. Only two countries, Ecuador and 
Panama, fall into the high exposure category in both cases, and no country falls into the low exposure 
category in both cases.  
 
FIGURE III.16 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): COMPARISON OF EXPOSURE LEVEL FINDINGS USING TWO 
DIFFERENT CRITERIA  




















Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
 the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
The findings again show the relative position of the countries of the region to one another. 
The countries that are presented as in the low exposure group will not be exempt from revenue losses; 
they are just in a better position than the other countries in the region.  
One final observation of this exercise is that, in addition to the indicator developed, it 
enhances understanding of the channels through which the current crisis is affecting tax collection in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
5. What tax changes have been observed, to date, in the region? 
5.a. Anti-crisis measures, fiscal policy options  
and the timing of implementation 
It would appear that from mid-2007 to mid-2008 relatively few tax changes occurred, and it seemed 
that Latin American and Caribbean countries had managed to uncouple from the effects of the 
international crisis. Shortly thereafter, this theory proved incorrect, since the crisis found a channel to 
enter the region through commodity prices and trade and financial flows. This could explain the initial 
delay in adopting compensatory measures that would have provided greater preparedness to address 
the new international conditions. 
As analyzed in detail in chapter I, in general terms, the region’s governments have taken two 
types of measures in the last several months: (i) countercyclical measures to activate domestic demand 
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and production of tradables, while moderating domestic factors that could aggravate the foreign trade 
imbalance; and (ii) domestic policies to reduce the regressive social effects of the crisis, as well as of 
possible future adjustment measures. 
Naturally, the measures implemented by the different countries will depend on the effects that 
they face, as well as their capacities and resources. Therefore, their ability to react to the crisis varies, 
based primarily on their respective fiscal contexts, their international currency reserves, access to 
foreign financing and other factors such as the degree of monetisation, the depth of the financial 
market and the state of the current account. 
Figures III.17 summarises the measures implemented or announced by the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. These have been grouped in five categories: monetary and financial policy, 
fiscal policy, exchange rate and foreign trade policy, sectorial policy, and labour and social policy. 
 
FIGURE III.17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): SCOPE OF MEASURES 












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The reactions of the Governments of the 
 Americas to the international crisis: an overview of policy measures up to 31 March (LC/L.3025), Santiago, 
 Chile, 31  March 2009. 
 
As may be seen, most of the countries have adopted policies to ensure adequate liquidity. 
In the fiscal area, governments have increased spending (investment projects) while lowering 
taxes or increasing subsidies. Notably, only some of the countries have implemented import restrictions 
or raised tariffs. 
In terms of foreign trade, the governments have attempted to sustain their exports primarily 
by financing exporters. 
With regard to targeted measures, housing programmes have in many cases been used (given 
their importance for employment and their high social value), as have sectoral policies (principally in 
the agricultural, tourism and industrial sectors). 
A number of countries have also adopted measures to help SMEs, and the majority have 
opted to maintain or adopt social programmes rather than promote job creation. 
Different fiscal policies generate different effects, since, in the first place, measures to 
increase spending have greater potential than do those based on reducing taxes. The former imply a 
direct increase in demand, whereas the latter generate an increase in disposable income in the private 
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sector that, in an uncertain context such as the current one, is very likely to translate primarily into 
more saving. Moreover, as is well known, it is difficult in the region to quantify and measure the 
impact of tax deductions and incentives, usually referred to as “tax expenditures”61. The 
implementation of these deductions adds another level to the analysis, namely, the duration of the 
measures, which may be temporary or permanent. 
However, very significant differences may still be evident if the analysis limits itself to spending 
increases. If this takes the form of direct transfers, the more it is possible to target sectors with a higher 
propensity to consume, the greater will be the impact. Nevertheless, this type of transfer is more difficult 
to implement in the short term, and more demanding institutionally than non-targeted transfers. 
Similarly, when spending increases take the form of programmes to increase infrastructure 
investment, it must be borne in mind that not all projects have the same impact on employment and on 
demand for locally produced inputs. Given the importance of rapid implementation in these cases, 
there is not always a ready portfolio of needed projects. 
As a result, despite the lesser potential impact of tax cuts (or non-targeted subsidies) vs. 
spending increases, governments often prefer the former, at least in the short term. Insofar as feasible, 
it is preferable to develop spending plans and implement properly evaluated investment projects, to 
promote more efficient use of public resources. 
5.b. Tax measures adopted by the region’s countries 
According to a survey by ECLAC (2009b) on the policies announced by countries in response to the 
crisis, it is possible to identify a series of measures that, in one way or another, are related to the crisis, 
although some may actually be responses to other circumstances. These are:  
Argentina 
• Tax and pension fund moratorium. Covers all tax and social security liabilities payable as 
of 31 December 2007. 
• Reduction in employer contributions: all firms creating or regularising jobs pay 50% of 
contributions for the first year and 75% for the second. 
• Reduction in tax on exports of wheat and maize: rates of export duty on wheat will fall 
from 28% to 23%, and on maize from 25% to 20%. Reduction by an additional point for 
every million tons of production above the recent average. 
• Fifty percent reduction in tax on exports of all fresh fruit and vegetables. 
• Elimination of the scheme of income tax deductions applicable to wage-earners since 
2000. This measure benefits some 800,000 middle- or high-income workers. 
• One-year extension of the system of incentives for the purchase of capital goods, which 
lowers tariffs on imported goods and provides a 14% rebate for local manufacturers in the 
form of vouchers that can be used to pay taxes. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
• Increase in the VAT from 9% to 12%. 
Brazil 
• Federal government and some states have extended the time allowed for monthly tax 
payments, thus easing pressure on corporate cash flows. 
                                                        
61
 For more detail on the problem of using tax deductions and differences in calculating “tax expenditures” in Latin America, see 
Jiménez and Podestá (2009). 
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• A series of tax cuts have been announced, totalling approximately US$ 3.7 billion, in 
order to boost consumption. 
• The tax on financial operations will be cut from 3% to 1.5% for direct consumer credit 
operations and for the overdraft credit line. 
• The processed products tax applicable to vehicles was temporarily cut (originally until 
March 2009, then for three more months up to June 2009). For the purchase of motor 
vehicles with displacements of up to 1,000 cc., the tax will be cut from 7% to 0%, and for 
those up to 2,000 cc., from 13% to 6.5%. 
• Income tax tables for physical persons were revised, introducing lower rates (7.55% and 
22.5%), which favour the middle class, i.e., those who earn up to US$ 900 per month. 
Chile 
• Stamp duty will be eliminated for all credit transactions in 2009, and the rate of this duty 
will be halved for the first half of 2010. 
• Increase in benefits under Decree Law 701 on incentives for the forestry industry. 
• Temporary reduction of monthly provisional payments of category-1 taxes (corporate 
income tax). 
• Income tax rebates will be brought forward for natural persons in respect of the 2010 
fiscal year. 
• Readjustment of the maximum amount subsidised by the SENCE tax exemption, and a 
discount on monthly training expenditures, through the exemption of the monthly 
provisional payments for businesses. 
Colombia 
• Taxpayers will benefit from cuts totalling US$ 1 billion under the tax reform of 2006, 
which introduced changes that will come into effect in 2009. 
• The nominal income tax rate drops from 34% in 2008 to 33% in 2009. 
• Stamp duty reduction, from 1.0% to 0.5%.  
• The number of wealth tax payments is reduced from three to two in 2009. 
Costa Rica 
• In March 2009, a decree was signed to permit accelerated depreciation of assets during 
2009, with a possible extension to 2010. 
Ecuador 
• Moratorium on advance income tax payment up to December 2009 for exporters in the 
sectors most affected by the crisis. 
• Reduction in the withholding tax on interest paid abroad, to 0% for the banking sector 
and to 5% for private firms until December 2009 (except for capital from tax havens). 
• Bank provisions above the required minimum are deductible.  
• Taxes on private banks are to be temporarily reduced, and financial institutions are 
required to capitalise their profits in exchange for issuing of credit to the productive 
sectors. 
• Banks’ stocks of external assets are taxed to encourage national saving, with the levy on 
capital outflows to be raised from 0.5% to 1%. 
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• Tariffs will be eliminated for inputs and capital goods not produced domestically.  
• A tax reform bill has been drafted. 
Guatemala 
• Income tax reform bill. 
Honduras 
• Income tax exemptions for employees earning under US$ 8,000 per year. 
Mexico 
• Low tariff. 
• Programme to Support the Economy (3/3/2008), with the following tax measures: 3% 
discount on provisional payments of the corporate income tax and the single rate business 
tax (IETU) (February-June 2008); stimulus of 1,000 Mexican pesos for individuals with 
business activity who file their 2007 tax returns electronically; 5% discount on social 
security contributions. 
Nicaragua 
• Import tariffs were reduced or temporarily eliminated. 
Peru 
• Temporary increase in drawback rate on non-traditional exports (from 5% to 8%). 
• Accelerated depreciation bill. 
Uruguay 
• Charging advances on taxes on income from business activities (IRAE) involving 
importation of consumer goods, as is already done with the VAT.  
• Regulation of IRAE for transfer fees.  
• Increase in domestic excise tax (IMESI) on cigarettes. 
• Bonus in the form of 120% exemption from IRAE for investments made in 2009, in the 
framework of the law on investment and the new weighting that rewards projects that 
create more jobs. 
• System for reimbursing tourists for taxes. 
5.c. What tax policy measures are advisable during the crisis? 
The variety of circumstances affecting the region’s countries makes it impossible to recommend 
policies that will be broadly applicable. The design of the “package of measures” should reflect the 
specifics of each country, taking account of their economic and social structures, as well as 
institutional factors. As has been emphasised above, no single model is right for all cases. 
If there is one generally applicable point, it is that the stimulus packages or measures adopted 
by the countries should be consistent with certain basic premises: temporariness, sustainability and 
institutional strengthening. 
The impact of the current crisis has been rapid and strong, though its future course is not yet 
clear. Observations and analyzes to date, vary as to the future and end point of the crisis. 
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The following table presents a quick compilation of feasible measures, with the caveat that 




FISCAL POLICY FOR THE CRISIS. MEASURES RELATING TO FISCAL RESOURCES 
 Measure Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Temporary reduction 
in consumption tax 
rates 
Increase in the purchasing power of 
families. By lowering the price of 
goods, such measures stimulate 
current consumption, vs. future 
consumption. 
Provides relatively more benefit for 
the lower income quintiles 
Not a targeted benefit, as some other policy 
options provide for 
Benefits may not always reach the consumer. 
In a context of uncertainty and a crisis of 
confidence, such measures may not be a 
sufficient stimulus to increase consumption 
2. Fixed tax rebates for 
certain sectors, and 
temporary increases in 
either the rates or 
maximum amounts of 
income tax credits 
Can be properly designed to target 
low-income sectors or consumer 
sectors subject to credit constraints. 
Can be implemented rapidly. 
Effects are temporary 
May not be effective if motivations for savings 
predominate. 
May not be effective for highly indebted 
families, since they will prefer to increase 
savings rather than consumption, in 
anticipation of an economic contraction 




Designed to increase employment 
by reducing costs for employers 
Can be implemented rapidly 
May not be effective if the economic outlook is 
considered weak 
There is little evidence that the measure 
actually impacts employers’ decisions 
While some advocate reducing social security 
contributions temporarily, there are risks that 
the reduction will not be reversed later, and 
will weaken social security financing 
4. More flexible rules for 
determining tax losses 
for banks and 
businesses 
Generates incentives for merger and 
acquisition of companies with 
problems, by firms with more solid 
positions 
Permits more symmetrical treatment 
of profits and losses 
Is designed to restore confidence in 
the banking sector and in 
businesses with problems 
Is a means of ensuring better 
management of businesses with low 
profitability 
The merged firms may be liquidated or 
discontinued after this process has taken 
place 
While this situation might be prevented 
through strict rules, the rules could prove 
difficult to implement  
5. Adjusting rules 
governing advance 
payments in order to 
take account of future 
income, as well as 
rules on carrying over 
losses 
Facilitates better cash flow 
management for firms, as well as 
more symmetrical treatment of 
profits and losses 
Firms may under-declare future income 
It is unclear whether, in the current context, 
these measures can actually help maintain 
aggregate demand 
(continuing) 
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TABLE III.16 (conclusion) 
 Measure Advantages Disadvantages 
6. Reduction in corporate 
taxes on income, 
dividends and capital 
gains, or application of 
special stimulus rules 
such as accelerated 
depreciation 
No observed advantages 
Not advisable 
Not effective, since firms’ profits are low, and 
many firms may have tax losses  
Reductions in rates, and stimuli, may be 




for firms with problems 
 
No observed advantages 
Not advisable 
Highly distorting 
Highly unequal in treatment of different 
economic activities 
Affects moral behaviour of taxpayers 
Leads to a race for subsidies 
Inefficient in a system that is well-structured in 
its treatment of advance payments and future 
losses 
8. Compensatory rules 
vis-à-vis past tax 
liabilities  
 
No observed advantages 
Not advisable 
The possibility of compensating for current 
losses with profits from previous tax periods, 
or of receiving rebates of taxes already paid, 
is not only inefficient in terms of future 
performance, but highly distorting 
9. Changes in taxation 
that increase existing 
distortions  
No observed advantages 
Not advisable 
Increased tariffs, for example, are distorting, 
and may be highly inefficient 
10. Measures to strengthen 
financial markets and 
prices 
No observed advantages 
Not advisable 
Measures such as tax cuts for capital gains 
are distorting, and may provoke fraud as 
taxpayers attempt to lower their tax burden by 
making regular income appear to be capital 
gains 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of A. Spilimbergo and others, Fiscal Policy for the Crisis, IMF Staff 
 Position Note (SPN/08/01), Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund (IMF), December 2008, Appendix I.  
 
Any measures adopted should be capable of creating an immediate “shock” impact, rather 
than an impact that is diluted over time. By the same token, they should include a time limit. This is 
especially important for investment-demand-stimulus policies with no end date, which leave the 
economic actor free to determine when to make use of the benefit.  
A second factor to consider when choosing measures is that they should not compromise 
fiscal solvency in the medium and long term, since, if they do, they will raise doubts not only about 
their effectiveness, but also about the future of the economy. This means making short- and medium-
term decisions that are consistent, although often these two types of measures are not considered in 
tandem. Thus, it is advisable that the measures adopted be susceptible to rapid reversal once there is a 
clear change in the course of the crisis. 
In this context, it is important to consider both the feasibility of application/implementation 
and the lag between time of adoption and impact on the economy. 
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6. The political economy of reform during the crisis,  
and the changes required for a paradigm shift 
In the context of the international crisis, the countries’ tax measures will be subject to circumstances 
that are not only economic, but also political, social and institutional, which tend to make a forceful 
appearance in times of crisis. Ultimately these circumstances play a significant role in the countries’ 
ability to emerge from their fiscal crises, which strongly affect economic stability, political legitimacy 
and the level of social welfare. 
Analysis of the political economy studies of taxation in Latin America shows that the great 
majority agree that there is a vicious circle, which largely explains the difficulties that the region’s 
countries have in implementing reforms. The components of the vicious circle are (Gómez Sabaini 
and O’Farrell, 2009):  
i. A socioeconomic structure marked by high levels of inequality, capital concentration and 
informality; 
ii. Political institutions that are delegitimised, and are heavily influenced by power groups; 
iii. A fiscal system characterised by insufficient funds, regressiveness and limited capacity 
for reform. 
In terms of Latin America’s socioeconomic structure and level of development, the strong 
weight of the economies’ primary sectors, the size of the informal economies, the high concentration 
of capital, the high levels of income inequality and low per capita income produce harmful effects on 
politics and institutions, as well as in the area of taxation. 
With regard to effects on taxation, the following factors constitute important limitations: very 
small potential income tax bases, dependancy on non-tax revenues, limited capacity of tax 
administrations, low level of tax awareness and morality, high evasion levels, and incentives for 
corruption and rent seeking. 
At the same time, the socioeconomic features cited above strongly affect the capacity of 
political institutions, making them, among other things, highly susceptible to influence. They may 
even be run by lobbies. These realities produce policies that benefit a small group, generally an elite, 
while at the same time leading to the blocking of reforms that are undesirable to those most involved 
with government.  
As a result of this, the region’s governmental institutions and policies suffer from pronounced 
delegitimisation, and are considerably weaker than those of the more developed countries. 
Delegitimisation and institutional weakness have direct implications for tax policy. According to data 
from the Latinobarometer, 79% of Latin Americans are not confident that tax monies will be well 
spent. Furthermore, 50% believe that the State is capable of solving few or no problems. These 
perceptions and beliefs on the part of citizens create systematic resistance to tax collections and to 
actions designed to change collections procedures. 
Many writers point to the consequences of the institutional and political features that affect 
the State’s capacity to effectively implement tax policy. One study on Brazil, by Marcus Melo (1998), 
underlines how political fragmentation can put reforms “in neutral”. He analyzes different features of 
democratic institutions that contribute to this, including the fact that “political parties have become 
collections of factions with minimal coherence”. 
Along a similar line, Lledo, Schneider and Moore (2004) note the differences in direct 
taxation levels between the Caribbean countries and the Latin American countries. One of the 
explanations offered is that the Caribbean countries inherited stronger parliamentary institutions than 
those present in the presidentialist regimes of South America. Thus, in polarised situations, the 
ECLAC – Project Documents collection Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives 
99 
legislators in the former countries can negotiate, making concessions and compromises on taxes, while 
presidents in the latter group still govern with a legislature dominated by the opposition (in the worst 
cases, a fragmented opposition), with the attendant difficulties in moving a progressive tax package 
forward (Murga Pinillos, 2005). 
These writers agree, in a sense, with one of the most influential works on this subject 
(Steinmo, 1993), which centres on the relationships among institutions, and the ability of different 
actors to negotiate. According to Steinmo, the differences in tax systems may be found in the design 
of democratic institutions, since these depend on the ability of actors interested in the results of tax 
policy to negotiate, as well as on the information available to them and the incentives they have for 
seeking particular policies. 
Finally, we note that recent trends in the literature underline the importance of the quality of 
institutions in the processes of creating and implementing public policy. Stine and Tommasi (2006) 
conclude that effective political processes and public policies are feasible when political parties are 
institutionalised and programme based, when legislatures have substantial capacity to formulate 
policy, when an independent judiciary is in place and bureaucracies are solid. They believe, at the 
same time, that in institutionalised party systems, when political organisations are programme based 
(in the sense that they compete and gain support based on differences in their policies and 
achievements), it is more probable that they will promote greater coherency in policy over time, and 
that there will be greater potential for establishing lasting agreements. 
In this sense, the institutional deficiencies common to the great majority of countries in Latin 
America are highly relevant to understanding conflicts regarding tax systems, as well as the 
constraints on implementing reforms. 
The factors to which tax reform is subject, cited so far, create very limited room for possible 
change in tax policy (Prats and others, 2007), and are directly associated with two of the most notable 
taxation problems in Latin America: insufficient revenue and regressiveness. These two factors, and a 
very limited ability to change them, mean that tax policy not only cannot reverse socioeconomic 
inequalities and combat poverty, but also that in many cases it increases them. 
These factors must be borne in mind in the present crisis, since they will to a great extent 
determine the ability of each country to respond to the conflicts that arise —a situation that calls for 
pro-active policies.  
Thus, the conditions created by the crisis not only require reforms, but may also help to make them 
possible. In this respect, Mahon (1997) lists four determinants of tax reform in Latin American countries, 
along with empirical findings on their relevance: economic crisis, electoral cycles, type of regime and 
international pressure. 
Mahon observes that basic changes in tax structure and administration are generally possible 
in times of crisis. Citing Bird (1992), the author points to evidence that, during crises, it becomes 
possible to overcome the coalitions of political opposition and administrative inertia that ordinarily 
block important reforms. One example of this is the economic emergency laws passed in Argentina in 
2002. In that situation, it became possible to approve tax measures that had been rejected by the 
legislature only a few years earlier. It is clear that this proposition is particularly important in 
attempting to effect tax changes that have serious redistributive implications, and that would be 
rejected out of hand in non-crisis circumstances. 
Again, in the case of Argentina, various reforms contained in the 1999 tax laws, particularly 
regarding taxes on persons, found support during the crisis. Moreover, in the recent economic 
expansion, characterised by unprecedented growth of fiscal revenues, reforms were quite limited, 
except in the case of Mexico. In the other countries, it appears that as revenue goals are met or 
surpassed, incentives to change tax systems have fallen sharply. 
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Indeed, discussion of the inequality of the systems becomes limited to academic circles, and 
does not translate into legislative bills to address these problems, though they are widely known 
(Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini, 2007; Gómez Sabaini and Martner, 2008). 
The introduction of the income tax in the region between 1920 and 1930 can be seen in the 
same way. In practically all of the countries, this occurred in a context of scarce resources due to 
declining world trade, the economic crisis following World War I and the Great Depression. 
Another factor facilitating the implementation of reforms, according to Mahon, is 
international pressure. Referring in particular to international influence on reforms in Latin America 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the author asserts that international pressure is often decisive in the 
implementation of reforms. This pressure may appear as a result of economic programmes subject to 
economic policy conditionalities, or based on pressure from external trends. In the area of taxation, as 
is perhaps true in a limited number of other economic areas, there is ample room for an “imitate your 
neighbour” effect, which explains why the region’s tax systems have been strongly influenced by 
different trends, with implementation of the VAT being one of the most important and widespread 
examples (Gómez Sabaini and Martner, 2008).  
In line with the arguments set forth by Mahon (1997), Di John (2006) argues that threats, both 
internal and external, generate windows of opportunity for tax reform. As indicated above, many 
historians hold that these threats —in the form of wars or invasions— were determining factors in the 
creation of the Western nation states, opening the way for citizens to be less resistant to increased taxes. 
Di John (2006) argues that threats today could take forms other than imminent war, including 
action by domestic social movements, fiscal crises or global economic conditions. It is clear, then, 
that, as in the case of other determinants of tax policy, contextual conditions can serve to legitimise 
changes in both the level and structure of public revenues by creating increased societal consensus on 
the need for them. 
Finally, we must not ignore ideological changes, and what many writers see as a paradigm 
shift in the structure of the economy, the role of the State, and the State’s relation to society. This shift 
involves a major change in the countries’ fiscal policies, moving toward higher levels of spending, and 
hence more tax revenues. The current situation may aid many of the region’s countries in reaching 
greater consensus for measures that reduce the system’s regressiveness and increase the tax burden, 
thus strengthening the State’s ability to act, particularly with regard to combating poverty and 
reducing economic inequality.  
7. Final remarks 
A number of thoughts emerge from this analysis, concerning the impact that the crisis may have on the 
countries of the region. These are of interest when considering concrete tax policy measures that may be 
advisable for the various countries. One of the lessons for the region, emerging from the analysis, is the 
importance of countering the volatility of fiscal revenues and addressing the effect this has on public 
spending. To accomplish this, it is essential that the solvency of public accounts be based on revenue 
sources that are less vulnerable to business cycles, since the sustainability of public finances over time is 
a necessary condition in creating the fiscal context in which countercyclical fiscal policy can be brought 
to bear62. Thus, it is important to strengthen the tax systems, an achievement that involves efforts in both 
the policy area and in tax administration. 
First, it is evident that not all of the countries will be affected by the international crisis to the 
same extent or via the same channels. The asymmetrical nature of the crisis suggests that a “one size fits 
all” model will be of little use, with specific actions having to be tailored to each individual situation. 
                                                        
62
  For more detail on the relation between macroeconomic fluctuations and fiscal policy in Latin America, see Fanelli and Jiménez (2009). 
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Second, it is clear that, although a price will have to be paid for adopting tax measures that 
inevitably fall short of garnering the normal political consensus, this price will be less than the cost of 
inaction or hesitation. The external, international nature of the crisis means that the determinants of the 
countries’ tax revenues are now exogenous variables that cannot be changed by any individual 
country. Therefore, the greater the adaptability or flexibility of the policy in the face of change, the 
less negative the effects of such change are likely to be. 
Third, although the “eye” of the storm may be narrow and quickly exhausted, its secondary and 
collateral effects may be long term. Therefore, measures to address the crisis should not be postponed, 
and should, at the same time, be consistent with what is expected in the medium and long term. 
Distorting measures that create rapid short-term gains but have negative effects on the pace of future 
growth should be avoided. 
Fourth, a positive element is that the tax burden in the region’s countries has grown over the 
last decade, nearing maximum potential capacity. Moreover, in most cases the tax structure has also 
undergone positive changes, bringing it more closely in line with international norms. The measures 
adopted must not reverse the achievements made to date, and should be susceptible to reversal once 
the effects of the crisis are attenuated over time. Measures with effects that cannot be reversed, or that 
introduce distortions in the tax structure, should therefore be avoided. 
Fifth, in order to contribute to an initial assessment of the crisis impact on each country’s tax 
circumstances, an index reflecting exposure to the crisis has been developed. This takes account of a 
series of variables in order to assess the impact of the crisis. It is evident that the tax revenues of 
countries with a high percentage of non-tax revenues or a high percentage of revenues from taxes on 
natural resources activities, with low tax burdens and economies highly open to trade, have a higher 
exposure index than do the revenues of systems with high tax burdens, those where income tax plays a 
greater role in revenue, and those where the VAT has a high productivity ratio. 
The final factor is the countries’ institutional and political capacity to implement their policies. 
This points directly to the political economy of taxation, a complex field where analysis highlights a 
number of features and arguments to consider, none of which is conclusive. If any assertion can 
confidently be made here, it is that crises also represent opportunities for change and, as Di John states, 
may open a “window of opportunity” for reforms to Latin American tax systems that are needed not only 
to deal with the crisis, but also for the purpose of economic and social development. 
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